*1 PRESBYTERIAN THE OF NATIONAL MISSIONS OF BOARD AMERICA, ET THE UNITED OF CHURCH IN STATES NEELD, APPELLANTS, AL., DI AARON DEPUTY K. DIRECTOR, OF TAXA DIVISION RECTOR ACTING AS TREASURY, TION, DEPARTMENT OF THE RESPOND ENT. TAX THE INHERITANCE IN THE MATTER TRANSFER OF WALLACE, THE ESTATE OF ISABEL IN ASSESSMENT DECEASED. Argued May 5, April 1952. 1952 Decided *2 Moore, Jr., the cause for the Ira argued Mr. C. appellants &Moore Whiting, Phillips, attorneys). (Messrs. cause for the respondent

Mr. Jansen Joseph argued Parsons, attorney; Mr. Attorney-General, Theodore D. (Mr. Moore, A. counsel). William special delivered by the court was The of opinion tax assess- This is from inheritance appeal Oliphant, and the National Missions ments levied Board of against Church. Presbyterian Board of Missions Foreign Court, taken Division of the Superior to the appeal, Appellate there, certified here on our own motion. was before argument here, died testate December Wallace, the decedent on Isabel and 1948, the terms her will certain trust 11, and of by of boards transferred to each the appealing indentures she $33,934.32. The boards claimed before the sum of Taxation, that Treasury, they of Department Division of within the intendment of R. educational institutions 8. were therefore from transfer entirely exempt and 54:3U-4(á) defendant, taxes. The director of deputy inheritance otherwise, held Taxation, Division determining of transferees set forth fell within the as category boards in R. S. institutions or charitable 54:3A-2(6) and were therefore to a tax five subject every- cent per in excess thing $5,000, therein. provided R. S. levies tax five 54:34-2(6) every- cent on per $5,000 “churches, excess of thing on transfers of property hospitals libraries, orphan asylums, Bible public societies, tract institu- religious, benevolent charitable tions and organizations,” while R. 8. 54:3A-4(d), as amended c. transfers of to or totally exempts property the use- of “educational institutions” provided shall not extend to edu- exemptions transfers of property cational states, institutions of other which do grant same of transfers exemption for the property benefit such institutions of this State. The New York State of this grants exemption.

The is, therefore, issue presented into which do category fall; these boards are or educational institu- they religious tions ?

The Board National New Missions is a York corporation and its as stated in its is “the purpose charter extension of and the of Christ in all its Christianity Gospel fullness and service and all its in His the implications United States of America and elsewhere as said general assembly (the govern- of the direct and ing body church) may by establishing churches, local and organization strengthening evangelism, as deemed such wise.” In further- special enterprises may the and ance of hoard owns purpose operates boarding States, and 18 schools day schools United throughout and in 7,808, an enrollment of addition conducts having and vacation Bible daily schools, schools Sunday enroll- 17,536. ment of the latter addition the board main- being missions, tains and and operates hospitals, dispensaries said, It and it will centers. be con- community readily of this board is ceded, program designed improve social, literary, and cultivate eco- religious, physical, of the aspects population and recreational or commu- nomic touches, and that all its which it activities are nity integrated in the mission of Christ to bring Gospel people fields and them to live as Christians. teach New York Missions,

The likewise a Board of Eoreign establish- “for the corporation, was incorporated purpose and outside the continental Christian missions ing conducting America, diffu- area of and the the United States of general board, set forth sion of The Christianity.” commit- in the the chairman its administrative affidavit of tee, diffusion of Chris- is likewise stated “the general are all its and tianity,” activities, and departments projects a hand directed that end. The board or has operates toward 10,052 with schools an enrollment Sunday operating 1,775 with an enroll- 723,000, elementary excess of and schools 150,000, ment of also stations. In the field of its over medical mental, build re- activity physical spiritual seeks to individual, with sources for the fullest self-realization by character, and inspira- complete development personality tion of for the services of their community, nationals highest nation, their their fellowmen and their God. and basic is that general argument appellants which are benevolent charitable institutions

religious, transfer inher- exempt also educationál institutions are from itance taxes. is contended that words “educational institutions” as used the statute are not limited to schools ordinary sense but institution colleges apply, any which carries on or educational function. The performs an boards of their activ- aspects two argue are ities to those our Chris- analogous performed leading in that they tian colleges endeavoring prepare people *4 live their contend that They to lives Christians. teaching is much or educational as is the Christianity just religion the conventional school work aim of or college. They their say hospitals, dispensaries, effect community like to merely ancillary centers and the their educational as, example, the athletic of a uni- just purpose, program purpose. is its The Division versity principal Taxation takes a view. . contrary /

