9 A.2d 388 | Pa. | 1939
In 1935, plaintiff, a member of the Allegheny County bar, was elected by the quadrennial convention of the Croatian Fraternal Union of America to the office of Legal Counsellor. In 1938 certain charges were preferred against him, as to which he was examined and cross-examined at a hearing held by the Supreme Board of Directors. The Board dismissed him from office. He appealed to the Supreme Trial Board of the Union, which approved the action of the Supreme Board of Directors. He thereupon filed a bill in equity against the members of the Supreme Board of Directors and against the Union, praying that the Directors be ordered to reinstate *286 him as Legal Counsellor and that he be awarded damages suffered by reason of their action. The court below entered such a decree. Defendants appeal.
There are several reasons why the decree cannot be sustained.
The first is that plaintiff did not pursue all of his remedies within the Union. The by-laws provide that the Supreme Trial Board is the "judiciary body," but the Convention is the "supreme judiciary" (section 5), and is given the power to ratify or amend the decrees and verdicts of the Supreme Trial Board (sections 8, 184). Courts will not entertain jurisdiction unless all the remedies afforded by the by-laws have been exhausted: Maloney v. United Mine Workers of America,
The second reason which compels a reversal of the decree of the court is that when the proceedings in an association have been regular, fair, and free from fraud, and the party whose rights are involved has been given an opportunity to appear and be heard, the courts will not inquire into the merits of the case nor review the action of the association: Commonwealth v.Union League,
It is true that if no evidence is taken to support the charges made, the proceedings must be regarded as arbitrary and should be set aside: Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge,
A final reason against the affirmance of the decree of the court below is the fact that plaintiff's only complaint, in his bill in equity and in the testimony, is in regard to alleged inadequacy of the proceedings before the Supreme Board of Directors. But, according to the bylaws of the Union, the Supreme Board of Directors is the "executive body," and not a judicial tribunal (section 5), and there is no provision which requires or even suggests that it should conduct judicial proceedings. As an executive body it could take action after making such inquiries as it deemed sufficient. The provision of section 212 that it should dismiss the Legal Counsellor if it "finds him guilty" of violating his obligations does not connote the necessity of a trial; in section 218, relating to "Editors," where there is a similar provision, the phrase used is "after an investigation and after being satisfied of his guilt." It is the Supreme Trial Board which is to conduct trials (sections 165, 166, 174, 188),* with a right of appeal to the Convention as already stated. Plaintiff appeared before the Supreme Trial Board with his counsel; the record is silent as to what transpired there and does not disclose any irregularity in the proceedings before that tribunal.
The decree of the court below is reversed, and the bill is dismissed, at appellee's cost.