45 Kan. 636 | Kan. | 1891
Opinion by
This was an action brought in the district court of Linn county, to perpetually enjoin and restrain the board of county commissioners of Linn county from levying a tax to pay the interest upon certain bonds, issued under chapter 236 of the Laws of 1887. It is disclosed in the record before us that, prior to the year 1885, Linn county was the owner of a tract of land in Mound City known as the “public square;” that during that year, upon the application of citizens of the township in which Mound City is situated, leave was granted by the board of county commissioners of the county to build a court-house on such public square; that certain citizens procured subscriptions from other citizens of the township, for the purpose of erecting a court-house; that a committee of citizens then proceeded to and did erect the walls of a suitable building for a court-house and put on a roof, but no floors were laid, and no doors or windows were put in; that after the erection of the walls of said building,
It is urged that the legislature had the right to authorize the township to issue its bonds for the purpose designated, notwithstanding the fact that there may have been no legal obligation resting upon the township to refund the different sums subscribed and paid by the various citizens, to be used in the construction of this court-house. The proposition involved is, whether or not this law, which recognizes the right and authorizes the municipality, upon a vote of the people, to assume and pay certain obligations of an equitable character, can be upheld. One of the canons of constitutional con
The reasoning in the adjudicated cases cited is, that the legislature may determine what moneys may be raised and expended, and what taxation for municipal purposes may be imposed; and it certainly does not exceed its constitutional authority when it compels a municipality to pay a claim which has some meritorious basis to rest upon. From the numerous authorities upon the question of legislative control over municipalities, Judge Cooley lays down the following proposition: “That the legislature has the undoubted power to compel the municipal bodies to perform their functions as local governments under their charters, and to recognize, meet, and discharge the duties and obligations properly resting upon them as such, whether they be legal, or merely equitable or moral; and for this purpose, it may require them to exercise the power
The court of appeals of New York recognizes the doctrine of large legislative discretion upon the question of raising and appropriating public money, and of imposing a tax upon towns and other municipal or political divisions, whenever it will be promotive of the public welfare. The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which a legal demand exists against the state. It can thus recognize claims founded in equity and justice, in the largest sense of these terms, or in gratitude and charity. Independent of express constitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money whenever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can, moreover, under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among all the taxpaying citizens of the state, or among those of a particular section or political division. (Town of Guilford v. Supervisors, supra.)
In speaking upon this same subject, in the case of Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, Mr. Justice Butler said: “To make a tax law unconstitutional on this ground, it must be apparent at first blush that the community taxed can have no possible interest in the purpose to which their money is to be applied.” In the case of Sinton v. Ashbury, supra, Crocket, J., stated the rule:
“It is established by an overwhelming weight of authority, and I believe is conceded on all sides, that the legislature has the constitutional power to direct and control the affairs and property of a municipal corporation for municipal purposes, provided, it does not impair the obligation of a contract, and by appropriate legislation may so control its affairs as ultimately to compel it, out of the funds in its treasury, or by taxation to be imposed for that purpose, to pay a demand when properly established, which in good conscience it ought to pay, even though there be no legal liability to pay it.”
The law challenged in this case is not subject to the objec
Following the maxim which.we regard as the true and correct rule, that there should be great caution in arriving at a conclusion adverse to the validity of a legislative act, and, believing that the law in question is within the constitutional power of the legislature to pass, we recommend a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
By the Court: It is so ordered.