Thе appellee’s complaint is in three paragraphs and charges the appellant with having negligently-failed to keep a public bridge safe for travel.
Our decisions settle the question of the liability of counties for a negligent breach of duty-respecting public bridges, but they do not hold by any means that a county is to be regarded as an insurer of the safety of those structures. If ordinary care is exercised in constructing and maintaining the bridges, there can be no liability. State, ex rel., v. Demaree,
The objection urged against the first paragraph of the complaint is, that the fact that the bridge was safely used fоr thirteen years overcomes the statement that it was negli
The appellee’s cause of action did not accrue until he was injured, and, although the defendant’s negligence runs back to 1871, the аction is not barred by the statute of limitations. The two elements of the appellee’s cause of action arе the legal injury and the resulting damages. City of North Vernon v. Voegler,
Thе facts pleaded show that the appellee’s injury was the proximate result of the appellant’s wrong, and this is sufficient without a direct averment. Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Thompson,
In the second paragraph of the complaint it is averred that the appellant negligently constructed the bridge of unsafe and unsuitable material, and it thus appears that the appellant itself was the wrоngdoer, so that the case does not fall within the rule that a public corporation can not be liable for suffering а bridge or highway to become unsafe, unless it has notice of the defect. If the original wrong is that of the corporation itself, and is of such a nature that it endangers the safety of travellers, it is not necessary to allege that it had notice of the unsafe condition of the bridge or highway. If the negligence is in the construction of the highway or bridge, then it is not necessary to aver notice. Board, etc., v. Bacon,
The allegation in the second paragraph that the bridge had ; not been inspected by a qualified inspector may be conceded to be without force and still the paragraph upheld, for if this allegation be entirely rejected there will remain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is unnecessary, therefore, to considеr, the effect of this allegation, although w.e are inclined to the opinion that it adds nothing to the complaint.
The attаck on the third paragraph of the complaint can not be maintained. If a public corporation knows that a bridge or highway is unsafe because of the need of repairs, and it undertakes to repair, it must exercise ordinary care and skill. If, as is here charged, the corporation knew when it employed persons to make the repairs that thеy were incompetent, it did not exercise ordinary care. A corporation charged with the duty of keeping a bridge in repair must select the proper means and persons to do the work, if by the exercise of ordinary care suсh a selection can be made. If, however, ordinary care is used in selecting suitable persons, and in requiring the persons selected to exercise their skill with reasonable prudence and diligence, the bridge still remains unsafe, there will be nо liability. City of North Vernon v. Voegler,
There was no error in permitting the surgeon who attended the appellee to give in evidence the statements of the appellee as to the nature and location of thе pain from which he was suffering. This question has long been settled in this court. Board, etc., v. Leggett,
The motion for a venire de novo was properly overruled. There is no imperfection in. the verdict, for sufficient facts are stated to enable the court to pronounce judgment, and, under the rule which prevails in this State, the failure to find upon all the issues does not entitle a party to a venire de novo. Wilson v. Hamilton,
Judgment affirmed.