OPINION
In this bаnkruptcy action, the debtor appeals from the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on the debtor’s claims of defamation and tortious interference with contractual relations. I find that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over this matter, and therefore the judgment of the court below will be reversed,
I. Facts
The debtor, Charles T. Bobroff, formerly operated a shoe and leather goods store. In 1979, the debtor secured a loan from Continental Bank for business use; the debt was secured by a second mortgage upon the debtor’s home and by a security interest in property of the debtor’s busi *747 ness. The debtor had contracted with Guardian Life Insurance Co. for the issuance of ten policies of disability insurance. Under these policies, in the event of disability, Guardian would reimburse the debtor for business overhead, pay a monthly amount to Continental Bank as loss payee, and pay monthly amounts to the debtor personally. In June of 1980, the debtor became disabled due to a psychiatric episode, and Guardian began paying under these policies, on a somewhat irregular basis. The debtor then defaulted on the debt owed to Continental. The Bank obtained a judgment against him in February of 1981 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. On April 24, 1981, the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Codе.
Shortly after the petition in bankruptcy was filed, counsel for Continental, the law firm of Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCau-ley, deposed one Jane Engel, a friend of the debtor’s. Ms. Engel stated that the debtor was storing items previously displayed at the debtor’s store (and presumably subject to Continental’s security interest) at her apartment and at the garage of a Mrs. Spector; and that the debtor stated to her that he had deliberately concealed three valuable lithograрhs from the Bank. The debtor had previously stated under oath that no one other than he had possession of any furnishings or art work belonging to his estate. The Blank, Rome firm informed the bankruptcy court of the deposition testimony, and the court ordered that the debtor’s residence and business and the Spector garage be padlocked pending an inventory by the trustee.
Additional relevant events are conversations by Frank Leis, an employee of Continental, and by members of the Blank, Rome firm with Guardian, regarding the debtor’s disability policies. Following these conversations Guardian terminated payments on all of the disability policies it had issued to the debtor.
On February 22, 1983, the debtor commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against Continental Bank, its employee, Frank Leis, its legal counsel, the Blank, Rome office, and two members of the Blank, Rome firm, Andrew D. Bershad, Esq., and Samuel H. Becker, Esq. The defendants filed an apрlication in the bankruptcy court for removal of the action to that court 1 on March 16, 1983, stating that the debtor’s action in the state court was a “civil proceeding related to a case under title 11” and that therefore the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the matter. The case was then automatically removed to the bankruptcy court, and the debtor's motion to remand the case to the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas was denied.
In a “form of complaint” attached to the motion to remand, the debtor set forth three claims against the defendants: malicious prosecution, defamation, and interference with contractual relations. The parties subsequently agreed to a voluntary dismissal of the malicious prosecution cause of action. Debtor claimed that defendants had damaged his reputation in the community by stating that he was concealing assets from the bank and from the bankruptcy court. The debtor further claimed that defendants interfered with his contractual relations with Guardian Insurance Co. by inducing Guardian to cut off further payments to him under- his policies of disability insurance. On March 5, 1984, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to defendants on both claims. This appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 gave the United States district courts “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28
*748
U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982). The Act also сonveyed “all of the jurisdiction” conferred by section 1471(b) upon the district courts to the “bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982). In
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
In the wake of Northern Pipeline an “Interim Rule” was promulgated governing bankruptcy jurisdiction pending corrective legislation by Congress. 2 Although all civil proceedings “related to” cases brought under Title 11 are automatically referred to bankruptcy courts under the Rule, the bankruptcy judges may not issue binding judgments in “related” proceedings, but are limited to submissions of findings of fact and proposed rulings which must be reviewed de novo by the district court. Interim Rule § (e)(2). 3 “Related” proceedings are defined in part by the Rule as “civil proceedings that, in the absence of a petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or a State court ... including], but ... not limited to, claims brought by an estate against parties who have not filed claims against the estate.” Interim Rule § (d)(3)(A).
In the recent Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, Congress codified into positive law the provisions of the Interim Rule applicable to proceedings “related to” bankruptcy, providing;
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core рroceeding 4 but *749 that is otherwise related to a ease under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.
Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 157(c)(1). 5
Under both the Interim Rule and the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, this cоurt, and derivatively, the bankruptcy court, have jurisdiction over cases “related to” proceedings arising under title 11. When such a case is initially heard by a bankruptcy judge, this court must review de novo the bankruptcy judge’s findings and conclusions. As applied to this case, if the debt- or’s claims against defendants are “related to” the debtor’s pending liquidation proceedings under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court below had jurisdiction to entertain this action and to recommend that summary judgment be granted to defendants on debtor’s claims, and this court has the power to review the record below de novo and to adopt or reject the bankruptcy court’s recommendation. Thus, the central issue to be decided in this case is whether a debtor’s action against a creditor and its agents for defamation and interference with contractual relations, arising out of events occurring following the filing of debtor’s bankruptсy petition, qualifies as a proceeding “related to” an action arising under title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of the district and bankruptcy courts of the United States.
III. The Scope of “Related” Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Code
Congress is given power in section 8 of Article I of the Constitution “To establish ... uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Congress has enacted three bankruptcy statutes, the Acts of 1867, 1898, and 1978. These Acts set forth procedures for bankruptcy adjudications and for the adjustment of the rights of debtors and creditors in bankruptcy cases, thus making the core bankruptcy proceedings subject to federal rules of decisions under the authority of Article I of the Constitution. Under these Acts, core bankruptcy proceedings became cases “arising under [the] Constitution [or] laws of the United States” to which the judicial power exercised by courts of the United States extеnds under Article III of the Constitution, U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
The question arises to what extent courts of the United,States may exercise jurisdiction over actions subject only to state-created rules of decision that are in some way related to a pending bankruptcy proceeding, when no independent ground for federal jurisdiction exists, as in this case. In the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, Congress interpreted its Article I authority as empowering it to confer jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy courts “over all litigation having a significant connection with bankruptcy,” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-52,
reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6009.
6
The Supreme
*750
Court subsequently struck down the exercise of jurisdiction over state law causes of action having a “significant connection” to bankruptcy by courts established without Article III tenure and salary guarantees,
Northern Pipeline, supra.
The Court did not address, however, the scope of the jurisdiction of
Article 111
courts over state law matters that are tangentially related to a federal court bankruptcy proceeding. In
Northern Pipeline
the debtor had filed an action against a third party to recover damages for breach of contract in order to augment its estate. The Court stated that Article III court jurisdiction over this claim rested upon “its relationship to the petition for reorganization.”
Situations will undoubtedly arise in which the controversy is so tangential to the title 11 case that a court will hold that the case neither arises in nor is related to the title 11 case. In such cases, the bankruptcy court may decide that the еxiguous nature of the relationship between the proceeding and the *751 bankruptcy case is such as to fall without the court’s jurisdiction. The criterion to be adopted in such a situation will undoubtedly be related to a determination of whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect upon the estate being administered.
1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3:01[l][e] (15th ed. 1983) at 3-49. 10
Under the Bankruptcy Code, it is only those interests in property, including causes of action, that belong tо the debtor at the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed that are considered “property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982); see S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5868, 6323. 11 In this case, the events that gave rise to the debtor’s action for defamation and interference with contractual relations occurred following the filing of the debtor’s petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 and the debtor’s causes of action against defendants are therefore not property of the bankrupt estate. 13 Thе outcome of debtor’s action, had it been allowed to continue in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, would thus in no way af-feet the estate of the debtor currently being administered under the aegis of the bankruptcy court. Any recovery would accrue to the debtor personally.
This action is “related to” the debt- or’s bankruptcy petition in a literal sense, in that the action is brought by the debtor against his major creditor and the creditor’s agents. The identity of the cast of characters in the two actions does not make this case sufficiently “related to” the bankruptcy proceeding in a legal sense, however, to confer jurisdiction upon this court under Article III. The definition of a proceeding as “related to” a bankruptcy matter for purposes of federal court jurisdiction depends upon “the character of the claims asserted and the relationship of those claims to the bankruptcy proceeding, rather than with the status of the parties as debtors or creditors.”
