Pursuant to Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code, a jury found Appellant Michael Wayne Bohannan to be a sexually violent predator. The trial court in that case adjudicated Appellant as a sexually violent predator and ordered him to be civilly committed for treatment.
Background
In 1982, Appellant rode his bicycle past K.C.'s home several times. Bohannan II , 388 S.W.3d at 299. Through a window, he watched her inside. Id. One evening, donning a ski mask and carrying a large knife, Appellant entered K.C.'s home through the rear door. Id. He walked down the hallway past a room in which a child was sleeping and entered K.C.'s bedroom, where she was lying on the bed and reading a newspaper. Id. Appellant orally and vaginally raped her and then left. Id. Appellant would later testify in his civil commitment case that he thought he would get some satisfaction or self-fulfillment out of raping K.C. Id. In some way, he also expected K.C. to "like being raped." Id.
Some three weeks later, Appellant was driving around on his lunch break when he saw P.H. enter her home. Id. He stopped, put on his ski mask, picked up his knife, and walked through the front door. Id. Inside, P.H. was with a group of children. Id. Appellant forced P.H. to move the children to another room, and then he orally and vaginally raped P.H. in her bedroom. Id. As with the earlier rape of K.C., Appellant thought he would get some satisfaction from raping P.H. and "maybe ... feel more of a man." Id.
Appellant was apprehended, and in 1983, he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated rape with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.
In 1998, Appellant was again released on mandatory supervision, and in 2000, he moved to South Carolina to live with his mother. Id. at 300. While there, he was convicted of exposing his genitals to an eight year old girl in a toy store, and he was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Id. In 2002, Appellant's mandatory supervision was again revoked, and he returned to prison in Texas. Id.
In 2004, Appellant was released on mandatory supervision for a third time. Id. Two years later in 2006, he was caught viewing child pornography on a county law library computer, even though he was enrolled in sex offender therapy at the time, and his mandatory supervision was again revoked. Id. After a psychologist reported that Appellant was a sexually violent predator, the State petitioned for him to be civilly committed. Id. A civil commitment trial was held in which the State had two experts testify. Id. at 301. However, Appellant's designated expert was not permitted to testify. Id. The jury determined that Appellant suffered from a behavioral abnormality, as defined in the sexually violent *170predator statute, and the trial court accordingly adjudicated Appellant as a sexually violent predator and ordered Appellant to be civilly committed. Id. at 302. Appellant appealed this decision. See In re Commitment of Bohannan ,
Meanwhile, he was transferred to the supervision of the Council on Sex Offender Treatment. Bohannan v. State , No. 09-13-00090-CR,
On February 14, 2009, the MTD generated a "bracelet gone" alert. Bohannan III ,
On July 22, 2010, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of civil commitment and remanded for a new civil commitment trial. See Bohannan I ,
On April 24, 2011, Appellant got into a dispute with the staff at the facility.
Meanwhile, the State sought review of the court of appeals's decision reversing the judgment of civil commitment. See Bohannan II , 388 S.W.3d at 302. On August 31, 2012, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. Id. at 307. Nevertheless, a couple of months later in October of 2012, the State indicted Appellant of violating the civil commitment order. Bohannan III ,
The court of appeals upheld Appellant's conviction.
Jurisdiction
Appellant first argues that the conviction cannot be upheld because the reversal of the civil commitment order deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. This is so, he contends, because a valid indictment is necessary for jurisdiction. According to Appellant, the indictment in this case is invalid because it does not state an offense, and it does not state an offense because there is no valid judgment or order of civil commitment.
Under the Texas Constitution, the presentment of an indictment or information to a court invests that court with jurisdiction over the case. Tex. Const. art. V, § 12 (b). To constitute an indictment or information, an instrument must charge a person with the commission of an offense. Teal v. State ,
The indictment in this case alleged:
THE GRAND JURY, for the County of Montgomery, State of Texas, duly selected, empaneled, sworn, charged, and organized as such by the 284th Judicial District Court for said County, upon their oaths present in and to said court that Michael Wayne Bohannan, hereinafter styled Defendant, on or about February 14, 2009 and continuing until on or about April 24, 2011, and before the presentment of this indictment, in the County and State aforesaid, did then and there intentionally or knowingly violate civil commitment requirements of Section 841.082 of the Texas Health and Safety Code as required by the Final Judgment and Order of Civil Commitment entered in Cause Number 08-07-06907-CV, In Re: The Commitment of Michael Wayne Bohannan, in the 435th Judicial District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, to wit
Clerk's R. 12. Appellant was prosecuted under section 841.085 of the Health and Safety Code. At the time of Appellant's prosecution, that provision stated:
(a) A person commits an offense if, after having been adjudicated and civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under this chapter, the person violates a civil commitment requirement imposed under Section 841.082.
Appellant's challenge to the indictment in this case is more accurately a challenge that one of the elements alleged is false or unsupported, or that is has been adjudged that way. This does not attack the indictment. It attacks a fact alleged in the indictment as false. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the alleged fact that there was a civil commitment order is not true, the result is not an invalid indictment. The State would simply be unable to prove that the offense occurred. The indictment itself still states facts that, if true , show an offense. Because the indictment is sufficient, the trial court was vested with jurisdiction over Appellant's case, and Appellant's jurisdictional argument fails.
