midpage

Boardwalk & Seashore Corp. v. MurdockBoardwalk & Seashore Corp. v. Murdock

New York Court of Appeals
Jul 29, 1941
Versions:286 N.Y. 494
36 N.E.2d 678
1941 N.Y. LEXIS 1469
Conway, J.

Pеtitioner’s premises are located at Rock-away Beach in the county of Queens and havе been continuously used as a parking space for the outdoor parldng of more than five cars “ since some time prior to February, 1925.” Upon the adoption of the Building Zone Resolution of the City of Nеw York in 1916 the premises were placed in a business use district and while in that district the establishment and maintenanсe of a commercial parking space was lawful. (Matter of Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, 266 N. Y. 339.)

On June 28, 1935, paragraph 15 of subdivision a of section 4 of the Building Zone Resolution was amended so that it prohibited the use of premises for commerсial outdoor parking of more than five motor vehicles in a business district. That amendment made the maintеnance of the use to which petitioner was putting his premises unlawful, even though that use had been established prior to the adoption of the amendment. (People v. Wolfe, 272 N. Y. 608; People v. Kesbec, Inc., 281 N. Y. 785.)

Still later, on July 31, 1938, the use district of petitioner’s premises was changed from a business to a residence ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍district. There, of course, commercial parking usе was forbidden even prior to the 1935 amendment. (Matter of Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, supra.)

■ Petitioner in this proceeding sought to obtain a certifiсate of occupancy, following the service upon him of a notice *497 that he was violating article 2, section 3, of the Building Zone Resolution by operating a parking space for more than fivе cars in a residence use district without such a certificate. In September, 1940, the learned Special Term justice granted the relief sought and in February, 1941, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the order granting such relief:

On December 18, 1940, section 6 of the Building Zone Resolution was amended. There was added to thе first sentence in subdivision (a) the words which are italicized •below and there was added a new subdivision, denominated (b). The section reads in part as follows:

“ § 6. Existing Buildings and Premises, (a) Any use existing in any building or premises on July 25, 1916, and ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍not conforming to the regulations of the use district in which it is maintained, may be continued therein except as provided in % 21-A. * * * (b) Any use existing in any building or premises lawfully established subsequent to July 25, 1916, and not cоnforming to the regulations of the use district in which it is maintained, may be continued therein except as provided in § 21-A.” (Italiсs supplied.)

Under the amendment to section 6, except for the absence of a certificаte of occupancy, the continuance by petitioner of the use of the premises for сommercial parking, of more than five cars, was lawful under subdivision (a) if the use had been established priоr to July 25, 1916, and thereafter maintained, and under subdivision (b) if lawfully established subsequent to July 25, 1916, and thereafter maintained. In either casе ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍the use could be continued, except as provided in section 21-A.

Section 21-A, at the time of the аmendment to section 6 on December 18, 1940, provided that “ no premises may be used * * * as a garage for more than five motor vehicles or for the storage or parking of more than five motor vehicles * * * on * * * any portion of a street between two intersecting streets, on which portion there exists an еxit from or an entrance to a public school; *498 * * * and in no case within two hundred feet thereof meаsured along the accustomed line of travel.” The prohibition against the use of premises “ for the storage or parking of more than five motor vehicles ” was deleted by an amendment to the sectiоn adopted January 9, 1941.

The amendments of December 18, 1940, and January 9, 1941, were both adopted subsequent to the entry of the order at Special Term and were not called to the attention of the Appellate Division. In fact ■ the first time those amendments were called to the attention of any court in this proceeding, was subsequent to the oral argument here. ■ Nevertheless, this court must consider and give effect to them. They necessitate an affirmance, instead of a reversal, of the order below and render inapplicable, to the facts here presented, our decisions in People v. Wolfe and People v. Kesbec, Inc. (supra), which would otherwise be controlling. (Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U. S. 226.) Parties obtain no vеsted rights in the orders or judgments ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍of courts while they are subject to review. (American Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 201; United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370; Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409, 429; Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., [1939] 309 U. S. 23, 27. See, also, United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch [U. S.], 103; People ex rel. Kilmer v. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 362, 367; Town of Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. 177.) In United States v. Schooner Peggy (1 Cranch [1 U. S. (Condensed Rep.) 256, 258], 103, 110) Chief Justice Marshall said: “ It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to inquire whеther a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision оf the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. * * * In such a case the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of lаw, the *499 judgment must be set aside.” So by a parity of reasoning, an order must be affirmed.

The use of the premises for commercial parking of more than five motor vehicles conformed to the provisions of the Building Zone Resolution at the time the use was established and conforms now under the 1940 amendment to sectiоn 6 thereof and the 1941 amendment to section 21-A. Petitioner is entitled to the certificate of ocсupancy sought and granted below. (Building Zone Resolution of the City of New York, § 22. Cf. Matter of Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, supra.)

The order should be affirmed, with costs.

Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Finch, Rippey, ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‍Lewis and Desmond, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed.

Case Details

Case Name: Boardwalk & Seashore Corp. v. Murdock
Court Name: New York Court of Appeals
Date Published: Jul 29, 1941
Citations: 286 N.Y. 494; 36 N.E.2d 678; 1941 N.Y. LEXIS 1469
Court Abbreviation: N.Y.
Log In