Facts
- Loyola University of Chicago filed a forcible entry and detainer lawsuit against Onward MSO, LLC for unpaid rent following the closure of its restaurant due to the COVID-19 pandemic. [lines="29-32"], [lines="101-103"].
- The trial court granted tenant several continuances due to the health issues of their attorney, but ultimately denied a third request made shortly before trial after the attorney's sudden hospitalization. [lines="23-25"], [lines="38-40"].
- During the trial, Onward MSO, LLC was unable to present its case as it was not represented by any attorney, leading to a directed verdict in favor of Loyola University. [lines="42-43"], [lines="268-270"].
- While the eviction order was executed, the trial also included a monetary judgment against Onward MSO, LLC for past-due rent. [lines="276-278"], [lines="310"].
- Onward MSO challenged the trial court's rulings regarding continuances and the exclusion of trial evidence, claiming they were prejudiced without legal representation. [lines="364-370"], [lines="282-290"].
Issues
- Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Onward MSO's request for a continuance because of its attorney's sudden hospitalization shortly before the trial? [lines="364-366"].
- Was Onward MSO deprived of its right to represent itself adequately during the trial, given that it did not have counsel present? [lines="364-367"].
Holdings
- The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for a continuance based on the sudden illness of Onward MSO's attorney, which warranted a postponement of the trial. [lines="23-25"], [lines="615"].
- The appellate court concluded that the absence of counsel rendered Onward MSO defenseless in the trial, justifying a reversal and remand for a new trial to determine liability for past-due rent. [lines="575-578"], [lines="616"].
OPINION
BOCHETTO AND LENTZ, P.C. v. ANNE RIVERS A/K/A ANNE MARY RIVERS AND JAKE SUDDERTH A/K/A R. JAKE SUDDERTH
No. 2434 EDA 2023
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SEPTEMBER 30, 2024
J-A12025-24. NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37. Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 17, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 190403606
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2024
Appellants, Anne Rivers a/k/a/ Anne Mary Rivers and Jake Sudderth a/k/a R. Jake Sudderth, appeal from the judgment entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, in favor of Appellee, Bochetto and Lentz, P.C. (“Law Firm”) in this breach of contract action. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On April 24, 2019, Law Firm filed a complaint against Appellants alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The complaint alleged that Law Firm provided legal serviсes for Appellants and Appellants owed $157,851.00 in unpaid legal fees pursuant to the fee agreement executed by the parties. For
On January 17, 2023, a jury trial commenced. Attorney George Bochetto testified that in October of 2016, Law Firm agreed to represent Appellants in two cases involving their former business partner and landlord. Over the course of their representation, Law Firm began to represent Appellants in three other cases, resulting in Law Firm representing Appellants in a total of five separate cases. Attorney Bochetto testified that in October of 2018, Law Firm notified Appellants that it was terminating its representation of Aрpellants due to unpaid legal fees and withdrew as counsel of record from all five of Appellants’ legal proceedings.
Attorney Bochetto further testified that the parties had executed a fee agreement at the commencement of their professional relationshiр. The fee agreement set forth the rate of legal fees and the additional costs that Appellants would be responsible for during the representation. The fee agreement expressly stated:
We expect our invoices to be paid upon presentation. We reserve the right tо withdraw from the representation for failure to promptly pay our invoices or for other just cause.
If any of our fees or costs are unpaid, and we take any action to collect the same, we shall be entitled to reimbursement at our regular rates of all attorneys fees and costs incurred in effecting such collection, even if we do the work
ourselves.
(Trial Exhibit P-18, submitted 1/17/23, at 3). The signed fee agreement was published to the jury and admitted into evidence. Additionally, Attorney Bochetto read the provision entitling Law Firm to attorney’s fees for collection efforts to the jury and testified that Law Firm was еntitled to fees associated with the instant action.
Law Firm also presented invoices and billing summaries that showed a balance of $157,853.08 of unpaid legal fees associated with the work that Law Firm did for Appellants during the course of its representation. These documents were published to the jury and admitted into evidence. During cross-examination of Attorney Bochetto, Appellants introduced an additional invoice created by Law Firm that was dated July 22, 2022, and titled “Rivers/Sudderth Collections.” Attorney Bochetto clarified that he would not characterize the invoice as a “bill” because it was nеver sent to Appellants for collection. Nevertheless, he confirmed that the document contained an itemized list of all costs associated with Law Firm’s collection efforts to recover the unpaid legal fees from Appellants. The balance of those costs as of July 22, 2022 was $100,015.88. Attоrney Bochetto further stated that although the invoice had not yet been billed to Appellants, pursuant to the fee agreement, Appellants are responsible for the fees contained in the collections invoice. This document was also published to the jury and admitted into evidencе as Exhibit P-55/D-41.
Appellants raise the following issues for our review:
Whether the judgment against [Appellants] should be reversed because it included amounts not permitted pursuant to the contract between [Law Firm] and [Appellants]?
