Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Adams County ("the County") brought two suits against the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment ("the Department") for its issuance of a radioactive materials license and a hazardous waste permit to Clean Harbors Deer Trail, LLC. ("Clean Harbors"), which intervened on the Department's behalf. In both cases, the trial courts dismissed the suits for lack of standing. The court of appeals upheld both decisions. Adams County v. Colo. Dep't of Pub. Health and Env't,
Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act, § 24-60-2206(8), C.R.S. (2009), and the Hazardous Waste Siting Act, § 25-15-206(1), C.R.S. (2009), the Department may not issue a license or permit to an applicant until the applicant has first applied for and received a Certificate of Designation ("CD")
In addition, we hold that the County has met the prudential standing considerations set forth in Romer v. Board of County Commissioners,
1.
When called upon to consider whether a party has standing to bring an action, we accept as true the allegations set forth in the complaint. Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision,
The Clean Harbors hazardous waste facility ("the Facility") is a private facility that bas existed in its current location in Adams County since 1987. Clean Harbors has owned the Facility since 2002. The Department is a state ageney charged with, among other things, regulating hazardous and radioactive wastes.
In 1988, the County passed a resolution ("the 1983 Resolution") conditionally approving a Certificate of Designation containing several restrictions. These restrictions prohibited the proposed Facility from accepting radioactive wastes and polychlorinated biphe-nyls ("PCBs") that contain a proscribed level of hazardous materials.
In March 1987, the Department
Clean Harbors has owned and operated the Facility since 2002. Following the 2002 change in ownership, the County in 2004 approved the transfer of the Facility's CD to Clean Harbors. The transferred CD remained expressly subject to the conditions of the 1983 Resolution and the limitations in the 1998 Permit.
Beginning in 2005, Clean Harbors sought to become a low-level radioactive waste disposal site. Clean Harbors submitted to the Department an application to renew and amend the 1998 Permit. The County alleges that Clean Harbors proposed to accept and dispose of radioactive materials exceeding the limits defined in the 1987 and 1998 Permits.
In 2005, Clean Harbors also applied to the Department for a radioactive materials license.
The County objected to both applications-for the amended permit, and for the radioactive materials license (including the application for the Facility's designation as a regional disposal site under the Compact)claiming that the permit and license could not be issued until Clean Harbors first applied for and received from the County a CD allowing for the materials contemplated by the license and the permit.
In June 2005, the Compact Board designated the Facility as a regional disposal site under the Compact. In December 2005, the Department issued Clean Harbors the radioactive materials license ("the License") and the renewed hazardous waste permit ("the Permit").
The County filed two lawsuits seeking judicial review of the Department's actions.
The Department moved to dismiss both cases for lack of standing. It argued that the County failed both steps of the analysis for standing set forth in Wimberly v. Ettenberg,
Second, the Department argued that the County did not suffer an injury in fact-as required by Wimberly-because the County had already issued Clean Harbors a CD for the Facility. If the County believed that Clean Harbors' proposed activities violated its CD, argued the Department, then the only legal avenue for the County to pursue would be to suspend or revoke the CD
The Department further argued that specific considerations of prudential standing barred the County from seeking judicial review. Under Romer v. Board of County Commissioners,
Both trial courts granted the motions to dismiss for lack of standing. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of both suits.
The court of appeals held that, under Wimberly, the County did not have any legally protected interests in the License or Permit issuances, negating any injury in fact. Adams County I,
Addressing the prudential standing considerations, the court of appeals held that the statutory provisions made clear that the County was a subordinate state agency in matters of radioactive and hazardous waste management. Adams County I,
Finally, the court of appeals held that no statutory provisions expressly provided the County with standing. Adams County I,
IL.
To decide whether a party meets our standing requirements, we must first determine whether there has been an injury in fact to a legally protected interest. Wimberly,
A.
The Wimberly standing analysis revolves around whether the plaintiff has suffered injury in fact to an interest protected by statutory or constitutional provisions so as to constitute an actual controversy. See Wimberly,
The first step in the Wimberly analysis is a showing of injury in fact.
