BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LARAMIE COUNTY d/b/a LARAMIE COUNTY FAIR BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LARAMIE COUNTY and LARAMIE COUNTY
S-19-0192
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
March 24, 2020
2020 WY 41
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2019
Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Gay Woodhouse and Christopher Brennan, Woodhouse Roden Nethercott, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Woodhouse.
Representing Appellees:
Steven Freudenthal, Freudenthal & Bonds, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Freudenthal.
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
[¶1] The Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County (Commissioners) passed a resolution dissolving the Laramie County Fair Board of Trustees (Fair Board) and assigning a new entity, the “Laramie County Events Department” (Events Department) the task of “operati[ng] and carrying forward” the county fair. The Fair Board sought a declaration that the Commissioners had no authority to dissolve the Fair Board, or to reallocate tax money originally collected for the Fair Board‘s use. On motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the Commissioners had authority to dissolve the Fair Board and entered declaratory relief in their favor. We reverse and remand.
ISSUES
[¶2] The parties raise various issues that we consolidate and rephrase:
- Does the Fair Board have standing to maintain this declaratory judgment action?
- Do the Commissioners have implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board?
FACTS
[¶3] For many years, the Fair Board has been responsible for running the annual Laramie County Fair, “one of the oldest and largest fairs in the state of Wyoming.” The county fair hosts various events, including “Mutton Bustin‘, Pig Wrestling, demolition derby, wagon rides,” and prize animal showcases.
[¶4] In November 2018, the Commissioners passed a resolution dissolving the Fair Board (Resolution). In its place, the Commissioners created the “Laramie County Events Department,” tasked with managing and “carrying forward . . . the Laramie County Fair” and other Laramie County recreational activities, grounds, and facilities. It also created the “Laramie County Events Advisory Board,” which was to “function in an advisory capacity” to the Events Department. According to the Commissioners, the “decision was driven by our need to consolidate our recreational and event-related activities and operations throughout the county.” During the public hearing on the Resolution, the Commissioners maintained that the fair would “continue to be the best fair in the country, certainly the best fair in Wyoming“; that funding for the fair would not be cut; and that they “want[ed] the fair to succeed [and] to grow.”
[¶5] The Fair Board filed this action shortly after the Commissioners passed the Resolution, seeking a declaration “whether or not the Laramie County Commissioners have the authority to dissolve the Laramie County Fair Board of Trustees and substitute in its place an ‘Events Advisory Board.‘” It also sought a declaration whether the Commissioners had authority to reallocate tax money originally collected for the Fair Board‘s use. Following the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the Commissioners had implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board and, because it had been dissolved, that the Fair Board lacked standing to challenge reallocation of collected tax money. The Fair Board timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶6] Our standard of review of a district court‘s summary judgment ruling is well established:
We review a district court‘s order granting summary judgment de novo and afford no deference to the district court‘s ruling. Thornock v. PacifiCorp, 2016 WY 93, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 175, 179 (Wyo. 2016). This Court reviews the same materials and uses the same legal standard as the district court. Id. The record is assessed from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give a party opposing summary judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. A material fact is one that would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Id.
In re Estate of Weeks, 2018 WY 112, ¶ 15, 427 P.3d 729, 734 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting White v. Wheeler, 2017 WY 146, ¶ 14, 406 P.3d 1241, 1246 (Wyo. 2017)). Whether a party has standing to maintain a declaratory judgment action is a question of law that we review de novo. Williams v. State ex rel. Univ. of Wyo. Bd. of Trs., 2019 WY 90, ¶ 7, 448 P.3d 222, 226 (Wyo. 2019). Likewise, whether the Commissioners have authority to dissolve the Fair Board raises a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Delcon Partners LLC v. Wyo. Dep‘t of Rev., 2019 WY 106, ¶ 7, 450 P.3d 682, 684 (Wyo. 2019).
