Judy V. BODE, et al., petitioners, Appellants, v. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, et al., Respondents.
No. C1-98-2200.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
June 1, 2000.
Rehearing Denied July 24, 2000.
862
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Craig L. Engwall, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for respondent.
OPINION
PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.
In 1998, following 18 years of legal and administrative proceedings, appellants Judy and Linda Bode asserted that a 1986 Nicollet County District Court judgment was void because a 1980 appeal from an administrative hearing was filed one day late. In that subsequent and separate district court action, the Bodes made a motion under
In 1976 and again in 1979, the Minnesota Legislature directed the Commissioner of the DNR to inventory the state‘s public waters and to designate those that were public waters and wetlands.1 As a result of this legislation, the DNR inventoried the Bode farm in Nicollet County and classified part of the farm as wetlands. The DNR determined that the designated tract of land met the definition of “wetlands” contained in
In August 1980, William Bode3 timely appealed the DNR‘s classification to the Nicollet County Hearings Unit. The Hearings Unit was created by statute to resolve landowner disputes arising from the DNR‘s wetlands inventory. See
The DNR appealed the Hearings Unit order to the district court pursuant to
Meanwhile, the court considered the DNR‘s appeal and in 1986 reversed the Hearings Unit findings by an order for judgment that was dated December 17, 1986. Following the 1986 judgment, years of legal proceedings ensued between the Bodes and the DNR regarding the DNR‘s efforts to restore the wetlands located on the Bode farm. It is fair to say that at times the relationship between the Bodes and the DNR was acrimonious. For example, there was an episode on May 7, 1992 when the DNR, with the assistance of conservation officers and sheriff‘s deputies, went onto the Bode farm to destroy part of the Bodes’ tile drainage system. A similar episode appears to have occurred on November 22, 1993.
In March 1996, the Bodes brought a subsequent independent action in district court alleging that (1) part of their farm had been improperly classified as wetlands, and (2) they were entitled to damages resulting from the DNR‘s destruction of part of their tile drainage system. In response to this action, the DNR raised the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel, asserting that the classification issue had already been decided. The DNR also asserted the defense of official immunity and subsequently moved for summary judgment on both grounds. The court granted the motion by an order dated September 18, 1997 and judgment was entered four days later.
In July 1998, in conjunction with the 1996 action, the Bodes brought a motion pursuant to
The DNR appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals began its analysis by stating that “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction is ‘a court‘s power to hear and determine cases of the general class or category to which the proceedings in question belong.‘” Bode v. Minnesota Dept. of Natural Resources, 594 N.W.2d 257, 259 (Minn.App.1999) (quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1425 (6th ed.1990)). The court then concluded that some Minnesota case law has applied subject matter jurisdiction analysis to judgments that do not necessarily fall within the aforementioned definition of subject matter jurisdiction, but instead involve “procedural irregularities.” Id. The court reasoned that cases with procedural irregularities may involve an “incurable jurisdictional defect,” but do not necessarily implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The court then stated that holding a judgment void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on an untimely appeal confuses an inappropriate exercise of power with the absence of
I.
We begin our analysis by noting that a party may either directly or collaterally challenge a judgment‘s validity for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A party can directly attack a judgment “in the same proceeding as the one in which the judgment was entered.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 472 (7th ed.1999). Also, when appropriate, a party may make a collateral attack, which is an “attack on a judgment entered in a different proceeding.” Id. at 255. Here, it is undisputed that the Bodes brought a
By filing a
Beyond being procedurally deficient, the Bodes’ collateral attack on the 1986 judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction also fails on its merits. We review issues involving jurisdiction de novo. See Minnesota Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Metropolitan Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn.1999). We have held that the “statutory limitation of time within which an appeal may be taken from an appealable order or * * * judgment is jurisdictional.” Arndt v. Minnesota Educ. Ass‘n, 270 Minn. 489, 490, 134 N.W.2d 136, 137 (1965). The traditional rule is that there is no time limit for challenging a final judgment that is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 12 James W. Moore et al., Moore‘s Federal Practice § 60.44 (3d ed.1997). The principle underlying this rule is that a judgment‘s validity is of utmost importance. Minnesota courts have adhered to this traditional rule. In Lange v. Johnson and its progeny, we held that judgments are void if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that there is no time limit for bringing a motion to vacate such a judgment. 295 Minn. 320, 323-24, 204 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1973); see also Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn.1994).
Under the traditional rule, a judgment rendered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void and can be challenged at any time. See 12 James W. Moore et al., Moore‘s Federal Practice § 60.443 (3d ed.1997). While this rule places great emphasis on a judgment‘s validity, there is a countervailing consideration—the interest in finality—that can be undermined by application of this rule. Total reliance on a judgment‘s validity may produce problematic results when attacks on subject matter jurisdiction are initiated after final judgment is entered. The dilemma posed by the conflicting interests of finality and validity was discussed by the commentators to Section 12 of the Restate-
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction must be justiciable if the legal rules governing competency are to be given effect; some tribunal must determine them, either the court in which the action is commenced or some other court of referral. If the question is decided erroneously, and a judgment is allowed to stand in the face of the fact that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, then the principle of validity is compromised. On the other hand, if the judgment remains indefinitely subject to attack for a defect of jurisdiction, then the principle of finality is compromised.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, cmt (a) (1982). For example, it may be unjust to allow a party to contest subject matter jurisdiction after the opposing party has prevailed on the merits. See generally id. Additionally, vacating a judgment after years of litigation may waste both public and private resources. See generally id.
