Bock v. Gold

(1943) Sweat, Varholy ruling, 15 So. 2d 2. In the amended the court — (citation omitted). substantially again concluded for plaintiffs 32. It is clear that the small claims same reasons as before judge using the term “bail” in the failed to state claims sense, money second to mean filed in assault, battery, imprisonment, for false payment of the court to secure debt. or intentional infliction of emotional dis- fully Lanoue was aware of the court’s plain- The tress. court went on dismiss put up intent when bail in he issue. claim, § tiffs 1983 this time on two bases: circumstances, Under these I see no er- (1) false-imprisonment that the claim on distributing ror in the bail to Rutland appeared § which the 1983 claim to be Renovations. rejected, premised already had been sum, appeal because Lanoue’s Krupp citation of untimely, was not I would reach the mer- (1967), Krupp, 126 Vt. 236 A.2d 653 its of his claim and affirm. § did not raise a viable claim under 1983. ruling § The court’s on the was: 2008VT 81 Finally, [plaintiff] alleged has not GOLD, Gordon BOCK Steven any cognizable § 42 U.S.C. 1983 Commissioner, Department Vermont complaint, claim. In the amended Corrections, of et al. [plaintiff] generally states that [959 990] A.2d he intends claim based on his imprisonment, false and various No. 06-276 nonspecific constitutional viola- imprisonment tions. The false rejected. claim has been In his memorandum, [plaintiff] appears 1. June 2008. Plaintiff Gordon appeals superior Bock from the court’s [§] to base his 1983claim on what dismissal of process for failure to he believes to be a due procedural history may state a claim.The furlough violation in the revoca- briefly hearing, be stated. purportedly Plaintiffs amended tion complaint against Depart- Krupp Krupp. several named scribed . . . (DOC) however, employees Krupp, ment of Corrections is a divorce case, four common-lawcauses of action and does not address due — assault, battery, imprisonment, process furlough false revocation proceedings. and intentional infliction of emotional appears dis- [Plaintiff] arising rely portion tress and a claim Krupp under on the of U.S.C. 1983. Defendants moved to Supreme dis- which the Vermont miss, contending rejected findings Court of failed to state a claim. V.R.C.P. the trial court because 12(b)(6). granted merely The trial court testimony, the mo- recited May basing appearance tion the dismissal in did not have the part theory reflecting judge’s on the that “an inmate on the trial true furlough custody findings____The status in the remains Court held that DOC,” and that status “is not a “recitation of evidence in find- probation parole, ings finding and an inmate has no is not a of the facts right testimony to it or in it.” interest contained in the re- subsequently ruling court vacated that lated and it cannot be so con- perceives and issued an amended decision on the strued.” . . . The court motion to dismiss. no viable 1983 claim. [§] requirement briefing only appealed, omits 3. Plaintiff appeal. Accordingly, we “the facts 1983 claim on former statute that the trial court requir- consider whether upon” pleaded, relied dismissing 1983 claim. See erred ing instead “a short and Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Harvester R. Brown & of the claim statement Corp., Vt. pleader is entitled to (1982) (claims appeal are not briefed on relief,” language closer to that of waived). Chancery Rule 3. The former disposi review the trial court’s We language emphasizes that new novo, a motion to dismiss de tion of specific not the rules do any appropriate ground. may affirm on and detailed statement Diamond, 178, Levinsky v. 151 Vt. See constitute a cause of facts which 185, 1073, 1079 (1989), overruled A.2d 559 action, simply a statement State, Muzzy grounds by on other v. 155 enough give clear’ “to the defend- (1990). 279, 280n.*, 583 A.2d n.* Vt. plain- of what the ant fair notice to for failure to state a Motions dismiss claim is and the on tiff’s rarely claim are disfavored and should be which it rests.” Endres, 108, granted. Endres v. 2006 VT Notes, (mem.). Reporter’s ¶ 4, 640, V.R.C.P. 8. Plaintiff’s A.2d 975 180 Vt. 912 12(b)(6) satisfy only § had to the liberal proper Dismissal under beyond requirements there of Rule 8 in order to survive when it is doubt that exist no facts or circumstances consistent motion to dismiss.