DISCUSSION
I. The Fair Board has standing to maintain this declaratory judgment action
[¶7] The Commissioners argue the Fair Board lacks standing to bring this declaratory judgment action because: 1) neither it nor its members suffered financial harm because of the dissolution; 2) a judgment from this Court “cannot operate effectively upon the question of who controls the monies, means and methods of managing the various recreation and entertainment assets of Laramie County“; 3) a judicial determination from this Court will not have the force and effect of a
[¶8] “A party generally has standing if it is ‘properly situated to assert an issue for judicial determination.‘” In re Estate of Stanford, 2019 WY 94, ¶ 9, 448 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Health, Div. of Healthcare Financing/EqualityCare, 2014 WY 70, ¶ 16, 326 P.3d 918, 923 (Wyo. 2014)). The existence of standing does not hinge on a party having a property or liberty interest. Those inquiries are relevant to whether a party has been deprived of procedural due process, an issue not before the Court. See Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4, ¶ 27, 367 P.3d 619, 626 (Wyo. 2016) (“In order to establish a procedural due process claim, [a litigant] must first demonstrate that she possessed a property or liberty interest.“). Instead, our four-part test from Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974), determines whether a party has standing.
First, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues. Any controversy lacking these elements becomes an exercise in academics and is not properly before the courts for solution.
Allred v. Bebout, 2018 WY 8, ¶ 37, 409 P.3d 260, 270 (Wyo. 2018).
[¶9] Here, the Fair Board has an existing or genuine right at stake because resolution of this action will determine whether it continues to exist. The Fair Board has a genuine interest in its existence, regardless of whether it or any of its members might suffer financial harm by its dissolution. A judgment declaring whether the Commissioners have authority to dissolve the Fair Board will effectively operate on that interest and have the force and effect of law because it will finally determine the legal status of the Fair Board. Finally, the parties’ divergent positions and arguments convince us that this proceeding is genuinely adverse in character. This controversy satisfies the Brimmer test.
II. The Commissioners do not have the implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board in these circumstances
[¶10] The district court concluded that the Commissioners “possess the implied power to dissolve a board that they were granted the power to create,” citing “their express power to create the Board in the first instance” under
(a) Each board of county commissioners may:
(i) Acquire lands and other property for fairgrounds, airports, parks and pleasure grounds;
(ii) Construct, maintain and operate a public auditorium, athletic fields, civic center or other community building, which may be designated as a memorial to the war veterans of the United States of America;
(iii) Appoint a board of trustees to control, maintain and manage the fairgrounds, airports, parks and pleasure grounds and to conduct agricultural, industrial and other fairs and exhibitions;
(iv) Levy taxes, issue bonds or incur indebtedness as then authorized by law for other county purposes. The taxes shall be levied and collected as are other
county taxes and the taxes collected, together with other monies received shall be expended as authorized under this section. Monies in the fund shall be expended only by the board of trustees. . . . .
(a) The board of trustees provided by
W.S. 18-9-101(a)(iii) shall be composed of not less than five (5) nor more than nine (9) competent citizens of the county appointed by the board of county commissioners. Trustees shall serve five (5) year terms which shall be staggered. The board of county commissioners shall annually appoint a successor to the trustee whose term expires. . . .(b) As soon as the original board has been appointed they shall organize by electing a chairman, secretary and treasurer of the board. As soon as they organize they shall file without fee a certificate showing their organization with the county clerk and the secretary of state. Upon filing the certificate the board of trustees is a body corporate, empowered to sue and be sued . . . .
(c) No member of the board of trustees shall be personally liable for any action or procedure of the board. The board has perpetual existence and it is not necessary to file any certificate other than that filed upon the original organization.
(d) Each year when a new member of the board is appointed the trustees shall meet and again organize by electing a chairman, secretary and treasurer. Each member of the board shall serve without compensation . . . .
[¶11] The parties agree these statutes give the Commissioners the express authority to create a Fair Board; they have conflicting views on whether the law also provides the implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board. The issue is subject to our general rules of statutory interpretation:
[O]ur goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and we “attempt to determine the legislature‘s intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.” Where legislative intent is discernible a court should give effect to the “most likely, most reasonable, interpretation of the statute, given its design and purpose.”
We therefore construe each statutory provision in pari materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We presume that the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new statutory provisions to be read in harmony with existing law and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. When the words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, we need not go farther and engage in statutory construction.
