11 La. Ann. 743 | La. | 1856
Lead Opinion
This suit is brought to recover of the defendants one hundred and five dollars, alleged to be due for certain drafts drawn by the captains of the schooners Southern, West Florida and Emma De Russy, for the inspection, at sundry times, of said vessels at the Rigolets, the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi river, during the time the quarantine regulations were inforced in the year 1855.
The defendants, by their answer, deny that they owe the plaintiffs anything exc.ept $15, which they aver they deposited in court. They deny that the Board of Health had any right to claim any ’fees or charges of defendants’ vessel, and aver that the Act of the Legislature and the regulations of the Board of Health under which said claim is made are unconstitutional and illegal.
The defendants in this court rest the defence to the action on the ground that the Act of the Legislature of the 15th of March, 1855, did not contemplate the payment of fees for the inspection of vessels at the Rigolets and the Ateha-falaya river; that the Board of Health were only authorized by the statute to claim fees for inspection in the Mississippi river, and that only one of their vessels was inspected in the Mississippi river, and for that inspection they have deposited the money in court.
We have no jurisdiction of this case. If the lower court has erred at all, it is in applying a law constitutional in itself to a case to which it was not applicable. Here, then, there is not drawn in question the constitutionality or
“The concluding part of this Article of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of this court in criminal cases to questions of law, and the conclusion, that in the case of a petty fine, a greater privilege should be held to be secured the citizen than in a prosecution involving liberty or life, must rest on something more definite than a mere implication.
“ Another conclusive reason against adopting the interpretation of the clause of the Article contended for by the counsel for the defendant is, that the determinations of questions of fact which occur of this kind would be impossible under the present organization of the court.”
In the case of the Second Municipality v. Corning, 4 An. 407, the question raised was the construction of an ordinance, precisely what is sought to be done in the 'present case in regard to an Act of the Legislature. The court said:
“ The tax we find to be lawfull Corning has been condemned to pay a tax which he did not owe; not that the tax itself was illegally imposed, but because it did not apply to him. The amount is not sufficient to enable this court to take cognizance of the appeal; the only decree we can make is to dismiss it.”
These decisions were rendered prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1862, and as the Constitution of 1852 adopts substantially the provisions of the Article No. 63 of the Constitution of 1846, we must suppose it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to adopt, with the Article in question, its judicial construction.
Again, if we have jurisdiction of the question of fact by which this law is applied to the inspection of vessels at the Rigolets, we have jurisdiction of every other fact and our jurisdiction is no longer confined in this class of cases to the constitutionality or legality of the law or ordinance levying the tax, toll or impost, but extends to every question of fact which may be raised in the cause to which the statute may be applied.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court, that the appeal in this case be dismissed, and that the appellant pay the costs of the appeal.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. Lord Coke’s definition of a tax has been accepted in this court on several occasions: “a burthen, charge, or imposition set on persons or property for public uses; exactions to fill the public coffers for the payment of the debt, and the promotion of the general welfare of the country”
The jurisdiction of this court extends to “ ali. cases in which the constitutionality or legality of any taw, toll, or impost, whatsoever, shall be in contes-tation.” Constitution,. Art. 62.
The sole question presented by the appellant in this case is, the legality or or illegality of the fees exacted from vessels arriving at the Rigolets and At-chafalaya quarantine stations, and there inspected under the provisions of the Act of March 15 th, 1855, entitled .“an Act to establish Quarantine for the protection of the State.” Sess. Acts, p. 471. It is conceded by the argument, that the law is constitutional.
The appellant contends, that this Act does not authorize the Board of Health to charge fees for the inspection of vessels quarantined at those two stations, but only upon such vessels as are inspected at the quarantine ground on the Mississippi river.
This is, to my mind, purely a question of law touching the legality of a tax, toll, or impost; and as such, I think, we are compelled to take jurisdiction of it, and to construe this law for the parties, irrespective of the amount in dispute between them.
By the seventh section of the Act in question, the quarantine stations of the Rigolets and the Atchafalaya, were established; but it was declared that the provisions of this Act should apply to the station at the Rigolets, only from the day of the issuing of the Governor’s proclamation, as provided by section thirteen, and should continue in force there until suspended by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Board of Health; and further, that the provisions of the Act should apply to and be enforced at the quarantine station on the Atchafalaya river, from the first of May to the first of November of each year, and also when the Governor shall have issued his proclamation as provided by the thirteenth section, and in such case should remain in full force until suspended by a resolution voted for by two-thirds of the members of the Board of Health.
I understand these provisions to extend the rule as to fees of inspection at the quarantine ground on the Mississippi river to the two stations at the Rego-lets and the Atchafalaya, whenever a quarantine is kept up there in pursuance of the Act. I therefore think the tax, toll or impost, levied upon the defendants’ vessels, was a legal exaction, and that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I think the fees claimed by the plaintiff are such as are sanctioned by law, and that the law imposing them is constitutional. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the judgment should be affirmed.