Romeo J. Roy, Inc. v. Northern Nat’l Bank (In re Romeo J. Roy, Inc.),
*752 In summary, a recovery by debtor on these claims would have no effect on the bankrupt estate; debtor’s claims are wholly subject to state law rules of decision, and no nonbankruptcy-related ground of federal jurisdiction over the defendants exists. Even under the broadest interpretation of federal court Article III jurisdiction, courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over this action.
Defendants contend that under 28 U.S.C. § 1478(b), this court has no jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s refusal to remand this action to the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Section 1478 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action ... to the bankruptcy сourt for the district where such civil action is pending, if the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over such claim'or cause of action.
(b) The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground. An order under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a decision not so remanding, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
Defendants in effect argue that, even though the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction was void, this court, by reason of section 1478(b), may not review and correct the error. It would be anomalous to hold, however, that in a “related case” proceeding, where the bankruptcy court may not enter a final order absent consent of the parties, and where this court must review the record below de novo, the bankruptcy court’s determination that federal jurisdiction exists over the cause is final and nonreviewable. The only interpretation of section 1478(b) that is consistent both with
Northern Pipeline
and with the principle that a judgment by a court acting without jurisdiction is void, is that this court is precluded from reviewing a refusal to remand only in cases in which the bankruptcy court clearly has jurisdiction over the action. A prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court over a removed state court action is an allegation by the removing party that the outcome of thе action may affect the bankrupt estate. The removing parties here did not, and indeed could not, so allege. On these facts, the bankruptcy court’s refusal to remand the action in the face of a challenge to its jurisdiction over debtor’s claims is reviewable by this court.
See In re Compton,
For all of the above reasons, the decision of the court below will be reversed, and the case will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
Notes
. The petition for removal was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1478(a)(1982), which provides:
A party may remove any ... cause of action in a civil action ... to the bankruptcy court for the district where such civil action is pending, if the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over such ... cause of action.
. In
White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A.,
.
But see Frank v. Arnold (In re Morrissey),
. The 1984 Act defines "core proceeding” to include:
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the purposes of confirming a Plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations as to the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate; and
(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor/creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 157(b)(2). Under § 157(b)(1), bankruptcy judges may enter final orders in "core proceedings,” which orders are appealable *749 to the district courts under § 158(a), "in the same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the district courts,” § 158(c). Debtor’s action against defendants here does not fall within the 1984 Act's definition of “core proceeding.”
. The 1984 Act also providеs that with the consent of all the parties to an action "related to” a case under title 11, the bankruptcy judge may enter final orders, subject to review in the district court in the same manner as district court final orders are reviewed in the courts of appeals. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 157(c)(2).
. In the first Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1867, 14 Stat. 517, Congress gave broad authority to courts of the United States over "suits at law or in equity brought by or against the assignee in refеrence to alleged property of the bankrupt, or to claims alleged to be due from or to him,” and this jurisdiction was exercised without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Lathrop v. Drake,
.See also American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,
. U.S. Const. Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
. In
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
. Justice Frankfurter set forth a coherent framework for evaluating federal court jurisdiction over state law matters related to bankruptcy in his dissenting opinion in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
[T]he bankruptcy decisions may be justified by the scope of the bankruptcy power, which may be deemed to sweep within its scope interests analytically outside the "federal question” category, but sufficiently related to the main purpose of bankruptcy to call for comprehensive treatment .... [I]f all the suits by the [estate], even though in many federal courts, are regarded as one litigation for the collection and apportionment of the bankrupt’s property, a particular suit by the [estate], under state law, to recover a specific piece of property might be analogized to the ancillary or pendent jurisdiction cases in which, in the disposition of a cause of action, federal courts may pass on state grounds for recovеry that are joined to federal grounds.
. Exceptions to this rule, not applicable here, include certain interests in property acquired within 180 days of the petition, see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5), and interests that the estate acquires in property following the filing of the petition, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7).
. The debtor's subsequent praecipe to convert the case to one filed under chapter 13 does not change the date of the commencement of the case, for purposes of determining, under 11 U.S.C. § 541, which interests become "property of the estate".
.
See In re Snssman,
.
See Miller v. Hill (In re Zip Enterprises, Inc.),