353 Statutes are to be from taxation granting exemptions construed tax strictly a claimant and a claimant for against has the entitlement exemption and burden of duty proving to the 699 73 N. J. L. exemption. Cory, Sisters v. Charity & A. (E. Trustees v. Piscata 1906); Rutgers University way 85 Ct. To Township, exempt (Sup. 1946). from a tax property burden the statute must express intent to that and in clear and unmistakable terms. Fairview, etc., Co. v. 90 N. L. 427 Ct. Fay, 1917), (Sup. affirmed N. J. L. 688 & Statutes, A. 1917). par (E. ticularly taxation, those with must extended not be dealing to include persons not intended and should not be construed more or effect than their broadly any given greater language Adams & requires, v. Atlantic 137 N. J. L. County, (E. A. The statute here 1948). involved exemption grants transferees “to or for the use educational institution” any and makes reference fund no to the for which the purpose so transferred is to be devoted.

The claims for here asserted must therefore exemption on the depend as educational institu appellants qualifying within tions the intent and of these as used words A statute. basic rule of is statutory construction. that words used therein “should be interpreted according the most natural and obvious without import language, to subtle or forced construction for the resorting either their operations,” City Affairs, limiting extending etc., Taxation, v. Jersey N. J. L. City Dept. of Ct. and in the of an a 1946), absence indication of (Sup. be accorded thereto the specific meaning ordinary meaning of the words is Eckert v. controlling. Highway N. J. State Ford Motor N. J. 474 Co. v. N. J. Dept., (1949); Dept. of Labor, acts, 5 N. J. 494 (1950). construing legislative laws, tax words common use are to taken particularly in their ordinary Evening Journal Ass’n. v. signification. Board, 47 36L. Ct. Co. 1885); Storage State N. J. (Sup. Assessors, N. J. L. 389 To'the 1894). ordinary individual, of a church is that concept average institution. *5 354

The of “educational institution” is a ordinary meaning conducted, where classes are such as schools and col place not an institution which furnishes some education leges, branch, no matter what as an incidental to its main adjunct purpose. Tappan Washington Memorial Corp. Margetts, 9 N. J. Div. In Super. (App. 1950). written opinion Jacobs, Justice when sitting Appellate Division, he dealt with the we statutory provisions are here concerned with. While the institution involved was an historical mu stated, seum it is there and we that in common agree, parlance the term institutions,” “educational sense, its primary would refer to and other ¿universities schools where students We are taught by/instructors. convinced the legislative purpose in enacting the statute here involved was to exempt an institution whose aim and primary object.was and not one whose educative function is in furtherance of another predominant An incidental purpose. qualification not sufficient upon which to a claim for ground exemption.

These claimants must show that the primary purpose, ultimate use or work, characteristics of their is that which the statute sets as a up basis for and this exemptions they Ministers, have etc., The done. Convention v. Thayer- Martin, 118 N. 1937). Legislature separately classified educational institutions in R. S. 54:34- 4(d) removed them from expressly category churches and institutions set in section up 2(6) of the act. This is indication and it will be strong presumed that it intended to designate exemption those educational institutions whose aim primary is education and not those where the educational is incidental to the attainment other, of some De though higher purpose, re Peyster’s Estate, Y.N. N. E. (Ct. App. 1914). The those exemption granted institutions enumerated in section cannot be extended to those 4(d) set forth sec. If 2(6). this could be done the separate classifications would be mean ingless. *6 church is

Every process engaged teaching people end that about Christ or some other to the those Deity and useful able to lead a more satisfactory teaches If we life. because accept premise teaching in- about Christ and often people Christianity necessarily and that such work many volves other teaching things if sense, then can be denoted educational the statutory conclusion, virtually this is followed to thought logical an educa- could be classified as every religious organization tional institution. itself not be con- church of would

