870 N.E.2d 791 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2007
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[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *358 {¶ 1} This is appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 2} On April 11, 2003, a group of Waterville Township residents ("the circulators"), who are designated as cross-appellees,1 filed a petition in which they asked the Lucas County Board of Commissioners to erect a new township pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 3} The present declaratory judgment action was filed on June 12, 2003. The board named a number of defendants including the circulators and cross-appellants, Anton J. Urbas and Timothy J. Pedro. Urbas is a nonfreehold elector who has resided in Waterville Township for 26 years. Pedro is a freehold elector who has resided in the village of Waterville for ten years and is a Waterville Township trustee. In their complaint, the board asked the common pleas court to determine the constitutionality of R.C.
{¶ 4} Urbas and Pedro filed an answer and a counterclaim against the board, asking the court below to issue a declaratory judgment finding that R.C.
{¶ 5} The circulators filed an answer and a counterclaim against the board based upon the board's Resolution Nos. 02-1008 and 02-1009, both dated July 25, 2002. In Resolution No. 02-1008, the board denied a petition, filed pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 6} The circulators also filed a motion for partial summary judgment in which they asked the court to find that R.C.
{¶ 7} On December 30, 2004, the trial court entered a judgment declaring that R.C.
{¶ 8} Subsequently, the circulators moved for summary judgment on the cross-claim asserted by Urbas and Pedro. The circulators maintained that contrary to the assertions of Urbas and Pedro, R.C.
{¶ 9} On January 30, 2006, the court below entered a judgment in which it determined that the circulators' petition, filed on April 11, 2003, did not meet the requirements of R.C.
{¶ 10} The board appeals the judgment of the trial court and asserts the following assignments of error:
{¶ 11} "1. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the January 30, 2006 Opinion and Judgment Entry finding that the petition filed by the Circulators on April 11, 2003 was invalid, since the Appellant's Resolution No. 03-808 was not a final order in accordance with R.C.
{¶ 12} "2. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the January 30, 2006 Opinion and Judgment Entry finding that the petition filed by the Circulators on April 11, 2003 was invalid, since the Appellees' August 4, 2004 counterclaim and cross-claim did not comply with R.C.
{¶ 13} "3. Even if Appellant's Resolution No. 03-808 was a final order in accordance with R.C.
{¶ 14} In their cross-appeal, Urbas and Pedro set forth the following cross-assignments of error:
{¶ 15} "(a) The trial court erred in failing to find that the `freeholder' requirement of O.R.C.
{¶ 16} "(b) The trial court erred in failing to find that the requirement of O.R.C.
{¶ 17} "(c) The trial court erred in failing to find that O.R.C.
{¶ 18} The circulators did not file a notice of appeal from the trial court's judgment; however, we allowed them to file an amicus brief, which addresses the question of subject-matter jurisdiction raised by the board.
{¶ 19} Because they have the potential to be dispositive of this cause, we will first consider the cross-assignments of error propounded by cross-appellants, Urbas and Pedro.
{¶ 20} The December 30, 2004 judgment on the question of the constitutionality of R.C.
{¶ 21} The Equal Protection Clauses of the
{¶ 22} The Equal Protection Clauses of the
{¶ 23} We must first determine whether any classifications are created by R.C.
{¶ 24} "Where a township contains a municipal corporation, either in whole or in part, if a majority of the freehold electors owning land in the portion of such a township outside the municipal corporation's corporate limits, petitions, with a map accurately setting forth such territory, praying to have such territory erected into a new township, and excluding the territory within the municipal corporation, the board of county commissioners shall enter an order erecting such territory into a new township, the boundaries of which need not include twenty-two square miles of territory. Upon the erection of such new township, the territory lying within the limits of the municipal corporation in the original township shall be considered as not being located in any township."
{¶ 25} A freeholder is the owner of an interest in land the duration of which is not fixed by a specified period of time. Cunningham v. Crabbe (1992),
{¶ 26} This court must next decide whether either or both of these classifications violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Our analysis of this issue rests upon the nature of the interest affected. Conley v. Shearer,
{¶ 27} If, however, the classification involves a fundamental right or a suspect classification, a strict-scrutiny test must be applied.2 Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994),
{¶ 28} In the case under consideration, cross-appellants claim that R.C.
{¶ 29} The answer to whether the right to vote is implicated in the application of R.C.
{¶ 30} On the other hand, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 31} In Bush v. Gore (2000),
{¶ 32} "[T]he right to vote as the [State] legislature has prescribed is fundamental and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter. * * * The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." See alsoState v. Thompson,
{¶ 33} Because this fundamental constitutional right is at issue, the constitutionality of R.C.
{¶ 34} Generally, the only restrictions that the state can impose on the right to vote are residence, age, and citizenship requirements. Hayward v. Clay (C.A.4, 1978),
{¶ 35} In the present case, cross-appellees, the circulators, assert that under the rational-basis test, it is the freehold electors living in the unincorporated areas of Waterville Township who have the greatest interest in the erection of a new governmental unit because they are the only persons who have to pay property taxes. We will first discuss this allegation with regard to the classification of nonfreehold electors who reside in the unincorporated areas of Waterville Township, as represented by elector Urbas.
{¶ 36} We conclude that the justification offered by the circulators is insufficient either under the strict-scrutiny or rational-basis standards. In Quinn v.Millsap (1989),
{¶ 37} Accordingly, we find that the basis advanced by cross-appellees is not compelling, or even rational, and therefore does not support the disparate treatment of a class of nonfreehold electors who live in the unincorporated section of Waterville Township. Therefore, that portion of R.C.
{¶ 38} With regard to the class of electors, be they freeholders or nonfreeholders, who reside within the incorporated areas of Waterville Township, as embodied in elector Pedro, we do not come to the same conclusion. Specifically, a compelling justification exists for excluding the vote of those electors who reside in incorporated areas of the township. Clearly, in enacting R.C.
{¶ 39} In their third assignment of error, cross-appellants complain that R.C.
{¶ 40} "All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly."
{¶ 41} Cross-appellants contend that R.C.
{¶ 42} We do not, however, find that preventing electors, freeholders or otherwise, who reside in the incorporated villages of Whitehouse and Waterville from petitioning for the creation of a new township under R.C.
{¶ 43} In the event that this court determined that permitting only freehold electors residing outside of the incorporated parts of a township rendered R.C.
{¶ 44} R.C.
{¶ 45} After severing the unconstitutional provisions of R.C.
{¶ 46} "Where a township contains a municipal corporation, either in whole or in part, if a majority of the electors in the portion of such a township outside the municipal corporation's corporate limits, petitions, with a map accurately setting forth such territory, praying to have such territory erected into a new township, and excluding the territory within the municipal corporation, the board of county commissioners shall enter an order erecting such territory into a new township, the boundaries of which need not include twenty-two square miles of territory. Upon the erection of such new township, the territory lying within the limits of the municipal corporation in the original township shall be considered as not being located in any township."
{¶ 47} It appears that after the severance of the unconstitutional language of the statute, the remaining portions may be read and stand by them-selves. That is, absent the language limiting the right to petition ("vote") to freehold electors owning land in that portion of a township outside of an incorporated area, R.C.
{¶ 48} Because we find certain parts of R.C.
{¶ 49} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for the sole purpose of vacating both its decision declaring that R.C.
Judgment reversed.
PIETRYKOWSKI, P.J., and GLASSER, J., concur.
GEORGE M. GLASSER, J., retired, of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.