* We turn defendants’ complaint question that would entitle the of whether it did. now to the plaintiff to relief. Union Mut. Fire Ins. complaint Plaintiffs amended ¶27, 4, 175 196, Joerg, v. Co. 2003 VT Vt. averred, 1983, § as to as follows: way, Put another 824 A.2d 586. by the actions Defendants plaintiff threshold a must cross in order took, take, or failed to as notice-pleading to meet our standard is supra, enumerated did thus com- Henniger v. Pinellas “exceedingly low.” mit numerous violations of 42 (M.D. 1334, County, Supp. 7 F. 2d 1336 through repeated 1998). [§] U.S.C. 1983 reviewing In the trial court’s Fla. flagrant abrogation dismiss, of Plain- grant we take all of motion civil under Amend- alleged tiffs facts in the as true. Ames, V, 288, 291, Amiot v. 166 693 A.2d ments VI and XIV of the Vt. 675, (1997). 677 as United States Constitution I, Chap- well as those in Article 5. The “no set of facts” standard also Kaluczky applies civil-rights ter 10 of the Vermont Constitution in the context. Plains, City 202, by ordering continuing v. White 57 F.3d 206 1995). heightened wrongful There is no Plaintiffs false and im- arising standard for claims un prisonment. 1983. Cf. Leatheman v. Tarrant § der Defend- For their breach the County Intelligence & Narcotics Coordi be held accountable. ants should Unit, (1993) 163, nation 507 U.S. 165-66 (federal may impose height not courts recently, dissenting * As we noted our § ened standards on 1983 liti Corp. reliance on Bell Atlantic colleagues’ gants against who raise claims munici 562-63, Twombly, 127 S. 550 U.S. palities). (2007), misplaced. Ct. 1969 See Umbrella, Inc., 20, ¶ Colby rule, ap- VT 5 The which 2008 [Vermont] n.1, plies pleadings, all 184 Vt. 955 A.2d 1082. affirmative through The Defendants more definite statement. See V.R.C.P. 12(e). confluence their actions abusing public discretion as offi- 9. Defendants also contend that repeatedly cials did and fla- was insufficient be grantly abrogate Plaintiffs civil § claims are not cause maintainable V, rights under Amendments VI against employees state in their official and XIV of the United States concedes, plaintiff capacities. As this is I, as well Article Gerhart, Constitution See Shields true. 155 Vt. Chapter (1990) 10 of the Vermont 153, 158-59 (affirming Constitution. against dismissal of 1983 claims state employees capacities). in their official Ac ¶ 7. The “actions . . . enumerated cordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dis supra” alleged due-process included vio- missal of claim proceedings leading lations at the DOC capacities. defendants in their official furlough revocation. Plaintiff also named defend alleged “every also named Defendant capacities, ants in their individual how participated in the decision to incarcerate ever, and insofar as it did so was sufficient depart- at a different level of the to survive the motion to dismiss. See through ment. Plaintiffs incarceration Melo, 502 U.S. Hafer the abuse of discretion the named (“Thus, merits, per ‘[o]n establish wrongful. Defendants was These eo-De- liability action, sonal in a it is conspired fendants to incarcerate Plain- official, enough acting to show that wrongfully.” tiff Plaintiffs amended com- law, dep under color of state caused plaint also included a “Statement ” right.’ (quoting rivation of a federal plaintiff specifically Pacts” which Graham, Kentucky v. each scribed named defendant’s (1985)). in role his incarceration. That section of ¶ Similarly, plain 10. to the extent that complaint plaintiff being the referred to premised tiffs 1983 claims were on vio “placed by in confinement the D.O.C. on Constitution, they lations of the Vermont allegations that were baseless” and to his properly dismissed. See Felder v. were wrongful imprisonment.” “false and Casey, (1988) (“Section 131, 139 ¶ dismissing 8. The trial court erred in species liability a 1983 creates of in favor the named de- persons deprived of of their civil federal capacities. fendants in their individual rights by wielding authority.” those state whole, plaintiffs Taken a as amended added)). (emphasis complaint challenge pro- a stated to the ¶ holding 11. Our furlough cess him afforded before his complaint should to the ex- complaint revoked. While the is not a tent it of violations his federal civil legal clarity, model of it did suffice to by the named in defendants their place gen- defendants on notice of Bock’s capacities individual have survived the eral claim: that he was not afforded depend motion to dismiss does not on necessary process before his purportedly incorporated by materials complaint give