Certainly ordinary insti- as within the classification of an “educational sidered far resemble tution,” these mission boards more yet church than school or ordinary ordinary college. do they subjects school or while ordinary college it is done in addition to their taught religion encouraged diocese is secular instructions. An or Catholic Episcopalian one, a and not an educational even religious organization under denomina- jurisdiction they their though may operate tional or schools or These parochial colleges. appealing boards are even under their religious organizations though schools or jurisdiction they operate ordinary colleges A sense. to a Catholic or church or bequest Episcopalian, diocese would be taxable as a transfer to a religious organiza- tion, whereas a to a testamentary gift particular school the church or diocese would be tax as a by operated exempt institution. a Similarly, transfer to bequest one of the one of schools boards operated appealing considered tax as a transfer to an educational exempt would be the boards institution, but when it is to themselves it must a be considered one to other religious organization. Any of the statute would be an unwarranted interpretation per- the words “educational institution” and as version of a result in the matter would granting exemptions practical which the virtually every religious organization Legis- never intended. lature the statute R. S. 54:34-

We have construed that part state amended, explanatory without resort 4(d), been the introduced. has ment attached the bill when the last nearly century, pronouncement law of this State for is not as this that such a statement year, of which was as late in judicial an index of intent to be construed as Co. v. Keyport Steamboat of the enactment. exposition Co., N. J. 13 (Ch. 1866), Eq. Farmers Transportation re County, & A. In Hudson Ibid, (E. 1866); affirmed p. & v. Raymond Township J. L. A. 1929); 106 N. (E. Teaneck, & A. v. Johan 1936); Flagg 118 N. J. 109 (E. Hock, sen, 124 N. J. L. 1940); Hoffman N. 397 (1952). *7 the better than as expressed rationale of rule cannot be The Johansen, Flagg Court in Supreme forth the former by set at it said: supra, p. where passage legislative of not be intent the a measure is to “But on is and unreliable a source. Such a statement from so frail deduced passed upon by legis part the It is not even no of the enactment. any appear upon It not the official lature committee thereof. does or reading, copy and before the houses for debate of bill which comes the not, deep knowledge think, upon passage. we technical It does draw statutory a to discern that if such state of the rules of construction express purpose frank and which in the full the ment be taken to measure, imputes is his the which thus troducer a bill to of only legislature member of the and that too at that one evidenced is of may debate, passage. precedes and amendment never a time which legislature expressed' a the as whole and intent of have the enactment, correctly- reflect, of as of the time of views even not anj' imputed single member, intent of of even the introducer. significance judicial legislature minority bloc, no in con a has of by clearly was stated This idea Chancellor Zabriskie struction. Keyport Transportation Co., Co. v. Farmers’ 18 N. Steamboat J. Eq. 24: act, draftsman of or the individual mem ‘The of the intention passed it, legislature properly voted for and if not who bers of the admitted, nothing act, expressed to do it is has with its con in the construction, only just especially among ; a rule free struction expressed people, those law to to whom it is of the by governed legislator prescribed, it. If the who and who to be judge expounds it, be the who his law afterwards enacted the should express, ought intention, not skill he has which own ” .govern.’ We have held that a statute is where ambiguous not, face, which the one under consideration is preamble circumstances, under some history legislation, intent, Black examined to ascertain might legislative Iles, Grobart, man v. N. J. 83 Grobart v. (1950); Co., 8 N. Bass v. Allen Home (1950); Improvement but this is far from a (1951); cry holding exam introducer’s statement to the bill should be attached ined. All with the use of these cases dealt foregoing intent. A preambles preamble determining legislative itself, a bill is remains a part always bill parcel to it and becomes enactment. preface part statements attached to bills are not even Many prepared and in instances are many solely introducer designed to further their accurate or not. they may be passage; Committee the consideration of reports proposed legisla- tion, debates recorded and accurately gubernatorial messages are in an different aids in entirely category determining intent.

