95 P.2d 605 | Okla. | 1939
The question for determination in this case is whether a new privately owned tractor, on which no motor registration fee or motor excise tax had been paid in this or any other state, which is being used by a county under a lease contract requiring the county to pay a rental of $500 and all registration fees and excise taxes that might be assessed against it, is exempt from the regular motor registration license fee and motor vehicle excise tax imposed *626 by sections 7 and 8, art. 7, chapter 50, Sess. L. 1937 (47 Okla. St. Ann. §§ 19f, 19g.) The lease was for five months from August 1, 1938. The owner, Oklahoma Tractor Equipment Company, and the lessee, McClain county, made joint application for certificate of title and registration certificate, and the county tendered $1 to pay the registration fee required of municipalities by section 13, art. 7, ch. 50, Sess. L. 1937 (47 Okla. St. Ann. § 191). The Tax Commission denied the claim for exemption, and held the owner liable for the $1 certificate of title fee, $48 registration fee, and $68 excise tax. From that order the owner and lessee appeal.
1. Appellants first claim exemption from payment of the registration fee and excise tax by reason of the provisions of section 6, art. 10, of the Oklahoma Constitution.
But in City of Ardmore v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission (1934)
2. Appellants next claim exemption from payment of the registration fee under sections 2 and 13, art. 7, ch. 50, Sess. L. 1937 (47 Okla. St. Ann. §§ 19a and 191).
Section 2 defines owner as "any person owning or possessingany vehicle, as herein defined."
Section 13 provides that "vehicles owned by the United States of America, by the state, or by any city, county, or school district of this state, shall be registered each year for the nominal registration fee of one ($1) dollar after having obtained proper Oklahoma certificate of title. All other vehicles shall be registered at the regular rate provided by this act."
(a) Appellants first contend that legal title is not the criterion in Oklahoma for the imposition of taxes. In support of this contention they cite Rose v. Stalcup (1920)
The first three cases hold that purchasers of lands under executory or conditional sale contracts are owners within the purview of the taxing statutes; the fourth holds that title to a chattel does not vest in the purchaser under a conditional sales contract. We fail to see wherein these cases are applicable.
The first three have to do with the ownership of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation. They have nothing to do with liability for excise taxes, which must be governed by the language peculiar to the statutes imposing such taxes.
(b) Appellants next contend that in the state of Oklahoma the use to which property is put determines under what terms or provisions it shall be taxable. They quote, without argument, from Board of Equalization of Carter County v. Carter Oil Co. (1931)
(c) Appellants next urge that the provisions of the statutes above set forth clearly show an intention that the user of the property shall be liable for the taxes. This brings us to the decisive question in the case. It will be noted that while the act (sec. 2, supra) defines "owner" as any person owning orpossessing any vehicle, the exemption (sec. 13, supra) is narrower in scope, being restricted to property owned. In various portions of the act reference is made to persons owning
or possessing vehicles, but the exemption section refers to those owning solely. The definition of the "owner," and the use of the term owning or possessing, in other sections of the act renders it apparent that the choice of the word "owned" in the exemption section was deliberate, and this is accentuated by the further provision that all other vehicles must be registered *627
at the regular rate. Exemption statutes are strictly construed against the exemption. Home Building Loan Ass'n of Shawnee v. State (1931)
3. The tractor, not being eligible to registration as property of a subdivision of the state, does not, as urged by appellants, come under the exception to the motor vehicle excise tax contained in section 11, art. 8, ch. 50, Sess. L. 1937, which provides that the excise tax shall not apply to "any vehicle registered by the state of Oklahoma, or by any of the political subdivisions thereof."
4. Appellants' last contention is that under the lease the board of county commissioners of McClain county must pay the taxes, and therefore the action of the Tax Commission is in effect the collection of a tax from the county. While the terms of the lease may define the rights of the parties thereto as between themselves, they cannot operate to divest the state of the right to collect taxes due, unless thereby the property leased is converted into exempt property. Holding as we do that the lease does not effect such change in status, we are not here concerned with its operation as a private contract. If, under the contract, the lessee has agreed to pay a rental of $500 plus what fees and taxes the owner is required to any, that is a matter with which the Tax Commission has no concern. We are of the opinion that the state cannot be deprived of its revenue by any such arrangement.
Affirmed.
BAYLESS, C. J., and RILEY, OSBORN, CORN, GIBSON, and DAVISON, JJ., concur. WELCH, V. C. J., and DANNER, J., dissent.