72 Ga. 353 | Ga. | 1884
The Board of Education of Glynn county was perpetually enjoined, by the decree rendered on a bill exhibited and prosecuted at the suit of the mayor and council of the city of Brunswick and certain citizens, residents of said municipality, from distributing among the various schools of the county any portion of the income arising from what was once the exclusive endowment of the Glynn County Academy, located in that city. Looking alone to the statements contained in the record, we should be at a loss to find reasons to sustain this decree, as we are satisfied, from a careful scrutiny of the several acts of the legislature creating this board, and defining its power? and duties, that its action in this respect was warranted by the provisions of such laws. The endowment of this academy, even from colonial days, seems to have been exclusively from the public treasury. Much of the fund had been lost or squandered, ana tne school had ceased to be maintained, when the act creating the. board of education for the county was passed, and an effort- was made to augment what remained of the endowment by supplementing it with, the county’s quota from die fund provided by the state for the support of common schools.
1. It was insisted in argument by the complainants in the bill, that the endowment of the academy by the state was a contract between the public authorities and the citizens of Brunswick, who were attracted to that city, and became residents thereof by reason of the educational advantages thus offered; that such citizens acquired vested rights in this alleged contract, and that an act of the general assembly, making another and different disposition of any portion of the academy endowment, divested these rights t'o the extent of this diversion, and thereby impaired the obligation of the contract. We do not know that the presiding judge was at all influenced by this view, and are not inclined to attribute it to him. Comity to a co-ordin
2. It was contended here with earnestness and plausibility, and not without considerable force, that the distribution made of the academy fund was not in accordance with the provisions of the act creating this board, entitled “ an act to regulate public instruction in the county of Glynn; approved February 21, 1873,” (Acts, p. 256), the first section of which makes the board consist of the mayor of Brunswick, together with three fit and competent persons, freeholders and citizens of Brunswick, to be appointed for their respective terms of office by the mayor and council of said city, and one member to be appointed by the grand jury of Glynn county for each of the 25th, 26th and 27th militia districts; and by §16 of the act, the board of education is required to report annually to the grand jury of the county, at' the fall term of the superior court, its financial transactions, with ail schools established or aided within the county outside of the limits of the city, and to make an exhibit, if required, of all its records, books and papers, and also to make a like exhibit and report to the mayor and council of the city, when they shall so require, concerning all schools established or aided, within the limits of the city, p. 262. By §2 of the act, p. 257, the board of education is made a body politic and corporate, with certain specified powers and duties, and among others they are invested in their corporate capacity with the title, care and custody of all school houses,.
The only question made under this legislation is, whether, by the terms of the act, the powers of the board of education are more restricted in the distribution of the funds derived from the academy than of others entrusted to their care .and management. Whether this particular fund goes into and forms a part of the general educational fund of the •county, or is to be kept separate and distinct therefrom, and is to be apportioned by a different rule? Whether, while the city of Brunswick can participate in the other funds proportionately with the rest of the county, it is ■entitled to the exclusive benefit of this academy fund? 'There is no provision of the act which, in express terms, justifies any such separation of this from the general educational fund, or directs the exclusive appropriation of the same as contended, and it would be going very far to imply this duty from differences of phraseology investing the board with the custody, control and disposition of these .several funds; it is true that they have the power to control, lease, sell or convey the one in such manner as they ■shall think will best subserve the interests of education, •while they are required to hold, invest and dispose of the proceeds of the academy fund as provided by law. If there is any special law requiring it to be disposed of in any particular manner, our attention has not been called
The legislature, as it had a right to do, has simply changed its system of public education in that county, and in consequence thereof has made a different appropriation of the fund from that which formerly prevailed, and has called into existence a new agency, which it has invested with such powers as were deemed appropriate to carry into effect the object it had in view. 22 Ga,., 506. The whole history of the Glynn County Academy shows that it was designed' to afford free education to the children and youth of the county, and was not for the exclusive benefit of those residing within the limits of the city, of Brunswick; it is not and never was a private or corporate, but a public eleemosynary establishment; and this
This discretion, we take it, is to be used in conformity to law, as is evident from various sections of the act prescribing the duties and responsibilities of the board, and especially those requiring it to report its actings and doings, not only to the grand jury and city authorities, but to the state school commissioner.
This injunction is set aside.
The parties prosecuting this suit have no right to interfere, either as a corporation or as citizens of the county, with the management of the board of education. It is responsible to the public authorities for its management of the trust confided to its care.
Judgment reversed.