Whether the trial court erred by not entering judgment in favor of [Appellants] nоtwithstanding the verdict because the jury’s verdict was so contrary to the evidence admitted at trial?
Whether the trial court erred by not granting a new trial on damages because the jury’s verdict of $257,000.00 was excessive and contrary to the evidence admitted at trial?
(Appellants’ Brief at 4-5).3
In their issues combined, Appellants arguе that Law Firm only pled that it was owed $157,000.00 in unpaid legal fees for services rendered. Appellants assert that Attorney Bochetto testified that Law Firm had not billed Appellants for the collections bill totaling $100,015.88. Appellants claim that “the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence because it awarded [Law
Our standard and scope of review are as follows:
In reviewing a trial court’s decision whether or not to grant judgment in favor of one оf the parties, we must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard[s] of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and [JNOV] are identical. We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a [JNOV] only when wе find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case.
Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court. There are two bases upon which a [JNOV] can be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgmеnt as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.
Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.Super. 2010), aff’d, 618 Pa. 228, 55 A.3d 1088 (2012) (quoting Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
Additionally, “[t]he grant or refusal of a new trial because of the excessiveness of the verdict is within the discretion of the trial court. This court will not find a verdict excessive unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock our sense of justice.” Whitaker v. Frankford Hosp. of City of Philadelphia, 984 A.2d 512, 523 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “The general rule in this Commonwealth is that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof as to damages.” Omicron Systems., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 564 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[A] verdict that is against the weight of the evidence is a verdict that shocks the conscience of the trial court in light of the evidence presented. When this occurs, the trial court should—if a party timely raises the issue in post-trial motions—order a new trial.” Avery v. Cercone, 225 A.3d 873, 877 (Pa.Super. 2019).
“[L]arge verdicts are not necessarily exсessive verdicts. Each case is unique and dependent on its own special circumstances and a court should apply only those factors which it finds to be relevant in determining whether or not the verdict is excessive.” Whitaker, supra at 523 (citation omitted). Further:
The determination of damages is a factual question to be decided by the fаct-finder. The fact-finder must assess the testimony, by weighing the evidence and determining its credibility, and by accepting or rejecting the estimates of the damages given by the witnesses.
Although the fact-finder may not render a verdict based on sheer conjecture or guesswork, it may use a measure of
Omicron Systems, Inc., supra at 564-65 (citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellants’ brief entirely fails to explain why Apрellants are entitled to JNOV. Appellants do not present any argument to demonstrate that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law or that the evidence was such that no reasonable minds could disagree that the verdict on Law Firm’s breach of contract claim should have been rеndered in Appellants’ favor. See Reott, supra. Rather, Appellants’ argument focuses solely on the amount of damages. As such, Appellants have waived their JNOV claim. See Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088-89 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 719, 110 A.3d 998 (2014) (explaining arguments that are not appropriately developed on appeal are waived).
Regarding Appellants’ claim that they are entitled to a new trial on damages, we do not agree that the jury’s award of damages is against the weight of the evidence. At trial, Law Firm presented the jury with the fee agreement which unequivocally states that Law Firm is entitled to reimbursement, at its regular rates, of all attorney’s fees and costs incurred to collect unpaid legal fees. Law Firm further presented invoices and billing summaries that showed a total balance of $157,853.08 of Appellants’ unpaid legal fees. Further, the jury was presented with an invoice totaling $100,015.88, which set forth the fees and costs Law Firm incurred in its efforts
Further, the record belies Appellants’ claim that Law Firm only pled and claimed $157,000.00 in damages for its breach of contract claim. In its complaint, Law Firm requested damages in excess of $157,851.00 for its breach of contract count and specifically claimed that it was entitled to fees and costs associated with the instant collection action. Although Attorney Bochetto testified at trial that Law Firm had not billed Appellants for the сollections amount, he further stated that Law Firm was entitled to recover the collections amount from Appellants pursuant to the fee agreement.4 On this record, we cannot say that Law Firm failed to claim any amount above $157,000.00 in damages, including fees and costs for its collection efforts.5
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date:
Notes
[Law Firm] pleaded that it was owed $157,000.00 in unpaid legal fees for previous services rendered. At trial, the invoiсes for these past legal services were presented to the jury as [Law Firm]’s damages. In addition, [Law Firm] presented to the jury the amount of collections which it admittedly did not bill, and which were not sent to [Appellants], which amounted to $100,015.88. As a result, the jury awarded [Law Firm] in the amount of $257,868.96, far more than the amount [Lаw Firm] requested under the parties’ written contract for legal services. Therefore, the compensatory award is excessive, [and Appellants] are entitled to a new trial on damages.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/20/23, at 2-3) (footnotes omitted). For the reasons already stated herein, the record does not support the court’s conclusion.
