The sole issue presented by this appeal is the constitutionality, under our state constitution, of Wyoming’s statutory provision providing for the establishment and funding of a county court in counties with a population of less than 30,00o. 1 The issue arises under the equal protection and uniform operation of the laws requirеments found in the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. 2 Sublette County, with a population of less than 30,000, was denied full funding to establish a county court, while the state legislature has approved full funding for a county court in other counties having a population of less than 30,000. We hold that the statutory provision does not facially violate the state constitution as special legislation, as there exist rational reasons why the legislature could deny funding of county courts in counties having a population of less than 30,000. However, as applied to this case, the statutory provision violates the constitutional mandate for еqual protection of the laws because there is disparate treatment of counties having populations of less than 30,000. We reverse the decision of the district court.
In the Brief of Appellant, the Board of County Commissioners, Sublette County, Wyoming states the issue as:
I. Whether Wyoming Statute § 5-5-103 is special legislation and violates Wyoming Constitution Article 3, Section 27?
*745 The State of Wyoming 3 restates the issue in the Brief of Appellees as:
I. Whether Wyoming Statute § 5-5-103 facially violates Wyoming Constitution Article 3, Section 27?
The parties filed a Stipulation Concerning Factual Issues in which they advised the court that the material facts in the case are not in dispute. Each of the parties had filed a motion for summary judgment, and for purposes of this appeal, the only facts set forth in the record are those alleged in the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. From the Complaint we discern that Sublette County, with a population of less than 30,000, had established a county court by a resolution of the board of county commissioners. The legislature did not provide funding for the county court in Sublette County although application for such funding had been made.
The statute applicable to counties with a population of less than 30,000 is Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-103 (1992) (emphasis added), which provides:
(a) In counties in this state which have a population of less than thirty thousand (30,000), according to the latest official federal census, thе board of county commissioners may establish a county court in their county by the adoption of a resolution establishing the same. * * ⅞
(b) The judicial salaries, salaries of the clerical staff, supplies, operating costs, jury and witness expenses and other expenses of the county court may be pаid by the state.
The statutory provision for counties with a population of more than 30,000 requires the state to fund the expenses of the county court. Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-102 (1992).
In its Complaint, Sublette County alleged that the decision to deny funding to Sublette County for its county court violated the provisions of Article 3, § 27 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming on the ground that it was special legislation on its face. The Complaint also alleged that the legislature has funded county courts in six other eounties with a population of less than 30,000, but refused to fund county courts in other counties with a population of less than 30,000. The Complaint alleges thаt the statute permits the legislature to afford a special benefit to some counties not provided to other counties that are similarly situated.
The district court granted the Motion For Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the State and denied the Motion For Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Sublette County. The effect оf the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment And Denying Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment was to hold that Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-103 is constitutional. Sublette County has appealed from that order.
The parties, by virtue of their stipulation, agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact in this ease. It was appropriate for the district court to dispose of the ease as one involving only a question of law.
State v. Moncrief,
Initially, however, we consider the jurisdiction of the court. Neither party has raised this issue, but we do have an independent responsibility to test jurisdiction.
Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd.,
In two cases, we have held that, absent a specific constitutional or statutory provision authorizing such an action, a county cannot sue the state.
Carbon County School Dist. No. 2 v. Wyoming State Hosp.,
These principles have not been applied, however, in actions between agencies of the state and the state itself, or between the state and officers of the stаte in suits to have statutes construed and to determine the correlative rights of the parties.
Board of County Com’rs of County of Laramie v. Laramie County School Dist. Number One,
Sublette County contends that Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-103 is special legislation facially violating Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 27 because the statute discriminates against the class of counties with a population of less than 30,000. The county argues that Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-103 affords discretion to the legislature with respect to whether it should fund the county court in counties having a population of less than 30,000, while the legislature is mandated to fund the county court in those counties having a population of more than 30,000 in accordanсe with Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-102. Because the essence of Sublette County’s claim is unlawful classification, our cases addressing classifications in the context of equal protection are analogous and pertinent. Indeed we have said that the prohibition against special legislation is a guarantee of equal protection.
Campbell County School Dist. v. State,
In treating the question of unconstitutionality of a statute, we impose a severe burden upon Sublette County.