Herrick v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 118, ¶ 20, 452 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Wyo. Jet Ctr., LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019)).
[¶12] The role of the county in the administration of state government also guides our analysis. “A county is a political subdivision of the state, created to aid in the administration of government.” Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs for Sublette Cty. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶ 22, 55 P.3d 714, 721 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Dunnegan v. Laramie Cty. Comm‘rs, 852 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Wyo. 1993); accord Laramie Cty. Comm‘rs v. Albany Cty. Comm‘rs, 92 U.S. 307, 308-312, 23 L.Ed. 552 (1875) (explaining that counties, cities, and towns “are but subdivisions of the State, deriving even their existence from the legislature“); Carter v. Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs of Laramie Cty., 518 P.2d 142, 144 (Wyo. 1974) (“[T]he legislature may delegate a part of its power over local subjects to municipal corporations, county boards, and other public bodies . . . for the purpose of local self-government.“) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Mem‘l Hosp. of Sheridan Cty. v. Pratt, 262 P.2d 682, 687 (Wyo. 1953))). Accordingly, counties “have no sovereignty independent from that
First, those granted by express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the [county], and the power is denied. Dillon on Municipal Corp., 5th ed., [§ 237.] The rule of strict construction does not apply to the mode adopted by the [county] to carry into effect powers expressly or plainly granted, where the mode is not limited or prescribed by the legislature, and is left to the discretion of the [county] authorities. In such a case the usual test of validity of the act of a [county] is whether it is reasonable. Id. § 239.
Schoeller v. Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs of Park Cty., 568 P.2d 869, 876 (Wyo. 1977) (quotation marks omitted). We have also stated that “the powers of a county are usually more restricted than those of a municipal corporation.” Vandehei Developers v. Public Serv. Comm‘n of Wyo., 790 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Schoeller, 568 P.2d at 875).
[¶13] The plain language of
[¶14] In concluding that
The County Commissioners possess the implied power to dissolve a board that they were granted the power to create. This is necessarily and fairly implied from, and incident to, their express power to create the Board in the first instance.
W.S. § 18-9-101(a)(iii) . In addition, the entire section read as a whole evidences the legislature‘s intent to grant broad authority to the Commission to create, fund, and manage fair and other recreational resources. The County Commissioners are responsible for, and must approve, acquisitions of land and are empowered to establish and collect taxes through mil levy to fund those responsibilities.One of the ways, though not the only way, a county can carry out those functions is to create a Fair Board, though they are not required to do so. The Fair Board being a mechanism available to the Commission, it is a reasonable reading of the statute that it is essential they have the authority to dissolve
that mechanism and continue to meet their obligations by other means.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶15] The district court relied on State ex rel. Wyoming Agr. Coll. v. Irvine, 84 P. 90 (Wyo. 1906) and Wright v. City of Florence, 93 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. 1956) for its conclusion that the Commissioners “possess the implied power to dissolve a board that they were granted the power to create.” But both of those cases pertain to bodies with broader authority than counties have been granted. In Irvine, we considered the legislature‘s authority to dissolve an institution that it had created and held: “Having all the power that exists anywhere to establish an institution, [the legislature] necessarily has the power to dissolve it, unless the doing so involves the violation of some constitutional provision.” 84 P. at 107. Irvine‘s holding does not apply here because this case does not concern the legislature‘s authority to dissolve a legislatively created institution. Irvine relied heavily on the principle that, subject to constitutional limitations, “the power of the Legislature over [public institutions] is unrestrained, and its authority supreme,” stating:
The Legislature is vested with all legislative powers of the state; it may do anything within the domain of legislation which is not repugnant to the state or federal Constitutions; and constitutional restrictions upon the Legislature are not to be enlarged by construction beyond their terms. Moreover, the power of establishing public institutions is by the Constitution expressly vested in the Legislature.
Id. at 106. The same is not true of counties. As noted, counties “are purely auxiliaries of the state . . . and the statutes confer upon them all the powers they possess[.]” State ex rel. Bd. of Comm‘rs of Goshen Cty. v. Snyder, 212 P. 771, 781 (Wyo. 1923). In contrast to the legislature, counties
are governments of enumerated powers, acting by delegated authority, so that while the State legislature may exercise such powers of government coming within a proper designation of legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly prohibited, the local authorities can exercise only those which are expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such regulations or restrictions as are annexed to the grant.