We hold that the County has met the Wimberly standing requirements because it has satisfied this two-part test. Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act, § 24-60-2206(8), C.R.S. (2009), and the Hazardous Waste Siting Act, § 25-15-206(1), C.R.S. (2009), the Department may not issue a 1i-cense or permit to an applicant until the applicant has first applied for and received a Certificate of Designation from the county in which the facility is to be located allowing for the disposal of materials contemplated by the license or permit. In this case, the County has alleged that, notwithstanding the fact that Clean Harbors never applied for nor received such a CD, the Department issued such a license and permit to Clean Harbors. The County has therefore alleged an injury in fact to its authority to issue (or to refuse to issue) a CD for the disposal of the materials in question prior to the Department's issuance of a license or permit. The County has satisfied the second step of the Wimberly analysis as well because it has alleged an injury to an interest protected by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act ("the LLRWA") and the Hazardous Waste Siting Act. Accordingly, the County has standing, under the Wimberly analysis, to seek review of the Department's actions.
We begin with the procedures regarding the issuance of a license by the Department. Under the LLRWA, any applicant who seeks a license from the Department to operate a low-level radioactive waste facility must first apply to the county for a CD allowing for such an operation. provides: Section 24-60-2206(8)
Any person who proposes to operate a [low level radioactive waste] facility shall first apply ... for a certificate of designation to the board of county commissioners of the county in which the proposed facility site is located. Such site and facility shall be reviewed and approved by such board of county commissioners prior to the issuance of any license [by the Department] pursuant to [the Radiation Control Act9 ].
(emphases added). Subsection 2206(8) therefore creates a statutory three-step process for any party applying-as Clean Harbors did starting in 2005-for a license allowing it to accept and dispose of low-level radioactive
Here, the County has alleged that the Department and Clean Harbors skipped the first two steps of subsection 2206(8). First, according to the County, Clean Harbors did not apply for a CD permitting it to become a disposal facility for low level radioactive wastes. Second, the County alleges that it did not "review[ ] and approve[ ]" the "site and facility" proposed by Clean Harbors. To the contrary, the County alleges that once Clean Harbors applied for the License, it objected both to Clean Harbors and to the Department. Despite these objections, the Department issued the License.
The County's complaint challenging the License issuance meets Wimberly's two-part test for standing. First, the County alleges that the CD Clean Harbors currently possesses expressly prohibits the low-level radioactive wastes contemplated by the License. Hence, the issuance of the License purporting to allow for materials otherwise prohibited by the CD caused the County injury in fact. Second, this injury invaded "a legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory provisions," Wimberly,
We come to the same conclusions regarding the Department's issuance of the Permit. The Hazardous Waste Siting Act ("the HWSA"), §§ 25-15-101 through -515, C.R.S. (2009), controls the procedures for the Department's issuance of a permit to operate a hazardous waste disposal site. See U.S. Pollution Control, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Las Animas County,
In this case, the County alleges that the Permit issued by the Department does not comport with subsection 204(1) because it purports to authorize Clean Harbors to dispose of certain radioactive wastes and PCBs, both of which are types of waste that the CD specifies it cannot accept. Additionally, the County alleges that the acceptance of these wastes, which is expressly prohibited by the CD, is a "substantial change" in the operation of the facility under subsection 206(1), and that therefore the change cannot be made until the county approves of it. The gist of the County's complaint is that the Department issued the Permit despite the fact that Clean Harbors had not obtained a CD permitting it to dispose of these wastes.
As with the License, the County has sufficiently alleged an injury with regard to the Permit under subsections 204(1) and 206(1) to meet our standing requirements under Wimberly. First, the County alleges that the CD Clean Harbors possesses expressly prohibits the wastes contemplated by the Permit, and that Clean Harbors has not applied for a modification of the current CD to allow for the "substantial change" in the types of waste accepted by the facility. Hence, the issuance of the Permit purporting to allow for materials otherwise prohibited by the CD caused the County injury in fact. Second, this injury invaded "a legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory ... provisions," Wimberly,
In sum, under the applicable statutory provisions, the Department may not issue a license or permit to an applicant until the applicant has first applied for and received a CD from the county allowing the disposal of waste materials contemplated by the license or permit.
