Bobel v. PeopleBobel v. People
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Carter
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error, Adam Bobel, was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of Cook county on an indictment charging, in the first count, “that Adam Bobel, late of the county of Cook, on the first day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, in said county of Cook, in the State of Illinois, aforesaid, unlawfully and willfully did, in a certain room then and there’ situated upon a certain location, then and there commonly known as No. 4500 State street, in the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, keep a certain-slot machine, the same then and there being a device upon the result of the action of which money or other valuable thing is staked,” etc. There were two more counts in the same language, except that the second used the words “is hazarded” instead of “is staked,” and that the third count used the words “is staked and hazarded.” A motion to quash the indictment, and, after trial, motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, were overruled and exceptions taken. Defendant below then sued out this writ of error, and asks us to reverse the judgment upon errors assigned. His contention is, that the statute under which the indictment was found is unconstitutional, and that the indictment does not state an offense against the laws of this State, and is bad on its face.
The statute on which the indictment is based is entitled “An act to prohibit the use of clock, tape, slot or other machines or devices for gambling purposes,” approved and in force June 21, 1895, (Laws of 1895, p. 156,) and is, except the emergency clause, as follows:
“Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That whoever, in any room, saloon, inn, tavern, shed, booth or building or enclosure,
“Sec. 2. Every clock, tape machine, slot machine, or other machine or device for the reception of money on chance, or upon the action of which money is staked, hazarded, bet, wron or lost, is hereby declared a gambling device, and shall be subject to seizure, confiscation and destruction by any municipal or other local authority within whose jurisdiction the same may be found.
“Sec. 3. Every owner, occupant, lessee, mortgagee or other person in possession of any premises upon which any gambling device may be located, and every person in the use, operation, lease or other possession of the same, shall be fined for the first offense not less than one hundred (100) dollars, and for the second offense shall be fined not less than five hundred (500) dollars and shall be confined in the county jail not less than six (6) months, and for the third offense shall be fined not less than five hundred (500) dollars and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than two (2) years nor more than four (4) years.”
It is insisted that this statute is unconstitutional because the subject of it is “not sufficiently expressed within the title of the act,” and that the title of the act limits its scope to the prohibition of the “use” of these devices for gambling purposes, and, therefore, that the mere “keeping”
Section 2 of the act is claimed to be unconstitutional because it provides for the seizure and destruction of any of the machines and devices mentioned in the act, without
.Counsel for plaintiff in error contend that the indictment is bad because time and place are not alleged of the “keeping” of the said device,—that is to say, that the word “keep” should be preceded by the words “then and there.” There is no merit in this contention. The indictment charge that Adam Bobel, on the first day of December, 1897, in said county of Cook and State of Illinois, unlawfully and willfully did, in a certain room, etc., keep a certain slot machine, etc. The allegations of time and place in the commencement are adverbial clauses modifying the verb “did keep.” They immediately precede the auxiliary “did,” which is ■ separated from its principal verb “keep” by the intervening description and number of the room in which the slot machine was kept, and the repetition of those’ allegations by the words “then and there” immediately preceding the word “keep” would clearly be tautological and unnecessary. Time and place are distinctly alleged of the verb “keep,” for there is no other word in the indictment which they can modify if they do not modify the word “keep.”
It is next contended that the allegation descriptive of the purposes for which the slot machine was used is faulty. The indictment charges that plaintiff in error did “keep a certain slot machine, the same then and there being a device upon the result of the action of which money or other valuable thing is staked.” It is claimed that this last allegation should be, “upon the result of the action of which money or other valuable thing was
Plaintiff in error contends that the mere keeping-of such a gambling machine is not an offense under the statute; that to constitute the offense the machine must be actually used, or at least actually kept, for gambling purposes, and that the indictment does not charge that it was kept for gambling purposes, but merely charges that it was a machine of the kind used for gambling purposes; and the contention is, not only that the indictment should .have been quashed, but that the court erred in admitting testimony not only descriptive of this slot machine, but that it was in fact, at the time and place mentioned, used for gambling purposes. We are satisfied, as before stated, that the indictment is good, and are also of the opinion that the testimony was properly received. If for no other purpose, this evidence was proper to prove the character and purpose of the machine,—that is, that it was a device upon which money is staked or hazarded, or upon the result of the action of which money is staked, bet, hazarded, won or lost,—in other words, that it was a gambling device. The second section of the act declares such machines to be gambling devices.
While a plausible argument is made that in view of the phraseology of the statute, and especially of the
We find no substantial error in the instructions complained of, and see no sufficient reason why the judgment should be reversed. It will therefore be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.