Cases in the federal are not jurisdictions guideposts persuade us to reach a different determination of this ques- VII, IV, Constitution, tion. Our par. Art. sec. provides ** law shall embrace but one every object, that shall be in the title.” There is no such expressed pro- vision in the Eederal Constitution and it is common knowl- that acts of are sometimes a edge Congress hodgepodge And the followed legislation. procedure process *8 the enactment of federal is different from vastly legislation There, after are system. our bills introduced committees them, consider often hold them and on the formal hearings are committee before houses of when reports Congress taken votes are thereon. The debates on bills are reported course, Of under such circumstances stenographically. legis- aid lative be an history may possibly ascertaining legislative intent. Our follows no such Legislature generally procedure. does a committee make a formal Barely report, committee are seldom and debates on the reported, floor of proceedings are not Assembly stenographically the Senate House there is no such procedure the federal reported. attached to as a statement of an introducer being thing proposed legislation. Co., Inc., in Hill Coal

Mr. Justice Holmes said Pine wisely States, 66 L. 482, Ed. 191, 42 v. United 259 U. Sup. S. : speculations “It is a delicate to base (1922) business upon a statute purposes about or construction of its in this State the vicissitudes of Particularly passage.” statute as must be from the intention gleaned enacted, from which of a expression single legislator house when was not before the house of the other origin, there, the bill in the process was considered Governor of its enactment. to the is to be found key of the statute interpretation which must the distinction which reasoning underlie between and charitable insti- made Legislature religious

tutions and institutions. The latter un- educational taxation, doubtedly exemption total from whereas granted institutions are not charitable because educa- tional institutions are State its func- assisting public tion of its citizens. educating Taxation,

The assessment made Depart- Division of ment affirmed. Treasury, Our has (concurring). granted Legislature

Jacobs, inheritance transfers exemption from taxes on partial “churches, property hospitals orphan asylums, public libraries, societies, Bible and tract beuevolent and religious, charitable institutions” S. and total exemption (R. 54:34-2) 1948, transfers to “educational L. c. 268 institutions.” I S. When the view 54:34-4(d)). expressed (R. Tappan Washington Margetts, Super. Memorial Corp. Div. that the meant to confine (App. 1950) Legislature traditional total institutions such exemption schools, I as universities and other found support attached c. statement when intro- originally

359 duced as a It set bill. forth that its was legislative “to endowed privately education encourage higher by making uniform the from inheritance tax of exemption bequests devises to all educational institutions not operated profit” and that full would confine “the of language exemption to such institutions as bequests Princeton University, Rutgers University, the State University of New Institu Jersey, tion for Advanced Drew Study, St. Peter’s Col University, lege, Seton Hall John Marshall College, Upsala College, Newark of College, Stevens Institute College Engineering, and other insti Technology, privately-endowed nonprofit - tutions at the elementary, secondary higher in State, levels this and on a basis in other reciprocal States.” Hock, However, in 397, 408 this (1952) Hoffman court indicated recently that such statement in any wise used aid in the extrinsic ascertainment of the Frankfurter, or intent. purpose, meaning Cf. Some Statutes, Reflections on the 47 Col. L. Rev. Reading 527, 538 I with (1947). this view as without disagree being basis in reason or in support persuasive elsewhere authority and take this first as a member of this court opportunity Landis, record dissent therefrom. A my See Note on Statu tory 43 Harv. L. 886 Interpretation, Rev. de (1930); Sloo vere, Extrinsic Aids in the Statutes, Interpretation U. of Note, Pa. L. Rev. 527 A (1940); Re-Evaluation of the Use Courts, in the Federal Legislative History Col. L. Rev. Jackson, But J., in (1952). Schwegmann Bros. v. cf. 384, 395, Calvert Distiller’s 341 U. S. Corp., 745, S. Ct. 1035, 95 L. Ed. 1048 (1951).