The Department urges us to adopt the reasoning of the court of appeals, which held that the County lacks standing because it has alleged no injury in fact. More specifically, the court of appeals held that the County has no "interest" in the license and permit issu
We disagree with the court of appeals reasoning because it ignores the fact that the General Assembly, under both the LLRWA and the HWSA, has carved out an important role for the County in the Heense and permit issuance process-namely, that a county must first issue a CD to an applicant for a license or permit allowing it to dispose of the types of waste contemplated by the license or permit before such a license or permit may be issued by the Department. Here, the County alleges that such a CD was not obtained by Clean Harbors.
The Department counters with the argument, again adopted by the court of appeals, that Clean Harbors does in fact possess a CD from the County. This, of course, may in fact be true, but it does not help the Department. The County acknowledges that it issued a CD to Clean Harbors allowing it to accept certain types of hazardous wastes. However, the County asserts that the CD it issued to Clean Harbors does not allow it to accept radioactive wastes above background levels or PCBs, and in fact expressly prohibits such wastes. Yet these are precisely the types of wastes that the License and Permit issued by the Department purport to allow. In other words, contrary to the Department's assertion, not just any CD issued by the County will support the issuance of a license or permit-rather, an applicant must first receive a CD from the County that allows for low-level radioactive wastes contemplated by the License and the various radioactive wastes and PCBs contemplated by the Permit.
Finally, we reject the Department's argument that in a situation in which the Department issues a permit and license for the disposal of waste not allowed by the county's CD-a situation alleged by the County in this case-the county's only remedy is to revoke or suspend that CD. This "remedy" proposed by the Department is a hollow one. The County in this case has no reason to, and in fact does not seek to, revoke the CD that it has already issued to Clean Harbors. That is because the CD that it has already issued allows Clean Harbors to dispose of the particular types of waste that the County has determined may properly be disposed of within its borders. The problem is that the License and Permit issued by the Department, as alleged by the County, permit Clean Harbors to dispose of wastes expressly prohibited by the current CD. Thus, the "remedy" proposed by the Department is in fact no remedy at all.
We therefore conclude that the County has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to a legally protected interest such that it has standing under Wimberly's two-part test to bring its claims against the Department.
B.
In addition to the Wimberly standing requirements, because of a county's role vis-a-vis the state, we must address specific prudential considerations. The prudential aspects of our standing test reflect "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of a court's jurisdiction." City of Greenwood Vill. v. Pet'rs for the Proposed City of Centenmial,
"[A statutory] county is not an 'Independent governmental entity existing by reason of any inherent sovereign authority of its residents....'" Bd. of County
Addressing our prudential concerns vis-a-vis a county's standing to challenge state action, we have held that "[iJn the absence of an express statutory right, a subordinate state agency ... lacks standing or any other legal authority to obtain judicial review of an action of a superior state agency...." Martin v. Dist. Court,
Two precedents guide our decision-Douglas County Board of County Commissioners v. Public Utilities Commission,
We held that the "general rule" was not applicable to Douglas County's suit. Id. Instead, we found that the PUC's authority over transmission lines was "statutorily limited by the requirement that the PUC first determine the reasonableness of any improvement that derogates from [Douglas County's] land use plan." Id. at 1810. The statutory scheme in place granted to Douglas County a "separate power to enact a land use scheme subject to improvements deemed reasonable by the PUC." Id. (emphasis added). Douglas County could challenge the PUC's actions with regard to regulating transmission lines because the PUC's regulations could only reasonably derogate from Douglas County's preexisting land use regulations. Id. We also found it significant that a statutory provision allowed "each party to [an] action or proceeding before the [PUC]" to appear in review proceedings. Id. at 1808 (citing § 40-6-115(1), C.R.S. (1984)). This statutory authority to challenge the PUC's action, coupled with the "separate power" over land use, "confer[red] statutory authority for the county to seek review." Id. at 1310.
In Romer, we held that Pueblo County "was acting as a subordinate state agency" when it made social service expenditures.
