{¶ 2} Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss under to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), in which he argues that relators have not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. He argues that the vacation of a public road is governed by R.C. Chapter 5553, and that those provisions apply to all public roads, including township roads, within a county, except those on the state highway system and those located within a municipality's corporate limits. Moreover, respondent maintains that because R.C. Chapter 5563 provides the exclusive means for appealing a board of county commissioners' decision in a road improvement proceeding, R.C. Chapter 2506 is not applicable.
{¶ 3} Prohibition is "designed to prevent a tribunal from proceeding in a matter over which it has no authority[.]" State ex rel. Henneke v.Davis (1986),
{¶ 4} Prohibition will not lie if the petitioner has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, including legal or equitable relief, unless the lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause. State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police,Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
{¶ 5} Here, there is no question that respondent is about to exercise judicial power. Therefore, we must determine whether the exercise of that power is unauthorized and causes an injury for which relators have no other adequate legal remedy.
{¶ 6} Relators argue that R.C.
{¶ 7} By definition, "[a] township road is * * * a public highway other than a state or county road." 2002 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 2002-003. See, also, R.C.
{¶ 8} Under R.C.
{¶ 9} Further supporting our conclusion that township roads are governed by R.C. Chapter 5553 is the fact that a board of township trustees does not have the authority to vacate a township road. It must ask the board of county commissioners to do so under R.C.
{¶ 10} R.C.
{¶ 11} In fact, "R.C.
{¶ 12} A person challenging a road improvement decision of a board of county commissioners must give written notice of his intent to appeal. R.C.
{¶ 13} After docketing the case, the court will hold a hearing to determine any preliminary questions or motions and examine the transmitted record. R.C.
{¶ 14} A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) should be granted only "if, after presuming the truth of all factual allegations of the complaint and making all reasonable inferences in [relators'] favor, it appear[s] beyond doubt that [relators] could prove no set of facts entitling them to the requested extraordinary writ of prohibition." Stateex rel. Conkle v. Sadler,
{¶ 15} After construing all material factual allegations and reasonable inferences in relators' favor, we conclude that they could prove no set of facts entitling them to the requested extraordinary relief. The trial court does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction because the General Assembly has expressly granted courts of common pleas the authority to determine appeals arising from a board of county commissioners' decisions in road improvement proceedings. Furthermore, relators have an adequate remedy through appeal following final judgment to raise these claims. Therefore, they are not entitled to the requested extraordinary writ of prohibition.
{¶ 16} We GRANT respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of prohibition.
Petition Dismissed. Costs to Relators.
Kline, J., McFarland, J. Concur.