Hansen v. State,
Claims of unсonstitutional classification are treated under two levels of scrutiny. If the class is suspect or a fundamental
*747
right is involved, a strict scrutiny standard is applied that requires a demonstration that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
In re Honeycutt,
We invoke the four part test articulated in
Allhusen
in analyzing the constitutionality of a classification under the rational relationship test.
Snyder,
(1) what class is harmed by the legislation and has that group been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our laws; (2) what is the public purpose to be served by the law; (3) whаt is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies disparate treatment; and (4) how are the characteristics used to distinguish people for disparate treatment relevant to the purpose the challenged law purportedly intends to serve.
Allhusen,
If we assume counties with a population of less than 30,000 are harmed, we then consider whether they have been subjected to a tradition of disfavor in the law. Counties with a population of less than 30,000 have not been subjected to a trаdition of disfavor in our law. Nothing in the record so suggests. In the absence of a demonstration of a tradition of disfavor we could not conclude that the legislature has classified those counties as a product of a pattern of disparate treatment. We then consider the purpose of thе legislative conclusion to provide state funding for county courts in those counties with a population of more than 30,000, but maintaining its discretion as to whether it should fund those courts in counties with a population of less than 30,000. By Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-102 counties with a population of more than 30,-000 are required to establish a сounty court. Conversely, if the population of the county is less than 30,000, the board of county commissioners is afforded discretion with respect to the establishment of a county court. Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-103(a). In such instances, the legislature reserved the determination of whether it would or would not fund a county court in a cоunty less than 30,000 population. Wyo. Stat. § 5-5-103(b).
Several factors may reasonably be conceived to justify this classification. The legislature might have considered the fact that more sparsely populated counties would not need the services of a county court because the volume of cоurt business would not justify a county court. Rationally, the legislature could have concluded that the state coffers were not adequate to fund a county court in all 23 counties of the state. It is possible that the legislature conceived that counties that could not justify the full-time services of a county court judge would voluntarily join with other counties to create a county court district and that the discretion to not fund would induce them to do so.
The public purpose factor is closely related to the third factor involved in the Allhusen test, that is the characteristics of counties having populations of less than 30,000 that justify disparate treatment. Some of the same facts that support the public purpose are involved with respect to the justification for disparate treatment. A lower volume of court business would perhaps justify the classification. The much larger number of counties leading to a significantly greаter expenditure from the public coffers is readily apparent. The adequacy of judicial service provided by a justice of the peace court is more probable in a smaller county. It may be appropriate to encourage such counties to share judicial servicеs on a district premise.
The fourth factor we must consider is how those characteristics that might distinguish counties with a population of less than 30,000 are relevant to assure the legislative purposes. Again the relevance is demonstrated by the characteristics discussed above. The *748 lower populаtion would lend credence to a conclusion that the volume of court business would not justify a county court. The relatively small number of counties with more than 30,000 people would not impose the same burden upon the state coffers that a county court in smaller counties would. Again the legislature may hаve been concerned about structuring a potential for collaboration among counties.
We conclude that, applying the
Allkusen
test, the classification of counties with less than 30,000 population is rationally related to the purposes to be achieved and is not facially unconstitutional. Sublette County, however, in its Complaint аnd in its brief to this Court, argues that the statute is unconstitutional as it has been applied because sub-classifications exist within the counties of less than 30,000 population and there is no rational basis to support the sub-classifications. Like equal protection, the contemplation of special legislаtion “mandates that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”
Allhusen,
While this action was instituted by Sublette County, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that the county entity represents the citizens who reside there. We find it implicit, if not explicit, in out-decisions relating to the expenditure of public funds that citizens in one county or area are entitled to have the law function in such a way that public funds are expended equitably.
Simons v. Laramie County School Dist. No. 1,
Under the statutory structure as it exists, the legislature has funded county courts in at least six different counties all having a population of less than 30,000. The legislature denied funding for the county court in Sublette County. We apply the same four factor test of Allkusen to determine whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied.
We also know that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operаtion.” Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 34; Washakie County School District No. 1. v. Herschler,606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980), cert. denied sub nom Hot Springs County School District No. 1 v. Washakie County School District No. 1,449 U.S. 824 ,101 S.Ct. 86 ,66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980). See Nehring v. Russell,582 P.2d 67 (Wyo.1978). This rule demands that these statutes be applied uniformly throughout the state, * * *.
Longfellow v. State,
The decision of the district court is reversed.