Chief Justice Marshall ex struck at notion that early trinsic aids are inadmissible the ascertainment of fash his common sense remarking ion that “Where the mind labours to discover the design it seizes aid legislature, from which can be everything Fisher, 386, derived.” United States v. 2 Cranch L. Ed. 313 (1804). Expressions comparable import found recent decisions of the readily United States *10 Co., Northern Trust Court. in Harrison v. Supreme Thus 476, 479, 361, 407, 317 87 410 (1943) U. S. 63 Ct. L. Ed. S. best, inexact at the court stressed that since words are tools history. there is no rule resort to wisely forbidding legislative Dickerson, 554, 562, 60 And in United v. 310 U. S. States court, 1034, 1356, 84 1362 the 1038, S. Ct. L. Ed. (1940) may while that materials recognizing particular legislative be without substantial contradictory, probative ambiguous deemed value, out that can be pointed they scarcely “incompe tent or irrelevant” and that the to be ascribed to meaning “can derived from a con only be congressional legislation sidered of relevant aid to construction.” weighing every Co., R. 130 N. J. L. 601 McFadden v. R. Pennsylvania Ct. our former availed itself of 1943) Court (Sup. Supreme ,a of history congres legislative ascertaining meaning sional enactment. when ascertain the Similarly, seeking of our this court provisions State Constitution has used all freely history. available constitutional See Marsh, Imbrie v. 3 N. J. 578 v. Winberry Salisbury, (1950); 5 240 Indeed, N. J. case the court (1950). Winberry reliance a and in some veto placed gubernatorial message Koch, 29 24, Koch v. 79 N. J. the court Eq. (Ch. 1911) that it could use a commission expressed opinion properly aids in report gubernatorial message interpreting L. W. R. Delaware & Co. ensuing legislative enactment. Cf. 2 93, v. Division Tax N. 98 Appeals, J. Super. (1949), 946, 3 N. J. 27 dism. 338 affirmed 70 (1949), app. U. S. 488, Ct. 94 L. Ed. 583 Ablondi v. Re (1950); S. Board of view, 71, 8 N. J. 75 Div. Super. (App. 1950); Family 13, v. Gough, Finance 21 Div. Corp. Super. (App. . true It we 1950) notwithstanding foregoing find in our cases sometimes dis reexpression generally carded view that enactment construing beyond court not look words of statute itself. may 62, 106 N. J. L. & See In re Hudson A. County, (E. 1928). Law, Stone, The Province and Function p. But cf. However, this with may contrasted our settled (1950). construction doctrine that administrative contemporaneous will be the meaning given ascertaining weight Cas. Ins. New Harper Jersey v. legislative language. Mfrs. Hock, Co., 137 N. J. 93, 1 N. Kravis (1948); Cox, Learned Hand 1948). Judge See Statutes, 60 L. Rev. and the Harv. Interpretation rule that “The where the out author (1947) pointed are entitled to that administrative great interpretations rests recourse justifying on a basis similar to weight with be further contrasted history.” use courts which enable the of our broadening concepts in ascertaining proper extrinsic materials pertinent *11 instruments. of written contracts and other private meaning 2 N. Casriel v. King, (1949). Cf. 456, 459 Johansen, 124 J. L. Flagg 1940) v. N. a “frail and statement as the court described introducer’s intent should be unreliable” which source that this fails to It seems to me distinguish considered. The introducer’s and legal weight. between admissibility on any statement relevant evidence clearly proper constitutes intent; it sets issue as to the or purpose, draftsman sponsor forth the interpretation members of the his fellow is circulated legislation, amongst be, a matter as the and becomes may Senate or ease Assembly, all, and thereafter. record available for then inspection documented embody fully and be very complete substantial consideration. narrative of entitled to 21, 1952, March Ho. 15 introduced Assembly See e. g., to a which is form comparable and a statement bearing hand it may committee On other report. detailed to little con entitled misleading inadequate perhaps can tell what kind of But before this court sideration. it, must at looking statement is it have privilege I, one, denied. for am that is what Johansen Flagg Casale, 100 Winne v. N. J. L. See blinkers. removing Chief Gummere 291, 295 & A. where Justice (E. 1924) and Schweg- statement introducer’s found significance mann Bros. v. Calvert Distiller’s where Justice Corp., supra, remarked is the we Douglas “It look to sponsors when the meaning of the in doubt.” In statutory words is particular construing statutory such as that phraseology embodied must, c. 268 we unless are to we usurp functions of the other seek branches to ascer- government, tain and effectuate the than rather our legislative meaning own. To that task we should minds unafraid bring explore.

Justice Brennan in this joins opinion.

Wacheneeld, Burling, Brennan, JJ., Jacobs and con- in result. curring

For Justice and Justices Vanderbilt, affirmance —Uhief Oliphant, Wacheneeld, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan

For reversal—Justice Hetier —1. CITY, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, CITY OF JERSEY v. LE VALLEY HIGH RAILROAD AND COMPANY DIVISION OF TAX APPEALS THE IN STATE DEPARTMENT OF *12 TREASURY, THE RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. CITY, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT, CITY OF JERSEY v. NA TIONAL STORAGE COMPANY AND DIVISION OF TAX APPEALS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PETITIONERS-RESPONDENTS. Argued April 21, May 12, 1952 Decided 1952.