54 Kan. 334 | Kan. | 1894
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
At its last session, the legislature attempted to enact a special law fixing the fees and salaries of certain county officers in Miami county, which was approved March 9, 1893. (Laws of 1893, ch. 80.) It purports to regulate the compensation of the county treasurer, county clerk, county attorney, county superintendent, and clerk of the district court, and provides that some of them shall report all the fees that they receive in an official capacity, and these are to be paid into the county treasury and credited to the general county fund. There is a further provision that a failure to account for the fees, or the making of a false or fraudulent statement with reference to them, shall be deemed a misde
“This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its publication in the statute book, and after January 8,1894, except the county treasurer hereinbefore named, which shall take effect as to said county treasurer after October 10,1893.”
On the 4th of January, 1894, J. P. Hiner presented his claim for salary and compensation from October 1, 1893, to December 31, 1893, under the general law, but the county commissioners, assuming that the special law was in force as to the county treasurer from October 10, 1893, only allowed so much as would be due under its provisions. An appeal was taken to the district court, where it was admitted that the claim presented was just and correct, provided the old law was in force, and that the amount allowed by'the commissioners was correct, provided the new or special act was in force. The decision of the district court was that the special act is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it did not prescribe the time when it should be in force as required by § 19 of article 2 of the state constitution, and judgment was accordingly given in favor of the treasurer.
The constitutional limitation referred to provides that “ the legislature shall prescribe the time when its acts shall be in force.” This provision plainly requires that the legislature shall fix a single definite time when its act as an entirety shall become a law. According to the practice and legislative course in this state, the last section of every act fixes a definite time when the act as a whole shall go into effect. It is sometimes by publication in a newspaper, in the statute book, or at some fixed time after a publication has been made. It was not intended that one section or provision of an act should become a law, while other sections or provisions of the same act were in an inchoate and embryonic stage. A legislative act, whether general or special, is passed as an entirety, approved as an entirety, and the generally accepted interpretation of the constitutional limitation is that it must become a
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting: That the form of the enactment under consideration is awkward, and not to be commended, I fully agree, but that it violates any constitutional provision,. I am not convinced. The general rules applicable to the construction of a statute require that all of its provisions be considered each in the light of the others, and that the will of the legislature be given effect, unless it is clear that to do so would violate the fundamental law. The constitutional provision on the subject is: “The legislature shall prescribe the time when its acts shall be in force, and shall provide for the speedy publication of the same, and no law of a general nature shall be in force until the same be published.” It will be noticed that the section apparently requires that a time be fixed by the legislature when all its acts shall be in force, as the word “acts” is in the plural, while “time” is in the singular. It has never been contended, however, that all of the acts passed at one session of the legislature must take effect at the same time. The main purpose of the constitutional provision is to prevent laws from taking effect before publication, and to require speedy publication of every enactment. Nothing is more common in legislation than to provide for the performance of acts by public officers or others in the future, and for changing circumstances as they may arise. The regulation of fees and salaries of public officers in such a manner that a change in the rate of compensation
There is also some force in the argument that the compen-. sation of public officers should not be changed during the-terms for which they are respectively elected, and that the more just way. is to have the change take effect when there is a change of officers. But it is insisted that if this can be done in the body of the act, it cannot in that section which fixes the time when the act shall take effect. Section 5 is as much a part of the act as section 1, and is to be construed in connection with it. The whole, taken together, is an expression of the legislative will, and that will clearly is that the salary of the county treasurer shall be such as is provided by the act after October 10, 1893, and that the salaries of other officers shall be changed in accordance with its provisions after January 8, 1894.
Notwithstanding the awkwardness of the provisions, the legislative intent appears perfectly plain to me. I think the legislature has prescribed the times when its enactments become operative, and those times, being after publication in the statute book, are not prohibited, but are subject to its discretion.