62 Miss. 807 | Miss. | 1885
delivered the opinion of the court.
This cause is properly here by appeal. The legislature, by granting an appeal from the decision of the commissioners to the chancery court, from which court appeals may be taken from all final decrees, indicated, as we think, an intention to confer the right of appeal to the losing party, just as it is given to other litigants in that court. 0
By the third section of the act creating the board of levee commissioners power is conferred upon it to exercise the right of eminent domain for the acquisition of such lands as may be necessary for the construction of the system of levees provided for, but compensation is to be made to the owner to the extent of the “ value of the property [taken] and the damages sustained.” It is unnecessary to consider whether the State might have taken the land, paying only the value thereof, without regard to the injury which would result from the uses to which it was devoted, since it is manifest that it proposed to pay both the value of the property taken and the damages.
The measure by which damages are to be determined in cases of this character has been declared in several decisions of this court. We can add nothing to the rule as given in the case of Isom v. The Mississippi Central Railroad Co., 7 Geo. 312, that “the value of the property in market at the time, and the injury then necessarily known to result to the owner, as the necessary and immediate consequence of the public use of his property, without reference to the uncertain or remote benefits or disadvantages that may or may not occur in the future,” is the measure of compensation.
The overflowing water of the Mississippi River is the enemy of the public, and the State in assuming to deal with the danger arising therefrom has not provided for compensating the owners of lands lying along the borders of the river for any injury which may incidentally and possibly arise from confining the waters within the limits fixed by the line of levees.
The testimony of the witnesses who stated that the effect of the levees would be to raise the flood line should have been excluded. The evidence of the appellee that the lands between the levee and the river had been reduced in value seventy-five per cent, should also have been excluded, since a material factor in producing this deterioration was the fact that these lands were or would be unprotected by the levees, and this protection the public is under no obli
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded to the Chancery Court of De Soto County.