Schoeller, 568 P.2d at 876 (citing Lakota Oil & Gas Co. v. City of Casper, 116 P.2d 861 (Wyo. 1941)). Thus, Irvine is not relevant to the scope of a county‘s more limited authority.
[¶16] Likewise, Wright does not discuss the scope of a county‘s statutorily delegated authority. Instead, it considered a municipality‘s authority to repeal an ordinance that it had enacted. Wright, 93 S.E.2d at 216. The Court‘s analysis was guided by the statute granting the municipality authority to adopt the ordinance at issue, which stated its intent “to extend and enlarge the powers of such municipalities[.]” Id. No such language exists in the statute at issue here. Moreover, we have explained that “the powers of a county are usually more restricted than those of a municipal corporation,” Vandehei Developers, 790 P.2d at 1286, which is particularly true in relation to a municipality‘s broad local “police powers” exercised via municipal ordinance. See Dunnegan, 852 P.2d at 1142 (“The county enforces state statutes and laws. It does not enact laws. A municipality may, on the other hand, enact ordinances with criminal penalties which it enforces through its police departments and municipal courts.“); see also Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Local Government Law § 6 Distinction Between Public (or Municipal) Corporations and Public Quasi-Corporations, at 19-20 (2d. ed. 2001) (explaining that municipalities typically have broader powers of local government than counties); E. George Rudolph, Wyoming Local Government Law § 4.1, at 119 (1985) (describing municipalities’ very broad “police power . . . to adopt and enforce regulatory ordinances“).
[¶17] Another case relied on by the Commissioners in this appeal is no more persuasive. In Mariano & Assoc., P.C. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs of the Cty. of Sublette, 737 P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo. 1987), we stated that “a board, officer or governing body should not contract away either the discretion of future decision makers or more importantly the fiscal welfare of the citizens that they were elected or appointed to serve.” The Commissioners rely on this statement for the proposition that a
[¶18] The district court concluded that appointment of a board of trustees is merely one way in which the Commissioners can conduct a county fair. The plain language of
[¶19] The Commissioners’ Resolution clearly contemplates that the county fair will continue without a board of trustees. See, e.g., Resolution at ¶ II (stating that the newly created Events Department would be responsible for “the operations and carrying forward of the Laramie County Fair“).3 Although we appreciate the Commissioners’ desire to consolidate and streamline management of county recreational activities, the legislature has identified the means by which a county must conduct a county fair, and deviation from that procedure is beyond its authority. Schoeller, 568 P.2d at 877 (“When the statutory delegation of power to a local government entity specifies a procedure to be followed in the exercise of that power, the
[¶20] Having concluded that the Commissioners did not have authority to dissolve the Fair Board, we must also conclude that the district court erred in holding that the Fair Board lacked standing to challenge the reallocation of tax money originally collected for the Fair Board‘s use. The district court reasoned that the Fair Board lacked standing to seek declaratory relief on this issue because it had been dissolved. However, the Commissioners lacked authority to dissolve the Fair Board, and their Resolution is void. Crouthamel v. Bd. of Albany Cty. Comm‘rs, 951 P.2d 835, 839 (Wyo. 1998) (holding county board‘s “[f]ailure to follow the statutory requirements in adopting a freeze resolution results in a void, or invalid, freeze resolution“); Bd. of Cty. Comm‘rs, Carbon Cty. v. White, 547 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wyo. 1976) (holding county agreements purporting to vacate established county road by methods other than those provided by statute null and void); accord 20 C.J.S. Counties § 106 (Feb. 2020 Update) (“Acts done outside the authority of the county board are void.“); 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 179 (Feb. 2020 Update) (“any act by a county in excess of [its] authority . . . is null and void as an ultra vires act“). Thus, the Fair Board was not dissolved, and it has standing to challenge the use of tax money to which it was assertedly entitled. Because the district court found the Fair Board lacked standing, it made no findings on the allocation of tax money. We remand for further proceedings.5
[¶21] Reversed and remanded.