113 Ky. 234 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1902
Opinion on the court by
'Reversing.
This is an agreed case to test the validity of two acts of the Legislature with reference to public libraries in cities of the second class. In the act of March 19, 1894, for the government of cities of the second class, article 10, section 15 [Kentucky Statutes, 1894, section 3210), pro
The question submitted is 'whether “it is unlawful for ihe.general council to appropriate' the one per cent., and the three per cent of the taxes levied and collected for school purposes toward the maintenance of the free public library,'’ and whether “the acts providing for said appropriation are unconstitutional.” On behalf of appellant it is insisted that the percentage appropriated from the net amount of taxes levied for school purposes is a part of the common-school fund, and the use of it for any other purpose than for the common schools is prohibited by section- 184 of the Constitution: that the public library is not a part of the common school system, and this aid to it is not in aid of the common schools; and that the provisions of the statute above quoted are, in any event, in conflict with sec
For the purposes of this case we deem it unnecessary to consider or decide whether the tax levied by cities of the second class for school purposes is a part of the fund referred to in section 184 of the Constitution, which, after reciting certain assets of the State which “shall be held inviolate for the purpose of sustaining the system of common schools,” provides further, “The interest. and dividends of said fund, together with any sum which may be produced by taxation or otherwise for purposes of common school education, shall .be appropriated to the common ■schools, and to no other purpose.” There is no doubt that the money in contest here is levied and collected for school purposes. It is levied and collected by authority of section 3219, Kentucky Statutes, which provides: “Said board shall annually, in the month of January, approximately ascertain the amount of money necessary to be used to defray'the expenses of maintaining the schools, improving or constructing of buildings, and so forth, thereof, and any liquidations of the liabilities during the current, fiscal year, and report the same, together with the amount to be received from the common school fund of the State of Kentucky (which amount the board shall ascertain by taking the census required by law in April) to the auditor, and thereupon the general council shall, at the request of said board, levy and collect such taxes as may be requested, and the money arising from said levy shall, under the direction and control of said board, be used for the benefit of the common schools and for the purpose of paying off .the indebtedness of said board: Provided, that said levy
We have next to consider whether the library provided for in the two acts referred to is a part of the common-school system, and whether the appropriation of money in its aid devotes such money to school purposes. The orig-. inal act of 1894 provides for a kind of partnership of the
There1 are a number of cases which incidentally slied light upon this question. In most of them the question considered was with reference to what is now section 184 of the Constitution, and they deal with attempted appropriations of the State school fund to purposes which bear more or less resemblance to educational purposes. Underwood v. Wood, 93 Ky., 179 (14 R., 129) 19 S. W., 405, 15 L. R. A., 825; Higgins v. Prater, 91 Ky., 6 (12 R., 645) 14 S. W., 910; Halbert v. Sparks, 9 Bush, 259; Auditor v. Holland, 14 Bush, 147; School Dist. v. Webb, 89 Ky., 265 (11 R., 456) (12 S. W., 298). In one of the cases cited (Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74), it was, held unconstitutional to appropriate a part of the school fund to the purchase of a history. The argument in these cases is instructive. It shows how jealously the courts have guarded the fund set
It will be observed that section 3219 limits the amount of the tax levied, “to be used to defray the expenses of maintaining the schools,” etc., to 35 cents on each $100 valuation. This record does not disclose whether the appropriation of 3 per cent, of the amount actually levied would diminish the amount ascertained by the school board to be necessary to be used to defray the expense of maintaining the schools. It is quite probable that, as suggested by the learned special judge, the 3-*per cent, appropriated for the library would not diminish the amount required for educational purposes, as it is pi’obable that the school board could add 8 per cent, to the amount of their estimate, and still be within the 35 cents on the $100 valuation allowed to be levied for school purposes. But if is easy to see that if a percentage of the amount levied and collected for school purposes may be diverted to every object which indirectly aids “the cause of education,” “the general system of education,” “the objects of general education,” the tax for school purposes might be raised to the legislative limit
It is not denied that a part of the school tax in cities of the second class may be used for school libraries, as an adjunct to, and a part of, the school system. Nor do we controvert the proposition that playgrounds may properly be considered a part of the school system. What we decide is that the library provided for in the sections under consideration is not a part of the school system, but independent of it. It is no more an adjunct to it than a public park would be. Counsel for appellee concedes that “it must be clearly understood that the library is a school institution, and that it is the city that comes to the aid of the school institution, and not the school coming to the aid of a merely municipal institution.” In our opinion, the statutes provide exactly the reverse of this contention. It is not a case of using a part of the school tax for what is undoubtedly a school purpose, and a part of the school system, as the kindergarten and the high school, but the appropriation of a part of the tax levied and collected for school purposes to an object which, however laudable it may be, is not of the schools, and should be otherwise and specifically provided for.
The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to enter a judgment in accordance with this opinion.
Petition for rehearing by appellee'overruled.