127 S.W.2d 438 | Mo. | 1939
Lead Opinion
Appellant bank filed a suit to enjoin the sale of real estate under a deed of trust. A temporary injunction was sought, which was denied, and a sale was had. Thereafter appellant filed an amended petition seeking the cancellation of the trustee's deed, five notes and the deed of trust given to secure them. The trial court entered a judgment against appellant bank whereupon an appeal was taken.
Appellant, plaintiff below, was the administrator of the estate of Hugh W. Thomasson, deceased. The respondents, defendants below, were G.A. Wurdeman, owner of the notes and deed of trust in question, *575
and the purchaser of the property at the sale, and Richard Henry Stevens, trustee in the deed of trust. The notes and deed of trust sought to be canceled were executed by Hugh W. Thomasson, and made payable to the law firm of Wurdeman, Stevens Hoester. Appellant contends that the notes and deed of trust were void in their inception. The circumstances attending their execution, for the most part conceded, were as follows: Hugh W. Thomasson, a man of means, was more than seventy years of age at the time the notes and deed of trust were executed. That occurred on May 19, 1931. His nearest relations were second cousins. He had been living in the home of a cousin, a Mrs. Bolles who lived in St. Louis, Missouri, but left there sometime during the year 1930. Thomasson had executed a will wherein he had made some provision for Mrs. Bolles. That testament was being contested at the time this case was tried and withstood the assault made upon it. [See Townsend et al. v. Boatmen's Natl. Bank et al.,
[1] The statement of the case, as above set forth, suggests to a court of equity that plaintiff should be granted the relief prayed for. In the first place an insanity proceeding is not a suit to determine rights between the informant and the person informed against, and no personal judgment can be rendered in favor of the complainant. In State ex rel. v. Guinotte,
"`The primary object of the proceeding is not to benefit any particular individual, but to see whether the fact of mental incapacity exists, so that the public, through the courts, can take control. The petitioner can derive no direct benefit from it. The advantage to him, if any, is only such as would result if any other person had first acted in the matter.'"
The prime purpose of an insanity proceeding is to provide for the welfare of the person alleged to be insane and preserve his property. The public is also directly interested. [State ex rel. v. Holtkamp,
[4] An insanity proceeding cannot be prosecuted or used as a wedge to pry a settlement of any real or fancied claim that a person may have against the alleged insane person. That, however, was the only purpose which prompted the insanity proceeding here involved. This purpose was clearly disclosed by the testimony of one of the attorneys representing Mrs. Bolles when he was being questioned as to why the proceeding was instituted. Note the answer given:
"Well, she was wanting to get some income from his estate on the theory that the woman he had married, I might say was recognized as a `gold digger,' and the theory was she would get it all if somebody else didn't."
That expresses the true situation. At another point in the examination of this attorney the following appeared:
"Q. You testified that you brought this insanity information to protect Thomasson against this woman so she wouldn't get all the money? A. That was the ultimate idea."
If that was the ultimate idea no effort was made to carry it out. The proceedings were dismissed when Mrs. Bolles, through a deed of trust on valuable property belonging to Thomasson, was guaranteed an annuity of $100 per month and $5000 in notes, secured by deeds of trust given to her attorneys. Thomasson was left just where he had been prior to the institution of the proceeding, except that he had been relieved of some property. In other words, the lamb was rescued from the wolves long enough to permit the rescuers to shear what fleece they wanted then turned loose to be fleeced by others. It is evident that the contract to dismiss the insanity proceedings, whereby the informant and her attorneys obtained the property mentioned, was void as against public policy; also that the notes and deeds of trust given to obtain such a dismissal were void. Such contracts should have no standing in court. To recognize and enforce them would open the door to fraud. Contracts have been held to be against public policy which were much less vicious than the one now before us. For a recent case see Nute v. Fry et al.,
"Agreements calculated to impede the regular administration of *578 justice are void as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or employed in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country."
The judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed with directions to that court to enter a decree for plaintiff as prayed for in its amended petition. Cooley and Bohling, CC., concur.
Addendum
The foregoing opinion by WESTHUES, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur. *579