We find this case far more analogous to, and thus governed by, Douglas County. As discussed above, the General Assembly has conditioned the Department's authority to issue a license or permit on the county's issuance of a CD allowing for the disposal of waste contemplated by the license or permit, and has assigned the authority to issue such a CD exclusively to the county. Similar to the PUC in Douglas County, the Department's authority over radioactive and hazardous wastes is thus limited by the County's statutory authority in those areas. Indeed, a county's role in the permit and license issuance process is more pronounced than was the county's role in Douglas County, where the PUC was limited by the requirement that its actions could only reasonably deviate from the county's land use scheme. See
We also note that, as in Douglas County, statutory provisions expressly permit suit. Section 25-1-113(1) provides that "any person aggrieved and affected" by Department action "is entitled to judicial review." § 25-1-113(1), C.R.S. (2009) see also § 25-15-305(2)(a) C.R.S. (2009) (providing that "any final determination issued by the [DJlepartment ... shall be subject to review"); § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (2009) (authorizing "any person adversely affected" by agency action to "commence an action for judicial review"). Moreover, "person" is defined to include a "county." § 24-4-102(12), CRS. (2009); § 25-15-101(18), C.R.S. (2009). If anything, this language is more express than that contained in Douglas County, as it does not limit judicial review to those who were previously "party to the action or proceeding before the" relevant state department. See Douglas County,
In coming to a contrary conclusion, the court of appeals relied on the fact that the Department is designated as "the radiation control ageney of this state," § 25-11-108(1), as well as "the entity in the state responsible for the regulation of hazardous waste management," § 25-15-301(1). Yet these provisions must be read in harmony with sections 24-60-2206(8) and 25-15-206(1), which carve out an area of exclusive authority for the County with regard to issuing a CD that allows for the disposal of waste contemplated by the License and Permit. Similar to the PUC's authority vis-a-vis Douglas County, the Department has general authority over this area, less the duty specifically assigned by the legislature to the counties. In sum, the General Assembly granted the County an integral and specific role in both the license and permit processes, and further authorized "any person," including a county, to chal
We are mindful that generally "the proper forum for intra-executive dispute resolution is the executive branch itself." Romer,
IIL
We hold that the County has standing both under Wimberly and with regard to specific prudential considerations to challenge the Department's issuances of the License and the Permit. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. A CD is a land use and zoning device by which a county selects sites for waste disposal. See § 30-20-102(1), C.R.S. (2009).
. In 1987, the Department was known as the Colorado Department of Health.
. At the time, the Facility was owned and operated by Highway 36 Land Development Company, not Clean Harbors.
. The Department is authorized to issue radioactive material licenses under the Radiation Control Act, § 25-11-103(2), C.R.S. (2009).
. This Compact is a statutory mechanism by which states-in this case, Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada-can join together to create regional disposal sites for their low-level radioactive wastes and can prevent such wastes from being imported from outside of their compact. See § 24-60-2202, C.R.S. (2009).
. The County sought review of the License issuance in the District Court for the City and County of Denver pursuant to section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (2004) because as a state agency the Department is deemed to be a resident of Denver County. The County sought review of the Permit issuance in the District Court for Adams County pursuant to the Hazardous Waste Siting Act, section 25-15-305(2)(b), C.R.S. (2004), because the Facility is located within Adams County.
. The County has the authority to suspend or revoke the CD. See § 25-15-206.5, CRS. (2009).
. The same tribunal issued both opinions on the same day.
. The Radiation Control Act contains statutory provisions which, among other things, empower the Department to "issue licenses pertaining to radioactive materials." § 25-11-103(2), CRS. (2009).
. The Department and Clean Harbors point out that subsection 24-60-2206(3) applies to a site recommendation made by a county, which was to occur by "January 1, 1984." § 24-60-2206(4). The Department and Clean Harbors argue that, because the County in this case did not make such a recommendation by that date, section 24-60-2206 is inapplicable here. Instead, they argue that section 24-60-2207, which applies to site recommendations made by the Department based on a statewide assessment, should govern. See § 24-60-2207(1)(e) ("In the event that no county has recommended a facility site or an application for such site has not been submitted by January 1, 1985, the department shall prepare an alternative plan for facility development.") However, subsection 2207(1)(e) provides that [slaid alternative plan shall be submitted to the general assembly no later than January 1, 1986, for review and approval"-which did not occur in this case. In sum, neither the County nor the Department appears to have complied with the applicable dates. For purposes of our standing analysis, however, it does not matter whether subsection 2206 or 2207 applies. Both reflect a determination by the General Assembly that the Department cannot issue a license to a facility unless that facility has first obtained a certificate of designation from the county allowing for the disposal of materials contemplated by the license. See § 24-60-2206(3) ("Any person who proposes to operate a facility shall first apply ... for a certificate of designation to the board of county commissioners of the county in which the proposed facility site is located."); § 24-60-2207(1)(e) ("No facility may be licensed until designated ... by the board of county commissioners of the county in which the proposed facility is to be located.").