Status at the Time
Appellant next argues that the court of appeals improperly expanded responsibility under section 841.085 to those who had the status of one under a civil commitment order at the time of an alleged order violation, instead of to those who are under a valid order of commitment at the time of trial. Recently, a similar question was raised and answered by our decision in Stevenson v. State ,
*173
Addressing a separate double jeopardy argument, we further explained that a civil commitment order violation is a circumstances surrounding the conduct crime. Stevenson ,
The case before the Court today is controlled by Stevenson . Stevenson was subject to an order of civil commitment, which he appealed. He violated that order while the appeal was pending. We upheld the conviction in part because a violation of a civil commitment order is not dependent on the order being final. The circumstance of being adjudicated and ordered to be civilly committed is the gravamen of the offense. Here, Appellant was subject to an order of civil commitment, which he appealed. He violated that order five times with the five bracelet gone alerts before the court of appeals delivered its opinion. The circumstance that Appellant had been adjudicated and ordered to be civilly committed was present at the time of each of those bracelet gone alerts. Therefore, under Stevenson , the court of appeals did not err in affirming Appellant's conviction for violating the civil commitment order.
But the court of appeals did not have the benefit of our September 21, 2016 decision in Stevenson when it decided Appellant's case on October 29, 2014, nearly two years earlier. Instead, the court of appeals based its decision on our opinion in Ex parte Jimenez and the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in In re Sheshtawy . See Ex parte Jimenez ,
In Jimenez , the applicant in that case was originally convicted of rape of a child in 1982.
Cuellar v. State , also cited in Jimenez , provides a useful example of the same rule. See
We also based our decision in Jimenez on Lewis v. United States , a United States Supreme Court opinion dealing with a similar issue. Jimenez ,
*175In re Sheshtawy , the other case cited by the court of appeals in Appellant's case, involved criminal contempt in the context of the violation of a divorce decree. Sheshtawy ,
These cases, though they were not cited in our Stevenson opinion and are in much different contexts, are all in alignment with the rule in Stevenson . The common thread is that the offenses are circumstances surrounding the conduct crimes, and the necessary circumstance is the defendant's status at the time of the offense. At the time Cuellar possessed his firearm, he was not a felon. His time as a felon ran from conviction until the trial court set aside the conviction and dismissed the indictment. In contrast, at the time Jimenez possessed his firearm, he was a felon. His time as a felon based upon his underlying conviction ran from his conviction until we granted habeas corpus relief and set aside the conviction. At the time Lewis possessed his firearm, his predicate felony conviction had not been set aside; instead, he attacked its constitutionality during the firearm proceeding. At the time Sheshtawy failed to pay spousal maintenance, he was subject to the divorce decree which was then on appeal. And returning to Stevenson , at the time Stevenson violated his civil commitment order, he was subject to that order which was also then on appeal.
Appellant, however, contends that a particular passage in our Stevenson opinion negates any notion that the rule in Jimenez and Sheshtawy have any sway in the case before us:
this logic does not apply to civil-commitment order violations simply because the statute requires an "adjudication," not a "conviction."
*176Stevenson ,
In Jordan , we discussed Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12, § 15 's finality requirement in prior criminal convictions. There, we held that a prior felony conviction must be final to enhance the punishment in a subsequent prosecution. While the statute did not expressly require finality, we found a finality requirement in § 15 because without it, trial judges would have to predict an appellate court's decision in a pending case or risk judgments being overturned for events that occur while the case is pending. To reach this holding, we defined "final" in a manner consistent with the general principle that a conviction with a pending appeal is not final until the appellate court affirms the conviction and issues its mandate. Applying this principle, we explained that a pending appeal on a conviction must be resolved for a probated sentence to be a final conviction for enhancement purposes. When there is no pending appeal from the conviction, but there is an appeal only from a probation revocation, the conviction can be used as an enhancement. A deferred adjudication, however, becomes final only when guilt is adjudicated. We, therefore, held Jordan's community-supervision revocation was not final and could not be used to deny him community supervision in a subsequent prosecution. However, this logic does not apply to civil-commitment order violations simply because the statute requires an "adjudication," not a "conviction."
Stevenson ,
Appellant also argues this case is distinguishable from Jimenez , because unlike Jimenez where the predicate felony conviction was set aside long after the unlawful possession of a firearm, in Appellant's case the order of civil commitment was reversed before Appellant's trial on the violation. Indeed, Appellant repeatedly stresses the importance of the fact that the reversal occurred before trial. Appellant misses the key point of Jimenez and of circumstances surrounding the conduct offenses in general. Such crimes are criminal only because certain circumstances surround the conduct , not the trial. If such circumstances do not surround the conduct, the conduct is not criminal. For felon in possession of a firearm cases like Cuellar and Jimenez , the necessary circumstance is that the defendant is a convicted felon. For violations of civil commitment orders, the necessary circumstance is that the defendant has been adjudicated and civilly committed. If the order was reversed before he violated the terms of the order, the necessary circumstance would be missing, Appellant would be innocent, and his conviction would be in error. But that is not what happened in this case. First, Appellant was adjudicated as a sexually violent predator and civilly committed. Next, he appealed the order. Then, he violated the order. After that, the order *177was reversed. Finally, he was tried on the violation.
