This is а suit in equity to redeem lots 17 and 18 in Belt’s addition to St. Louis from a sale of the lots for payment of taxes, and for possession. The fаcts are these:
Manning Mayfield, by a deed of trust dated the first of. June, 1876, conveyed the lots to Henry Belt in trust to secure Mayfield’s note of the same date for $292.50, due in one year and payable to Greorge Belt and Francis Tafts. The note was duly assigned to the plaintiff -within -twenty days after its date. Thereafter the collector' commenced suit to enforce the lien for taxes for the year 1876. The parties named in the deed oh trust were made defendants, but the plaintiff, the then owner of the note, was not made a party to that suit. Judgment was rendered in the tax suit, and by virtue of a special execution issued thereon the sheriff sold the рroperty in February, 1880, lot 17 to Hiemenz arid lot 18 to Walker. The defendant purchased both lots from the last-named persons, reсeiving a quitclaim deed from Hiemenz in May, 1880, and a warranty deed from Walker in July, 1881. Defendant improved lot 17 in 1880 by erecting a dwelling-house and outhouses thereon at a cost of some two thousand dollars, and subsequently he made some improvements of no great value on the other lot.
Plaintiff caused both lots to be sold under the deed of trust on the first of September, 1881, and became the purchaser at that sale, and thereafter commenced this suit to redeem.
1. The plaintiff appealed from this decree, and the first objection is, that the court erred in requiring it to pay for the improvements.
The lien for unpaid taxes was paramount to that created by the deed of trust. As the plaintiff, the holder of the debt secured by the deed of trust, was not made a party to the tax foreclosure suit, it has the right to redeem from the tax sale. Boatmеn’s Savings Bank v. Grewe,
2. It is further insisted that defendant was not a purchaser in go'od faith. We have held, under the occupying-claimant law, that cоnstructive notice implied by a recorded deed is not sufficient to defeat a claim for
3. The defendant occupied the property in its improved state up to the dаte of the decree rendered in this case, and the next question is whether he should have been charged with rents. There is no evidence that the lots had any rental value until improved by defendant. With the improvements, they are estimated to have a rental value of from twelve to eighteen dollars per month.
In an accounting between a mortgagor and a mortgagee in possession, the mortgagee is allowed the cost of reasonable and proper repairs, and he is chargеd with rents, which rents are estimated upon the property as it stands improved by the repairs. Ordinarily a simple mortgagee in possession would not be allowed for improvements such as were made in the present case. But as the defendant built upon the property in good faith, believing he had acquired a good title, he is allowed the value of the improvements. This value, nоt the cost, is estimated at the date of the decree. He ought not to be charged with the rents for the house, for it is in a sensе his own property until he is
4. From what has been said, it will be seen the trial court treated both lots as one parcel of land, аnd in effect made the improvements on one lot a charge upon both. In this the court erred. Each lot was assessed with its оwn tax. The tax judgment directed a sale of each lot for the amount due thereon, and each lot was sold to pay thе taxes thereon, and no part of the proceeds arising from the sale of one lot could have been applied in discharge of the judgment against the other .lot. In short the tax liens were separate and distinct liens, and hence the plаintiff had a right to redeem in parcels. Where two parcels of land have been improperly assessed and; sold as one tract, one parcel may be redeemed without redeeming the other. Dietrick v. Mason, 57 Pa. St. 40; Penn v. Clemans,