Opinion by
Thе appellants in this case appeal from judgment on a verdict which they contend is excessive. The jury’s verdict was $15,464.20, which the lower court reduced to $12,000. We begin, therefore, with the accepted rule that — “It is the duty of the lower court to control the amount of the verdict; it is in possession of all the facts
The plaintiff, Michael J. Bochar, was injured on July 7, 1947, on the Pennsylvania Turnpike whеn his car collided with a car belonging to the defendant company under circumstances which have caused defendants to acknowledge complete responsibility for the accident. The impact of the collision threw the plaintiff against the dashboard of his car with such violence that he sustained a multiple, comminuted fracture of the right knee cap with displacement of loose fragments of bone. Numerous abrasions and contusions were also inflicted about his face and legs. He was taken to the Everett Hospital in Everett, Pennsylvania, where he was operated upon, a portion of the right patella removed and his right leg from hip to foot placed in a plaster cast. The cast came off on August 14, 1947, and for the next three months the patient received physical therapy treatments which included massage, heat application and manipulation of the knee which had lost considerable flexion. He got about on crutches and cane and returned to wоrk November 20, 1947.
Dr. W. W. Sipes, who performed the operation, declared the limitation of motion of the knee to be 25 to 30%; Dr. G. L. Laverty testified to a 20 to 25% limitation in active movement; and Dr. J. I. Kendrick testified that the plaintiff suffered a half inch atrophy in the right thigh and % inch atrophy in the mid thigh with a loss of 25 degrees flexion in the knee.
The plaintiff has been emplоyed by the Bell Telephone Company for 16 years, doing installation, repair
The knee joint is perhaps one of the nicest and most delicate pieces of anatomical engineering in the body, so that the pain аnd discomfort accompanying the stooping to which Bochar is subjected in his work can be comprehended when one notes the testimony of Dr. Sipes: “Q. State whethеr or not the injury to Mr.
The defendants contend that there was no evidence of impairment of earning powеr and that the fact that Bochar’s wages were higher after the accident than before proves no deterioration of earning ability.
1
A tortfeasor is not entitled to a reduction in his financial responsibility because, through fortuitous circumstances or unusual application on the part of the injured person, the wages of the injurеd person following the accident are as high or even higher than they were prior to the accident. Parity of wages may show lack of impairment of earning pоwer if it confirms other physical data that the injured person has completely recovered from his injuries. Standing alone, however, parity of ivages is inconclusive.
2
The office Avorker, who loses a leg has obviously had his earning ability impaired even though he can still sit at a desk and punch a comptometer as vigorously as beforе. It is not the status of the immediate present which determines capacity for remunerative employment. Where permanent injury is involved, the whole span of life must be сonsidered. Has the economic horizon of the disabled person been shortened because of the injuries sustained as the result of the tortfeasor’s negligence? That is the test. And it is no answer to that test to say that there are just as many dollars in the patient’s pay envelope now as prior to his accident. The normal status of а healthy person is to progress, and to the extent that his progress has
The plаintiff testified that because of his disablement he was not allowed to be employed overtime (on Sundays and holidays). On a rotation basis he was entitled to be on the job еvery fourth Sunday for which work he would receive time and one-half pay. (The pay for holidays was double time.) Up to the date of the trial the plaintiff lost |126Q because of inability to do this overtime work. Dr. Sipes testified that the impairment in the flexion of the injured knee would be permanent so that the jury had the right to compute the loss of overtimе wages on a permanent basis.
In his charge to the jury the learned Trial Judge very properly left to the jury determination of the duration of the impairment in earning power: “It will also be your duty to determine therefrom whether his partial impairment of earning power will last until the end of his life expectancy — he is now 33 years oid- or, if not, how soon Avill it probably change for the better, that is, whether the partial loss of earning power is temporary or permanent; and then adjust your award for such loss of earning power, if you find any, by the present worth rule which we shall hereafter explain to you.”
Further: “In computing the partial temporary or partial permanent loss of plаintiff’s earning poAver in the future, if you find any such loss under all of the evidence, you must determine how many years it will continue, Iioav long he will be incapacitated, or how long he Avill probably live if you find his incapacity Avill be for life.”
We cannot say that under these instructions, superimposed on the facts of the case, the jury was not justified in awarding a sum оf substance for impairment of earning power. The item of pain, suffering and in
The plaintiff lost wages in the sum of $1292 because of аbsence from work, his medical expenses amounted to $460.50, his inability to work overtime which would have been assured him had it not been for his injury, amounted to $1260. He is a comparаtively young man and in the field of employment to which he has apparently permanently committed himself, his injury is a definite money-losing handicap. The record, plus the trial judge’s appraisement of the damages, justifies the reduced verdict of $12,000, and the Judgment is affirmed.