. We see no support in the statutory language for the proposition that the County's role is limited to merely reviewing, rather than approving, an application for the CD that is required before the Department may issue a license or permit. See § 24-60-2206(3), CRS. (2009) (requiring that applications be "reviewed and approved" by the County) (emphasis added); § 25-15-206(1), C.R.S. (2009) (requiring County "approval" prior to changes in use); § 30-20-1119, C.R.S. (2009) (requiring "express written permission" from the County prior to radioactive waste disposal); § 30-20-102(1), C.R.S. (2009) (requiring a prospective site operator to "first obtain" a CD). The Department may be correct that such a limitation on its authority is problematic from a public policy standpoint. However, such public policy concerns are properly addressed to the General Assembly.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I agree that Adams County ("the County") has standing, but only to challenge the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment's ("the Department") issuance of the hazardous waste permit and radioactive materials license in the absence of the County first being able to exercise its legally protected right to review an application for a Certificate of Designation ("CD") for disposal of the wastes contemplated by the facility and to decide whether to issue such a CD. I disagree with the majority's finding that county issuance of a CD is a prerequisite to the Department's issuance of a permit or license because such an interpretation contravenes Colorado's comprehensive statutory scheme for hazardous and low-level radioactive waste disposal and frustrates the Department's duty and authority to implement the Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact ("the Compact"), codified at § 24-60-2202, C.R.S. (2009). The Compact obligates party states to open and operate waste disposal facilities sufficient to manage the low-level radioactive waste generated within the region.
I. Nature of the County's Legally Protected Interest and Scope of Its Standing
Hazardous and low-level radioactive waste disposal in Colorado is governed by a comprehensive statutory scheme.
Particular provisions within the statutory scheme clearly require a facility wishing to dispose of solid, hazardous, or low-level radioactive wastes to apply to the county for a CD. See § 80-20-102(1); § 25-15-201(1)-@2); § 24-60-2206(8). This application, and the county's decision, is to occur before the facility applies to the Department for a hazardous waste permit and radioactive materials license authorizing disposal of such wastes. See § 25-15-205(1); § 24-60-2206(8). As a result, counties have a legally protected right to receive and review an application for a CD for the wastes contemplated and to decide whether to issue such a CD.
In finding that county issuance of a CD is a prerequisite to Department issuance of a permit or license, the majority erroneously defines the County's legally protected interest, and therefore the scope of its standing, too broadly. According to the majority, if the County refuses to issue the CD, the Department is powerless to act. To the contrary, particular provisions and the overall intent of the statutory scheme evince a legislative intent that the Department, in such cireumstances, be able to freely exercise its authority and expertise in the area of hazardous and low-level radioactive waste disposal.
Section 25-11-108(1) to (2) of the Radiation Control Act and section 24-60-2205(1) of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act make clear that the Department is the sole radiation control ageney of the state. The General Assembly has charged the Department with dominant authority and expertise in issuing radioactive materials licenses and administering the Compact. § 25-11-108(1)-(2); § 24-60-2205(1). "No other agency or branch of this state shall have such power or authority." § 25-11-108(2). Likewise, seetion 25-15-801(1) to (2) of the Hazardous Waste Management Act provides that the Department is "the entity in the state responsible for the regulation of hazardous waste management" and for issuance of hazardous waste disposal permits.
The Department's authority and expertise is further evidenced by the fact that the General Assembly placed significant limitations on county discretion to issue a CD. Both the Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Hazardous Waste Siting Act require applications for CDs be referred to the Department for its review and recommendation as to approval or disapproval. See §§ 30-20-1083 to -104; §§ 25-15-202 to -208.
