722 N.E.2d 611 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1999
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *414
On or about August 8, 1996, appellee passed resolution number 96-61 declaring the necessity to appropriate a right-of-way across the Norfolk and Western Main Line which crosses land currently owned by appellee.1 The purpose of this right-of-way was to place a bike trail on the land. However, the proposed use of the land would cross a section of appellant's land. The former owner of appellee's land had a right-of-way across appellant's land. Appellant did not recognize appellee's right-of-way and refused to let appellee cross its land, stating that the original right-of-way was abandoned and that appellee has no authority to cross unless it proceeded according to Ohio law.
On February 19, 1997, appellee filed a complaint for appropriation to acquire an easement over and across appellant's right-of-way and to redefine and clarify appellee's interest in the land. Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was overruled on February 23, 1998. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the action on February 24, 1998, which was also overruled.
A hearing was held on February 26, 1998 before a magistrate, in which she determined the value of the taking, as was stipulated by both parties. The parties additionally stipulated that appellee did not have the right-of-way because it was abandoned by the former owner of the land. Further, the parties determined that the amount of compensation for the taking of the right-of-way *415
was $8,050 plus the expense of the crossing. The parties agreed that $235,000 was the estimated cost for the crossing gates, switches, steel mesh fences and paving of the crossing. At the hearing, the parties disagreed about the cost of the entire bike trail. Appellant alleged that it would cost $660,000, whereas appellee asserted that it would cost about $2 million. In a judgment entry dated March 11, 1998, the trial court ruled that pursuant to the February 24, 1998 magistrate's report, appellee had the authority to appropriate land pursuant to R.C.
Appellant filed two notices of appeal. On May 29, 1998, appellant filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which motion was subsequently granted by this court. Appellant now asserts the following as error:
"[1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of [appellant] in overruling its motion for summary judgment and dismissal maintaining that [appellee] has no jurisdiction to pursue an appropriation proceeding for a bike trail easement at grade over a railroad right of way without first filing an action in common pleas court mandated by
"[2.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of [appellant] in overruling its motion for summary judgment and dismissal maintaining that [appellee] is not an appropriate public entity having any authority to appropriate a right of way for a bike trail at grade across a railroad right of way."
In a summary judgment exercise, the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly held that in order for a summary judgment to be granted, the moving party must prove:
"* * * (1) [N]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made." Mootispaw v. Eckstein
(1996),
The court stated in Dresher v. Burt (1996),
"[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim. * * *" (Emphasis sic.) *416
In its first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and motion for dismissal because appellee did not follow the mandatory procedures of R.C.
Chapter 4957 of the Revised Code generally deals with the elimination of crossings. As part of this statutory scheme R.C.
"When it is desired by * * * any municipal corporation or authority constructing a new highway, that the * * * highway should be so constructed that they will cross each other at the same grade, or if it is desired to divert, change, or alter an existing public highway, a petition shall be presented by the party desiring such construction or diversion, to the court of common pleas of the county within which the crossing or diversion is situated. If it is the authority constructing the highway * * * the railroad company shall be the defendant * * *."
However, certain sections of this Revised Code Chapter do provide for the establishment of crossings at grade. R.C.
"The petition referred to in section
According to R.C.
"* * * no power to appropriate is conferred unless such appropriation will not unnecessarily interfere with the use of the property to be crossed, and the *417
appropriation proceeding cannot go forward until that question shall have been determined, whether the crossing be at the same or at separate grade, for it is jurisdictional." Id. at 161-162,
However, appellee asserts that R.C.
"The board of park commissioners may acquire lands either within or without the park district for * * * conservation of the natural resources of the state * * * and to those ends may create parks, parkways, forest reservations and afforest, develop, improve, protect, and promote the use of same in such manner as the board deems conducive to the general welfare. Such lands may be acquired by such board, on behalf of said district * * * by appropriation.
"* * *
"This section applies to districts created prior to April 16, 1920."
Although R.C.
In interpreting a statute, a court's principal concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. State v. S.R.
(1992),
"[U]nder the cardinal rule of statutory construction, `all statutes which relate to the same general subject matter must be read in pari materia.'" Cater v. Cleveland (1998),
We note that the Supreme Court of Ohio in, Johnson'sMarkets,
"In the judicial interpretation of potentially conflicting laws, certain statutory rules of construction must be considered.
As a threshold we observe that R.C.
"`In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:
"`* * *
"`(C) A just and reasonable result is intended;
"`(D) A result feasible of execution is intended.'
"Another statutory rule of construction which must be considered if, and when, statutes being reviewed by a court are found to be in irreconcilable conflict, is R.C.
"`If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.'"
Contrary to the provisions of R.C.
In considering both of the foregoing statutory provisions, it is apparent that R.C.
In the instant case, while we are aware that a board of park commissioners may acquire land for the general welfare of the public, courts must determine the necessity and desirability of the taking when the land involved is a railroad. "Absent ambiguity, statutory language is not to be enlarged or construed in any way other than that which its words demand." Kneisley v.Lattimer-Stevens Co. (1988),
Appellant asserts in its second assignment of error that appellee was not the proper public entity having authority to cross over the railroad to complete the proposed bike trail. Pursuant to R.C.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant's first assignment of error is with merit. Appellant's second assignment of error is not well-taken. Therefore, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHRISTLEY, J., NADER, J., concur.