159 Ga. 749 | Ga. | 1925
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
Must a contract between the county board of education and a person for the transportation of pupils to and from a public school, in a case where the board is authorized to provide such transportation, be reduced to writing, signed by both parties, and spread upon the minutes of such board, in order to be enforceable against such board by the party so contracting with it? It is insisted by the defendants in the court below, who at the time of the institution of this suit were members of such board, and the superintendent of the public schools of the county, that such a contract must be in writing and spread upon the minutes of the board. This contention is based upon section 386 of the Code of 1910, which provides that “All contracts entered into by the ordinary with other persons in behalf of the county must be in writing and entered upon their minutes.” The provision on this subject in the Codes of 1861 and 1868 is in the identical language of the present Code, except that in those Codes the words “justices of the inferior court” are employed where the word “ordinary” appears in the present Code. Code (1861), § 465; Code (1868), § 527. After the adoption of the constitution of 1868, jurisdiction over county matters, which had been vested in the justices of the inferior court, was lodged in the ordinary of each county. Code (1873),. §§ 337, 5101, 5149. So in the Code of 1873 and all subsequent editions thereof this provision stands as it does in the present Code. By its terms this section applies only to all contracts entered into by the ordinary with other persons in behalf of the county. If we adhere to its letter and stick in the bark in its. construction, it would not apply to contracts entered into by any other officer than the ordinary; but this court, in dealing with this section, has applied it to contracts entered into by county commissioners in behalf of the county. Milburn v. Commissioners of Glynn County, 112 Ga. 160 (37 S. E. 178); Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga.
So we are of the opinion that the only contracts which come within the terms of this section of the Code are contracts made by some county official in behalf of the county, to which the county
Was the county board of education of Houston County legally authorized to make with the plaintiff the contracts set out in the petition in this case? This question is raised by a ground of the defendant’s demurrer which challenges the power and authority of such board to enter into these contracts. The board is authorized to provide means for the transportation of pupils and teachers to and from any school which it is authorized to establish, whenever such board deems it for the best interest of such school. Code of School Laws, Acts 1919, pp. 288, 327, § 93; McKenzie v. Board of Education, supra. Such board can pay for such means of transportation “from the public-school funds of the county derived from the State, or raised by county-wide taxation as authorized by the constitutional amendment ratified November 2, 1920. Ga. Laws 1919, p. 66, Park’s Code Supp. 1922, § 6579.” McKenzie v. Board of Education, supra. Did the board of education have authority to consolidate the schools mentioned in plaintiff’s petition with the school at Perry? By the act of September 26, 1889 (Acts 1889, p. 1295), provision was made for the estab
It may be said that under the following acts, to wit, the act of August 18, 1919 (Acts 1919, p. 287), for the establishment and maintenance of one or more consolidated public schools in each county of this State, and the act of August 15, 1921 (Acts 1921, p. 178), which are found in 8 Park’s Code Supp. 1922, § 1437 (r), the county board of education is authorized to provide for the high school training of rural boys and girls at any consolidated school in the county, where, in the judgment of the board, the best facilities are provided and where such school may be most accessible to the pupils attending; and that this board of education could furnish the means of transportation of pupils to and from such school. We do not think that these acts authorize the board of education of Houston County to consolidate rural schools with the school established and maintained in the City of Perry by that municipality. Whether this board under these acts could consolidate rural public schools with a school established and 'maintained
So we are of the opinion that the board of education was without authority to make the contracts sued on, and could not expend the county educational funds for the purpose of transporting pupils to and from the school at Perry. It follows that the county funds could not be expended by the board in providing means for transportation of pupils to and from such school. Pace v. County Board of Education, 150 Ga. 777; Board of Education v. Butler, 154 Ga. 569 (115 S. E. 10); Glenn v. Trion Co., 157 Ga. 639 (122 S. E. 52).
But it is insisted that the law of this case has been fixed by the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of Board of Education v. Hunt, 29 Ga. App. 665 (116 S. E. 900), and that this law must now be followed, although the decision of that court may be incorrect. The Court of Appeals in that case did not rule that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the facts set forth in his petition. The only ruling made in that case by the Court of Appeals was that “A county board of education is not a body corporate with authority to sue and be sued, in the ordinary sense.” So we do not think that the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the contracts sued on in that ease and involved in this case.
Applying the above rulings, we do not think that the petition set forth a cause of action, and the demurrer thereto should have been sustained. These rulings make it unnecessary to determine whether there was a misjoinder of parties and of causes of action. Judgment reversed.