When read together to harmonize the entire, comprehensive statutory scheme for hazardous and radioactive waste disposal, the provisions granting the counties the right to review applications for CDs and those granting the Department dominant authority and expertise over the disposal of the waste at issue here illustrate a legislative intent that the counties play a limited and subordinate role and that the Department be able to freely exercise its authority and expertise.
II. The Majority's Decision Renders the Department Unable to Comply with the Compact
I disagree with the majority's decision that the Department is powerless to act if a county refuses to issue a CD. Hazardous and low-level radioactive waste disposal is an important state interest within the dominant authority and expertise of the Department, and the Department must be able to freely exercise that authority and expertise to implement the Compact. Therefore, if the County refuses to issue a CD or fails to act in a reasonable time, the Department can proceed to entertain the facility's application pursuant to its authority and expertise and its duty to implement the Compact. As a result, I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that county issuance of a CD is a prerequisite to the Department's issuance of a permit or license for waste disposal.
The majority's conclusion controverts both the Compact and the comprehensive statutory scheme evincing a legislative intent that the Department exercise dominant authority and expertise in the area of hazardous and radioactive waste disposal. Instead, the majority's construction of the statutory scheme functions to prevent the Department from overriding what are in effect local bans that render the Compact inoperative. Cf. Colo. Mining Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Summit County, 199 P.8d 718 (Colo.2009) (holding that a local ordinance banning the use of cyanide is impliedly preempted by the Mined Land Reclamation Act). This is especially problematic where, as here, the County is a statutory county-"a political subdivision of the state, existing only for the convenient administration of the state government, created to carry out the will of the state." Bd. of County Comm'rs of Douglas County v. Bainbridge, Inc.,
The majority's decision frustrates the Department's duty to implement the Compact because it effectively renders the Department powerless to approve a site for waste disposal within its borders. The Compact provides that "each state is responsible for providing for the management of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders...." Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, art. 1. A primary purpose of the Compact is to "ensure the availability ... of sufficient facilities for the proper and efficient management of low-level radioactive waste generated within the region...." Id. To this end, the Compact obligates party states to open and operate regional facilities. Id. art. 3.
Despite the purpose of the Compact and the obligations it imposes upon the Department, the majority's decision allows all counties in Colorado to simply declare, "Not in my back yard!" Surely the General Assembly did not intend such a result. To the contrary, in approving and ratifying the Compact, the General Assembly intended that the Department be able to override a county's decision not to issue a CD for disposal of low-level radioactive wastes.
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE MULLARKEY joins in this concurrence and dissent.
. See Solid Waste Disposal Act, §§ 30-20-100.5 to -122, C.R.S. (2009); Hazardous Waste Siting Act, §§ 25-15-200.1 to -220, C.R.S. (2009); Hazardous Waste Management Act, §§ 25-15-301 to-327, C.R.S. (2009); Radiation Control Act, §§ 25-11-101 to -203, C.R.S. (2009); Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act, §§ 24-60-2201 to -2212, C.R.S. (2009); Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact, codified at § 24-60-2202.
. Section 25-15-203(a) of the Hazardous Waste Siting Act explicitly requires the Department's recommendation of approval before a county can issue a CD. Although the county has broader discretion to issue a CD under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, section 30-20-104(3)(a) of that Act requires the county to incorporate as requirements in the CD any technical conditions of approval made by the Department.
. In contrast, the majority erroneously finds that county issuance of a CD is a prerequisite that limits the Department's authority to issue a permit or license. In so finding, the majority relies primarily on section 24-60-2206(3), which requires that proposed facilities "first apply ... for a certificate of designation to the board of county commissioners" and that the facility "shall be reviewed and approved by such board of county commissioners prior to the issuance of any license. ..." The majority errs in reading this provision in isolation, where other provisions and the overall intent of the statutory scheme and the Compact do not support such a finding. For example, another subsection of the same provision clarifies the relationship of a county and the Department: it requires only that the Department "first cooperate with and provide counties ... the opportunity to recommend facility sites within their boundaries." § 24-60-2206(1).
. Pursuant to its authority in Article 4 of the Compact, the Compact Board already has designated the facility, Clean Harbors, as a regional disposal site.