Therefore, we find Appellant's argument against the court of appeals's application of Jimenez and Sheshtawy unconvincing. In Stevenson we held that a civil commitment order is effective immediately upon entry, and jurisdiction to prosecute non-compliance is not dependent on being "final." Stevenson ,
Insufficient Evidence
Appellant also argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
*178He contends that because the civil commitment order was reversed on appeal, there is no valid civil commitment order in the record; because there is no valid civil commitment order, an element of the offense for which he was convicted cannot be proved; therefore, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
When considering a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia ,
Appellant was charged and convicted of an offense under section 841.085. Under the version of that statute in effect at that time, "a person commits an offense if, after having been adjudicated and civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under [Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code], the person violates a civil commitment requirement imposed under Section 841.082."
At trial, the State introduced, as State's Exhibit 1, a copy of the Final Judgment in Cause Number 08-07-06907-CV, In Re: The Commitment of Michael Wayne Bohannan. Rep. R. vol. 7, Ex. 1. This exhibit shows that on January 22, 2009, a jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was a sexually violent predator, and the trial judge "Ordered, adjudged, and decreed" that Appellant was a sexually violent predator and was to be civilly committed.
*179The jury in this case received copies of the Final Judgment and the Order of Commitment. Appellant did not object to the admission of those documents into evidence. During the cross-examination of the documents' sponsoring witness and during Appellant's case in chief, he did not introduce any evidence of his own suggesting that the documents were somehow incorrect, inauthentic, misleading, fraudulent, or forged. Considering all of the evidence on this element of the offense, and viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict, we are compelled to find that any rational fact finder would have concluded that the two documents before it-the copies of the Final Judgment and the Order of Commitment-were conclusive proof that Appellant was adjudicated as a sexually violent predator and then civilly committed. Appellant's sufficiency argument fails.
Due Process and Due Course of Law
Finally, Appellant argues that the conviction cannot be upheld because it would offend both due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and due course of law under the Texas Constitution.
As recited above, this is the entirety of Appellant's due process argument. His bare claim that the prosecution and conviction are "fundamentally unfair" and violate "any notion of due process or due course of law," with nothing else, is conclusory, does not make an argument, and does not contain any citations to appropriate authorities. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(I) ("The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions *180made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record."). This is not enough to support reversal. Bell v. State ,
Conclusion
In conclusion, a conviction for violating a civil commitment order can be upheld when the underlying commitment order has been reversed on appeal. Appellant's civil commitment order was effective immediately upon entry. Once the order was issued, Appellant was obligated to follow it until it was eventually reversed. The fact that the order was reversed does not excuse violations occurring before the reversal. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Appellant's conviction.
For a thorough explanation of the Texas scheme for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators under Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code, see generally Stevenson v. State ,
The aggravated rape statute was repealed and replaced by the current aggravated sexual assault statute. Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, sec. 21.03,
Responsibility for the administration and implementation of the civil commitment program was transferred from the Council on Sex Offender Treatment in 2011 to a newly created state agency, the Office of Violent Sex Offender Management. Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1201, § 2, sec. 420A.010 and § 4,
Section 841.085(a) was amended in 2015 and currently criminalizes violations of only those requirements imposed by section 841.082(a)(1), (2), (4), and (5). Act of May 21, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 845, § 19,
Like the aggravated rape statute, the rape of a child statute was repealed and replaced by the aggravated sexual assault statute in 1983. Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, sec. 21.09,
Other jurisdictions have similarly upheld firearm possession convictions where the predicate felony is on appeal, and even if the appeal results in reversal. See DePugh v. United States ,
The bail jumping cases also provide close analogies. Courts in that context have upheld convictions for bail jumping and failure to appear, even where the underlying charge is dismissed or the defendant is even acquitted. The Dallas Court of Appeals, in Small v. State , upheld a conviction for failing to appear.
Although Appellant cites these two separate and distinct constitutional provisions, one federal and one state, he does not provide any reason to consider the due process question independently from the due course question. See, e.g. , Fleming v. State ,
In the interest of justice, we briefly address Appellant's complaint that the prosecution and conviction mooted his appeal of the civil commitment order and made the errors in that proceeding inconsequential. First, the later criminal proceeding did not moot the earlier civil appeal. The civil commitment case was resolved before the criminal violation trial even began. Similarly, the later criminal proceeding had no effect on the error that occurred in the earlier civil commitment case. The error-the trial court's exclusion of Appellant's expert witness-led to the court of appeals reversing the civil commitment order. This is the complete opposite of the error being inconsequential. It had a consequence: the successful appeal.
Section 841.085 does not require a "valid" judgment of adjudication. It only requires an "adjudication," and the State does not have to show that the adjudication is final. Stevenson ,