40 F. 625 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern New York | 1889
(orally.) As to the construction of these ancient charters, touching the character of the estate they convey, this court will follow the rulings of the courts of this state.
The next question is as to the extent, territorially, of these patents. Ordinarily, a bay is spoken of as a distinct body of water, distinct from the sea, or from the arm of the sea, out of which it opens. Sounds and arms of the sea are said to flow into and out of the baj^s, and bays to open into sounds. In this particular case, there seems to be a measure of doubt as to the location of the line of the Sound, in the light cast upon it by some of these deeds which have been introduced. The boundary of Katon’s neck, as granted at about the time of this patent, makes it seem uncertain as to exactly where the Sound ended. These points were before Judge Cullen, 1 see, in the case of Ackerly v. Godfrey, and he there sustained the plaintiff’s view as to the boundary by the Hound. In this particular case, however, I do not think it necessary to determine precisely what would be the north and south limits of this patent, if we only had the words “by the Sound” and “by the sea.” The use of the words “harbor” and “haven” seems to be sufficient to carry this particular, body of water. I do not know that there is any rule of law, or any principle or practice of common speech, which requires that a harbor shall be land-locked, or that a haven shall be absolutely safe from every wind that blows. Grants from the sovereign, as well as acts of legislatures or documents generally, are to be interpreted by giving to the words which they contain, in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary meaning, the plain, ordinary meaning which they have in the educated speech of people by whom the language is employed. This particular body of water geographically indicates that it may be used as a haven or harbor., and the geographical appearance of the land is to be taken largely into consideration here; for these grants were made at a lime when, I infer, the north shore of Long Island was not used to any particular extent for the purposes of navigation, it not being much settled at that time. The geographical appearance, then, of this body of water, bounded on three sides by land, would indicate its appropriateness as a harbor or haven, and experience — as to which we have been advised through the testimony of the witnesses, leaving out of view any points of dispute between them — goes to show that it has been used as a harbor or haven. It is not a perfectly safe harbor, nor an absolutely secure haven. It is a place which, when the wind is blowing, or is threatening to blow, from a northerly point, it is desirable, perhaps, to leave; but when the wind comes from the east or south or west it is a place which,
It only remains to consider the effect of defendant’s use and occupation of the particular part of that land which he has used and occupied. With regard to this use and occupation, it is to be noted that it is not in character continuous. When he originally began to use the land, to occupy it by putting his personal property upon it, he claimed that he had a species of title to the land as a citizen of the state of New York; that he, in common-with all his fellow-citizens, had an equitable title to those lands, the legal title being in the state, in trust for the common purposes of its citizens. Under the law of the state, — I do not mean the statute law, — under the law of the state, if the title were still in the state, he could, (in that territory as to which he, with others, had a common title,) by the performance of certain acts thereon, segregate, as it were, a portion of such territory, so that, as to that, it might be said that his occupation and use of the portion thus segregated might become exclusive. Now, even conceding that the legal title was still in the state, and that this right which he obtained by actual occupation and use might be considered an equitable property right which he had there, his occupation in assertion of such property right continued only for six years. In 1872 he'moved out of the state of New York, — ceased to be a citizen of the state. When I was considering this case yesterday, I inclined to the opinion that the rights to the common lands held by the states were rights which, in the absence of anything to the contrary, were to be participated in by all the inhabitants of the Union. Since the argument yesterday, and after examining the subject more carefully, and giving it further thought, I am inclined to change that opinion. When the individual state succeeded to the sovereignty of England, and took the title to the property which theretofore the crown of England had held, each state held that property, that is, such of it as was held in common, in trust for its own citizens; and no property right whatever in the land so held by one state belonged to the citizens of an adjoining state. That being so, when the defendant removed from the state, and gave up his citizenship, he at the same time yielded up whatever equitable right of ownership he had in these premises. From and after that date, whatever occupation and use he had was the occupation and use of a trespasser only, which could not ripen by any lapse of time — certainly, could not ripen by the lapse of sixteen years — into either a title in fee or a right to continue the use. In this view which I take of the character of the occupation, I am inclined to the opinion that the defendant has not succeeded in establishing his right to continue to occupy this land as he has occupied it in the past. I shall therefore direct a verdict for the plaintiffs.
Verdict accordingly.
