191 A. 240 | Md. | 1937
This appeal is from an order granting the writ of mandamus on the petition of Charles B. Lazzell, to compel the respondents, B. Lucien Brun, J. Stevenson Hopkins, Louis Rossman, T.L. McCarriar, Frank P. Haynes, and Arthur P. Dixon, constituting the Maryland State Board of Dental Examiners, to cancel its revocation of the license or certificate of registration, which had been revoked by the board December 26th, 1935, effective January 1st, 1936.
The petition states that the petitioner (appellee) graduated from the school of dentistry of the University of Maryland in the year 1926; that later in that year he passed the examination conducted by the then Board of Dental Examiners, a certificate of registration was issued *316 to him, and thereafter, until January 1st, 1936, he was engaged in the practice of his profession in this state; and on December 26th, 1935, he received a letter from the Board of Dental Examiners, advising him that it had revoked his license; that prior to that letter he had received a letter under date of April 13th, 1935, advising him that, at a meeting of the board held April 12th, 1935, under the authority of section 8 of the Maryland State Dental Law of 1933, ch. 564 (Code (Supp. 1935), art. 32, sec. 8), his license to practice dentistry had been canceled because of his "recent conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude," unless he show cause to the contrary, in writing, to the board on or before April 20th, 1935; that following the receipt of this letter of April 13th, 1935, he filed an answer in writing (a) that he had not been convicted of any crime involving "moral turpitude"; (b) that the offense of "indecent exposure" does not involve "moral turpitude"; and (c) that the circumstances under which petitioner pleaded guilty to the offense of "indecent exposure" did not involve "moral turpitude"; that a hearing was had on the charges before the board on December 3rd, 1935, at which the petitioner appeared in person and by attorney, at which he admitted that he had pleaded guilty to the offense of "indecent exposure," and he was so found; that he related the circumstances concerning the plea and conviction; that his testimony showed that "he had not committed the offense of `indecent exposure' in any public place and that the circumstances which led to his plea of guilty and conviction were entirely accidental so far as * * * petitioner was concerned, and that no one would have seen or been able to see * * * petitioner exposed except by peeping through windows or open doors into the privacy of the office or home of * * * petitioner"; that his admission as stated was the only evidence at the hearing, and that it showed there was "no intent to commit the crime of `indecent exposure.'"
The petitioner denied the authority of the dental board to revoke his license, because he had been licensed to *317 practice dentistry before the passage of the Act of 1933, ch. 564 (Code [Supp. 1935], art. 32), by section 11 of which it was provided that "nothing in this Article, or in any other provision of this Code, shall be so construed as to interfere with the rights and privileges of physicians and surgeons, * * * nor of persons holding certificates, duly issued to them by the State Board of Dental Examiners of Maryland prior to the passage of this Act."
The board filed a demurrer and answer to the petition. The order appealed from sustained the petitioner's demurrer to the answer, so there is no need to consider any of the grounds of the board's demurrer, except the sufficiency of the charge of "indecent exposure" as involving "moral turpitude," and the application of the Act of 1933, ch. 564. By way of answer the board either flatly admitted or denied the statements of fact and legal conclusions, and, as they are clearly enough stated in the petition, it is not necessary to repeat them, except to say that the answer concluded by specifically charging that on October 17th, 1931, the petitioner was arrested on a charge of indecent exposure, to which he pleaded guilty, was convicted and fined $100 and costs at the Northwestern police station; that on February 15th, 1935, he was arrested by a patrolman who saw him expose himself to several school girls who were passing the house in which he had his office, and when the case came up for trial petitioner pleaded guilty. He was also indicted for a similar offense committed February 12th, 1935, to which he pleaded guilty, and it was upon this information of the three pleas of guilty and conviction, that the board of dental examiners made the charges, had the hearing, and revoked the license of the petitioner, which he now seeks to set aside by mandamus.
The petitioner demurred to the answer, his first ground being the usual "bad in substance and insufficient in law," and the second in effect that the Act of 1933 granted those licensed prior to that time immunity from any charges of misconduct. The court sustained the petitioner's demurrer to the respondents' answer, and canceled *318
the revocation of the petitioner's license or certificate of revocation, on the ground that the petitioner, having been licensed prior to the passage of the Act of 1933, ch. 564, sec. 11, the board was without authority to apply the provisions of that section to the charge of misconduct made against him. In the order the court assigned as the reason for its action the decisions of this court in Smith v. Gaither,
In Upshur v. Ward,
Chapter 564 of the Acts of 1933 was a repeal and re-enactment *319 with amendments of article 32 of the Code (1924 Edition), and among its provisions was section 11, which reads as follows: "11. Nothing in this Article, or in any provision of this Code, shall be so construed as to interfere with the rights and privileges of physicians and surgeons duly licensed to practice their profession in this State, nor of persons holding certificates duly issued to them by the State Board of Dental Examiners of Maryland prior to the passage of this Act or of dental students operating under the immediate supervision of their instructors in dental infirmaries or dental schools duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland," and it is this section which the petitioner contends absolves him from the prosecution of the charges preferred against him by the board of dental examiners. In the opinion of this court, it has no such effect.
This section is a repetition and re-enactment of a section of the same number contained in article 32 of the Code of 1924, as enacted by the Act of 1920, ch. 481, which was in effect when the petitioner was licensed to practice dentistry in this State, and was not even interrupted by the Act of 1933, and was as much in force as if it were still the Act of 1920. The law in this state with respect to the repeal and re-enactment of statutes is as stated by Judge Offutt in the recent case of Ireland v.Shipley,
We therefore hold that the State Board of Dental Examiners was not lacking in authority to hear and determine the charges preferred against the petitioner. *320
The question then is, Is the offense of "indecent exposure" one in which "moral turpitude" is involved? Ordinarily, the question arises in the case of witnesses who have been convicted of infamous crimes or those involving moral turpitude, and whose credibility is impeached by the asking whether they have been so convicted. State v. Bixler,
What is moral turpitude? Lexicographers and courts agree on the definition, but the courts do not agree in its application in characterizing offenses as involving moral turpitude.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's Third Rev.) 2247, defines it as, "An Act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." Drazen v. New HavenTaxicab Co.,
In the following cases it was held there was no moral turpitude: Violation by a physician of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act (38 Stat. 785), though the court said it was conceivable that one might be guilty of an offense under that act involving moral turpitude. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Friedman,
Offenses in which it was held there was moral turpitude were: Extortion resulting in disbarment of a lawyer, In re Coffey,
The provision of article 32 of the Code (1924), upon which the action of the Board of Dental Examiners in this case is based, is that part of section 8 of article 32, and contained in the Act of 1920, ch. 481, which reads: "Upon presentation to the Board of a certified copy of a court record showing that the practitioner of dentistry has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, *322 * * * the registration and certificate of the practitioner so offending shall be cancelled."
The petitioner admits in his petition that he "had pleaded guilty to the offense of `indecent exposure'," and that he had been found "guilty," but "that his testimony before the said Board showed that he had not committed the offense * * * in any public place and that the circumstances were entirely accidental." The answer to which he demurred states facts showing that the exposures were public and intentional. It has been decided that moral turpitude is not involved in a charge unless it is intentional or not innocent in its purpose, or not accidental. Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Central TransportationCo. (C.C.) 65 Fed. 158; Rudolph v. United States, 55 App. D.C. 362,
There is no charge that the petitioner was denied a hearing or that the action of the board was arbitrary. Weer v. Page,
Order reversed with costs, and petition dismissed. *323