In response to problems with application of the traditional rule in the context of collateral attacks on subject matter jurisdiction, a modern rule has developed that moves away from the traditional rule and its exclusive emphasis on validity. This modern rule is reflected in Section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which limits when collateral attacks on subject matter jurisdiction will be permitted. Section 12 attempts to balance validity with finality in contested actions by precluding post-judgment challenges to a court‘s subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except under three circumstances. More specifically, Section 12
provides that when a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, motions in subsequent litigation to vacate that judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should not be permitted unless:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court‘s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12. In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have favorably cited Section 12.5
The Bodes’ collateral attack on the 1986 judgment implicates the conflicting policy concerns that underlie the traditional and modern rules. The Bodes first contested subject matter jurisdiction 18 years after the DNR‘s initial appeal from the Hearings Unit order and 12 years after entry of the contested district court judgment. The district court, applying the traditional rule and the principles of our case law, vacated its 1986 judgment despite the fact that, in the interim, the parties took substantial action in reliance on the judgment. Prior to the 1986 judgment, William Bode installed a tile drainage system within the tract designated by the DNR as wetlands. Relying on the judgment, the DNR issued
Applying the traditional rule would invalidate these actions taken in reliance on the 1986 judgment‘s presumed validity. Such a result exemplifies the policy concerns that have led courts away from the traditional rule. We share many of these concerns; therefore, we conclude that it is appropriate that we now evaluate which approach—the traditional rule or the modern rule—strikes a better balance between the need to preserve a judgment‘s finality and its validity.
As previously noted, the Bodes actually launched a collateral attack on the 1986 judgment when they moved to vacate that judgment under their 1996 action. Therefore, we will analyze the Bodes’ collateral attack in light of the competing principles of finality and validity. While we acknowledge these principles cannot be perfectly accommodated, we recognize that total reliance on a judgment‘s validity produces problematic results when attacks on subject matter jurisdiction are initiated long after a final judgment is entered. Further, “if [a] judgment remains indefinitely subject to attack for a defect of jurisdiction, then the principle of finality is compromised.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, cmt (a). Therefore, we conclude that Section 12 achieves a better balance between finality and validity in the context of a collateral attack on subject matter jurisdiction than does our traditional rule. Accordingly, we will proceed to examine the Bodes’ collateral attack on subject matter jurisdiction to determine if it fits within one of the three exceptions found in Section 12.
Under the first exception, the Bodes can contest subject matter jurisdiction if the first action‘s subject matter was “so plainly beyond the court‘s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12. This exception is inapplicable here because it is undisputed that if the appeal had not been filed one day late, the district court would have had jurisdiction to consider the DNR‘s appeal from the Hearings Unit order. Therefore, we conclude that Section 12‘s first exception is inapplicable because the district court‘s consideration of the substantive issue in the first action was not a manifest abuse of authority.
We also conclude that the second and third exceptions do not apply. The district court did not “substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government * * *.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12. Nor have the Bodes demonstrated that the court lacked the capability “to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction.” Id. The Bodes do not dispute that the district court was the proper forum for the DNR‘s appeal. In fact, under the APA, the court was the designated forum for resolving this category of disputes. Further, it appears that the DNR‘s 1980 appeal, other than being one day late, conformed exactly to the provisions of the APA. Therefore, we conclude that the district court‘s consideration of the substantive issue did not substantially infringe on another government tribunal or agency‘s authority nor was the court incapable of evaluating its own jurisdiction.
Because we conclude that the Bodes incorrectly brought their motion under
Even though we have held that the district court improperly granted the Bodes’
ing this limitation, the rule demonstrates an intent to limit the length of time within which a party may receive relief from a final judgment. Thus,
Despite the “reasonable time” language of
Some of the problems encountered by courts when attempting to reconcile the interests in validity and finality are illustrated by the court of appeals’ effort to fashion some distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and procedural irregularities. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has made similar distinctions. For example, in Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., the court stated:
Absence of subject matter jurisdiction may, in certain cases, render a judgment void. However, this occurs only where there is a plain usurpation of power, when a court wrongfully extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its authority. Stated another way, such plain usurpation of power occurs when there is a “total want of jurisdiction” as distinguished from “an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Having concluded that direct attacks on a judgment based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be brought within a reasonable time, we next proceed to define the phrase “reasonable time” in the context of
[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time varies from case to case and must be determined in each instance from the facts before the court because “(t)he very nature of the exercise of discretionary power in cases of this kind is such as to prevent any absolute rule being laid down.”
Id. at 467, 88 N.W.2d at 195-96 (quoting Pilney v. Funk, 212 Minn. 398, 403, 3 N.W.2d 792, 795 (1942)). Expanding on this premise in Newman v. Fjelstad, we stated that what is a reasonable time must be determined by considering all attendant circumstances such as: “intervening rights, loss of proof by or prejudice to the adverse party, the commanding equities of the case, the general desirability that judgments be final and other relevant factors * * *” 271 Minn. 514, 522, 137 N.W.2d 181, 186 (1965) (quotation omitted). We reaffirm our definition of reasonable time as set forth in Sommers and Newman and will apply that definition to the facts of this case.
The Bodes brought their
We conclude that the Bodes’ motion does not fall within any of the Section 12 exceptions and was not brought within a reasonable time. Therefore, we hold that either a collateral or direct attack on the district court‘s subject matter jurisdiction fails. We affirm the result of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
I respectfully dissent.1 First, I believe that the court‘s elevation of finality over validity is a mistake. I would retain the traditional rule. Further, the court says that the first exception to Section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments “is inapplicable here because it is undisputed that had the appeal been timely filed, the district court had jurisdiction to consider the DNR‘s appeal from the Hearings Unit order.” While that statement is true as far as it goes, it ignores the fact that the appeal was not timely filed and the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal. An untimely appeal is “so plainly beyond the [district] court‘s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority.”