12 Utah 251 | Utah | 1895
Application was made by plaintiff for a writ of mandate to compel the defendants, as assessor and 'collector, respectively, of 'Weber county, to levy and collect the school tax assessed by plaintiff to maintain its school system for the year 1895. Plaintiff averred that it prepared in due form a statement and estimate of the amount necessary for the support and maintenance of its schools for said year, — the sum so estimated being $40,000, — and duly certified, by its president and clerk, said statement and estimate to said defendants, as assessor and collector, respectively, of Weber county, and for Ogden city, but that said defendants neglected and refused to levy the rate per cent, of tax to raise such amount, or to place and extend such per cent, and levy on the tax roll of said city, the same being the assessment roll prepared by the assessor of said county. An alternative writ of mandate was issued, and thereafter defendants moved to quash the same, and the motion was granted; From the judgment entered, plaintiff appeals.
The questions presented for consideration are of the highest importance, as they involve the existence of the public-school system of this territory in all cities of the first and second classes. The lower court was of opinion that the legislature had been guilty, not only of unskill-fullness, but gross negligence, in passing legislation relating to the school system, and revenue for the support thereof, as a result of which no instrumentalities had been provided for levying and collecting school taxes in cities of the first and second classes. Accordingly it was held that the
In the year 1890 the legislature passed an act providing for a uniform system of free schools within the territory. In each city 6f the first and second classes a public corporation was organized, independent of the city, but coextensive with it in territorial area; and provision was made for a board of education, to be elected biennially by the electors of- the municipality. This board was invested with power to levy taxes upon the property of the district, -and to perform many duties common to quasi municipal bodies, and' which were deemed necessary for the maintenance of an advanced state system of education. Each year the hoard was to estimate and levy the taxes necessary for the support of the schools .within the district, and to pay interest on bonds, etc. The estimate and levy so made were to be duly certified by the president and clerk of the board to the assessor and collector of the city, and the assessor thereupon was required to place the taxes so levied upon the tax roll of the city, and the city collector
The difficulty in this case seems to arise from the supposed repeal of all statutes providing for the assessing and
Before construing these acts, reference to some of the
Respondents’ construction of the statutes would lead to the destruction of a portion of the public-school system of the territory. Buildings in course of erection could not be completed, teachers engaged for the year would be discharged, thousands of children how receiving high educational advantages turned from the school-room, debts ■contracted -remain unpaid, tax sales of cities of the first and second classes rendered invalid, innumerable suits to •quiet title would inevitably follow, and great hardship and public inconvenience ensue. So we think these acts should be construed in the most beneficial way which their Ian-’
In section 129 of the school law, passed the same day as chapter 68, this language is used: “* * * And shall forthwith cause the same to be certified by the president and clerk of said' board to the assessor and collector for said city.” This language subserves a dual purpose. It refers to officers who were, in every sense, city officers for the year 1892, as well as to the persons who, by reason of their county positions, became assessors and collectors of the cities. The language, “ assessor and collector for the city/" clearly means the persons who assess and collect for the cities, whoever such persons may be. Section 129, referred to was intended to refer to two different sets of officers. ,It was necessary that such language should be used as to bear such construction. Viewing chapter 68 and section 129 in this light, it becomes apparent that the legislative language is appropriate to express the legislative intent. Section 6 of chapter 68, in express language, refers to the county collector as “ collector of the city tax,” and “collector of the city tax” is synonymous with “collector of the city;” and section 129 indicates the legislative intention to devolve upon assessors and collectors for cities, whoever they may be, the necessary labor and duty of assessing and collecting taxes for' the school - districts within them. Bespondents contend that there is no
Respondents also insist that section 139 is unconstitu-tutional, because it attempts to delegate power to a ministerial officer to perform a legislative act. There can be no doubt of the power of the legislature to carve the territory into school districts, and to invest such districts with the power to tax for school purposes. Cooley, Tax’n, p. 61; King v. Railway Co., 6 Utah, 281, 22 Pac. 158; Kuhn v. Board, 4 W. Va. 499; Wharton v. Directors, 42 Pa. St. 358. If the legislature conferred upon the board of education of Ogden city the power to levy taxes for school purposes, any attempt upon the part of the board
In the case at bar the board, in a legislative capacity, estimated that $40,000 were required for school purposes for the current year, — that is, they levied a tax of $40,000-upon the taxable property within the school district, — and the result of their action was reduced to writing, and certified by the president and clerk of the board. This was the exercise of legislative power. In the same manner the territorial legislature estimates the various amounts required for the maintenance of public institutions, and passes an appropriation bill embodying such amounts. This is a legislative act. Thereafter the assessors and collectors of
We think respondents’ third objection is not well taken. •Section 4, c. 68, supra, provides that “the county court of each county shall equalize the assessment roll of the whole county, including the assessment for general taxes of cities of the first and second class situated in the county. * * * The mayor of said city, or a member of the city council thereof, appointed by the city council, may •sit with, the county court, and be a member of the equalizing board.” The assessment roll mentioned in section 129 is the same as that referred to in section 4; and as it is provided in the school law that the “levy shall be uniform on all property within the city, as returned on the assessment roll,” and the assessment for school pur
We think that the statutes to which we have referred' áre not so repugnant as to be incapable of reconciliation. They relate to a common subject, the intention of the-legislature is clearly discernible, and the construction which we have given them is certainly within the spirit, if hot-within the letter, of the law. We are of opinion that these statutes provide a general educational scheme within cities, of the first and second classes, and, though unskillfully drawn, are not to be overturned by the objections which respondents have urged against them. The judgment of the low'er court is reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to the lower court to grant the writ of mandate as prayed for by the plaintiff.