158 Mich. 344 | Mich. | 1909
Gregory was a resident of Iosco county. He was taken ill with smallpox in Arenac county, at the village of Standish. He was placed in quarantine in temporary quarters provided for him, and a nurse and other supplies were furnished by order of the local board of health, amounting to $307.34. Among the items were stove $3, and tent $12, and these and some things listed as supplies, amounting in all to $56.79, are said to have been afterwards used for other patients who were not residents of Iosco county. The local board of health allowed all of the items, and the claims were audited by the board of supervisors, and paid by the treasurer of Arenac county. The bill so paid was presented to the board of supervisors of Iosco county on behalf of Arenac county, and was considered by said board at its regular session in January, 1904, and disallowed, whereupon this action was brought to enforce the claim. This expenditure was made in 1901, while 2 Comp. Laws, § 4424, was in force, though Act No. 7, Pub. Acts 1903, became operative before this action was commenced. The plaintiff has appealed.
Counsel seem to agree that the questions involved here are: •
(1) Was Iosco county conclusively bound by the action of the local board of health in auditing and allowing the bills ?
(2) Was it so bound by the action of the Arenac board of supervisors ?
(3) Was Arenac county bound to exhaust its remedies against other parties made liable to pay by the statute before suing defendant ?
(4) Was Arenac county barred from recovery under section 4424 by reason of the taking effect of Act No. 7, Pub. Acts 1903, before this action was begun ?
(а) Whether appellant has a valid claim for articles afterwards used for Arenac county’s own residents.
(б) Can recovery be had for services of nurse employed against the protests of the patient who offers to furnish his own nurse and physician ?
We are of the opinion that this action of the local board of health is equally conclusive of these things upon Iosco county under the statute cited, and, while Arenac county was called upon to pay the certified claim in the first instance, it was only necessary upon the trial to make proof of such allowance and payment. There is a close analogy between such a' case as this and the expenses of State troops in suppressing a riot. See Auditor General v. Board of Sup’rs of Bay Co., 106 Mich. 679, 680 (64 N. W. 570), for a discussion of the principle involved. See, also, Board of Sup’rs of Arenac Co. v. Board of Sup’rs of Iosco Co., 144 Mich. 54 (107 N. W. 725).
(1) Under the rule that statutes will not be considered retroactive unless the intent that they should have retroactive effect clearly appears. Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318; Smith v. Humphrey, 20 Mich. 398; Fuller v. City of Grand Rapids, 40 Mich. 395; Maxwell v. Bridge Co., 46 Mich. 278 (9 N. W. 410); Phillips v. Township of New Buffalo, 68 Mich. 217 (35 N. W. 918); In re Lambrecht, 137 Mich. 450 (100 N. W. 606); Davis v. Railroad Co., 147 Mich. 479 (111 N. W. 76).
(2) It cannot be construed as retroactive to the detriment of vested rights. Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24 (4 Am. Rep. 430); Van Fleet v. Van Fleet, 49 Mich. 610 (14 N. W. 566); Todd v. Boards of Election Com’rs, 104 Mich. 474 (62 N. W. 564, 64 N. W. 496, 29 L. R. A. 330); Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.), p. 528; Ludwig v. Stewart, 32 Mich. 27; Harrison v. Metz, 17 Mich. 377; McKisson v. Davenport, 83 Mich. 211 (47 N. W. 100, 10 L. R. A. 507); Atherton v. Vil
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.