was revoked. The need not complaint, reference into the amended specific “a language complaint and detailed statement of the but rests on the constituting plainly facts the cause of action.” itself. Defendants are correct that Diamond, Levinsky 600, 595, incorporation by 140 Vt. the rules allow reference (1982). greater only 442 A.2d 1280 If of materials in the same matter. See (“Statements 10(c) specificity required, were pleading defendants V.R.C.P in a compelled may by could adopted have it motion for a in reference a differ- 578 See, prepare e.g., part pleading plaint in for trial. ent of the same or an- and Cuomo, 40, 42 F.2d pleading in motion in the other Salahuddin added)). 1988) (pleading (emphasis rules a same action.” The Cir. prin purported incorpo- “plain” statement of claim because plaintiffs filings cipal pleadings give one named rate all of and function of is to party in a related matter he filed in the exhibit fair notice of the claim adverse court, plaintiff in brief here same and so as to enable him to answer asserted incorporated trial). also claims to have refer- prepare for and action in ence “his U.S. District Court reviewing sufficiency of a incorpora- None of Bock v. Gold.” these accepts complaint, true all this Court possible tions is under the rules. well-pled allegations, factual but need not contends, Finally, plaintiff citing accept conclusory allegations legal con Rule under Rule dismissals masquerading clusions as factual conclu 12(b)(6) leave to must be made with Umbrella, Inc., Colby v. sions. See replead, prejudice. rather than with In ¶¶ 5, 10, VT 184Vt. 955 A.2d 1082. light that the amended of our conclusion assertions, By refusing accept “bald was sufficient to survive conclusions, unsupportable opprobri dismiss, motion to we need not reach the epithets,” applying ous the Court is not a issue. standard; heightened pleading it is merely adhering pleading to the notice part, part, in reversed in Affirmed 8(a). requirements set forth proceedings remanded consis- for further Puertorriquenos Educadores en Accion expressed tent with the views herein. (1st Hernandez, F.3d 2004) (citation omitted) Skoglund, J., dissenting part (expressing simi sentiment). concurring part. agree majority I lar indicates majority appropriate that we should affirm the trial that dismissal is when it “beyond court’s claims for doubt that there exist no facts dismissal assault, battery, wrongful im- . . . that entitle false and or circumstances would Ante, prisonment, and intentional infliction of to relief.” 4. The Supreme emotional distress. Plaintiffs claim under clari United States Court has deficient, equally phrase, Conley, 42 U.S.C. 1983 was fied that this taken from 45-46, properly I and it too was dismissed. dis- 355 U.S. at was intended to de majority’s opportunity sent from the conclusionto the scribe “the breadth claims, contrary. prove adequate complaint what an adequate not the minimum standard of requirements 14. Our are govern complaint’s a sur

minimal, but are not nonexistent. A Corp. Twombly, vival.” Bell Atl. must contain “a short and U.S. S. Ct. statement of the claim that the (cited ¶20, Colby, (Burgess, 2008VT 8(a). pleader entitled to relief.” V.R.C.P. J., Thus, phrase dissenting)). should requirement, party To meet this need wholly applied not be to allow “a specific not and detailed state- conclusory statement of claim” to survive ment of the facts which constitute cause plead a motion to dismiss “whenever the action, simply “a statement clear ings open possibility that a le[ave] enough give the defendant fair notice ‘to plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of plaintiffs of what the claim is and the ” recovery.” support [undisclosed] facts’ to Reporter’s on which it rests.’ at at Id. 127 S. Ct. 1968. Notes, Conley (quoting V.R.C.P. 8 (1957)). Gibson, case, plaintiff alleged 355 U.S. 41 This allows 16. In this no opposing party support the to answer the com- facts whatsoever that would particularly claim under 1983. His entire claim is 18. true when one This is by stated as follows. “Defendants the considers the defendants named here. took, take, actions or failed to suggestion, Plaintiff offers no for ex supra, enumerated did thus commit nu- how, when, ample, why, as to merous violations of U.S.C. Department Commissioner of the of Cor through repeated flagrant abrogation and deputy rections or his violated his consti rights” of Plaintiffs civil under the fed- rights, tutional or how members of his “by ordering eral and state constitutions deprived treatment team him of his fed continuing wrongful and and [his] false See, rights. e.g., eral Hendricks v. imprisonment. For their breach the De- (2d 1997) Coughlin, 114 F.3d Cir. fendants should be held accountable. The (Section requires “personal involve through Defendants a confluence of their (rather respondeat ment in than mere abusing public actions discretion as for) superior responsibility any alleged repeatedly flagrantly officials did and ab- deprivation.”). constitutional As rogate rights” Plaintiffs civil under the explained, Hernandez court “in a civil federal and state constitutions. The ac- any action as other action sub supra” apparently tions “enumerated re- ject standards, to notice plaintiffs fer to all of related claims complaint should at least set forth mini defendants, against which were dismissed whom, mal facts as to who did what to by specifically the trial court and not when, where, why and ....” 367 F.3d at challenged appeal by plaintiff. on fact, plaintiffs general eonelusory 17. Plaintiffs and indicates that his claims defend allegations do not defendants allegation ants are on based his that he with fair notice of claim or the “false[ly] wrongfull[y] impris grounds on which the claim rests. See oned,” (1st claim that was dismissed IRS, Beaulieu v. 865 F.2d appealed by plaintiff. 1989) trial court and not (“Simply to state that a claim is dismissed, With his concrete claims there made under a named statute not a short is no articulated basis for claim statement of what the claim is. due-process rights that his were violated Even less is it a of entitlement to discretionary (citations omitted)). decision to revoke his relief.” Plaintiff does furlough. when, where, how, not describe allegedly According majority, named defendants violated his to the rights. federal constitutional See 5 C. reasonable inference to be drawn from Miller, Wright & A. Federal Practice & he 2004) challenge process Procedure at 94-95 ed. intended to af (notice-pleading standard “contem forded him defendants before his fur circumstances, Ante, platefs] lough Putting the statement of was revoked. occurrences, support questions any, process, and events in aside if what presented,” majority claim and it does not autho of these defendants owed pleader’s plaintiff, assuming arguendo rize as sufficient “bare aver protected liberty ment that he wants relief and is entitled has a interest in it”). remaining furlough, There can Conway be no doubt that on cf. 113, 118, 636 seeking respond Cummings, defendant to such 161Vt. generalized allegations (holding “[t]he “would have little United begin.” Twombly, pro idea where to States Constitution not fails to n.10, at 565 127 S. Ct. at 1971 n.10. This vide a interest status 8(a) type satisfy directly, does not case instructs [federal law] goals recognize right or advance the the rule is us that it would not such designed existing to serve. under law Vermont as a state- interest.”), plaintiff any promises. threats or See V.R.Cr.P. 11 created still (requiring any specific court to address defendant not identified facts to has accepting personally open in rights were violated. Our court before show that his plea). petitioner’s require guilty mention of rules do not that a be a No ante, 8, parole eligibility legal clarity,” was made the court or “model of plaintiff comply parties. that a do minimal standard set forth in hearing sentencing At in Janu- 8(a). Plaintiff failed to ary recommended a State sen- of his fendants with fair notice twenty-five years, tence of fifteen to rests, it claim and the on which agreed, petitioner argued while for a ten- properly and this claim was therefore year probation minimum. The officer who dismissed. prepared presentenee investiga- had report I am to state that tion recommended a sentence of authorized joins fifty years. Burgess Justice in this dissent. fifteen to Much of the testi- mony hearing petition- at the centered on counseling need er’s for while incarcer- 2008VT 82 ated. The clinician who had conducted an psychosexual peti- earlier evaluation of Christopher In re M. SHAIMAS undergo tioner recommended that he [958 646] both violent-offender and sex-offender probation treatment. The officer testified No. 06-492 pro- the recommended treatment grams required years each four or five complete normally and were taken con- secutively. long When asked how it would 1. June 2008. Petitioner Christo- petitioner complete take the recom- pher appeals superior M. a Shaimas from programming mended from the time he denying petition post- court order his for facility, explained entered the the officer convictionrelief. Petitioner contends that “suspicion”petitioner that it was his could rejecting the court erred in his claim that immediately, be “assessed and evaluated misunderstanding concerning a material probably begin fairly promptly” work eligibility parole guilty plea rendered his require approximately so that it would involuntary. We affirm. years petitioner complete ten for 1994, petitioner 2. In June was programs parole. and be for considered charged aggravated with sexual assault however, explain, The officer went on to aon minor. The information fifteen-year that his recommendation of a petitioner previously had also been con- assumption minimum was based on an victed of sexual assault. on the Conviction person might required that a “to sit for aggravated charge sexual assault carried period getting of time before involved imprison- a maximum sentence of life that, treatment” and with time-served change-of-plea hearing ment. At a in Oc- good-time credit, petitioner could be plea Thus, tober defendant entered a years. ten-year released in twelve guilty agreement under an proba- which the minimum sentence was agreed inadequate. State to recommend a sentence tion In im- officer’s view twenty-five years petitioner posing fifteen to the recommended minimum sen- argue years, remained free to for a tence of fifteen rather than lesser sen- ten During colloquy explained petitioner tence. the Rule 11 con- trial court court, petitioner relatively pre- young ducted acknowl- still man who edged plea response “high danger” was not sented level of and that it

Case Details

Case Name: Bock v. Gold

Court Name: Supreme Court of Vermont

Date Published: Jun 10, 2008

Citation: 959 A.2d 990

Docket Number: 2006-276

Court Abbreviation: Vt.