46 N.J.L. 173 | N.J. | 1884
Lead Opinion
An act was passed March 12th, 1880,. entitled “An act to provide for the payment of fixed annual salaries to the several prosecutors of the pleas of this state.” The first section provides that in eight counties therein named,, of which Passaic is one, .the prosecutors of the pleas shall receive fixed annual salaries instead of fees. The salaries given vary in amount, the highest being $7000 and the lowest $400. Pamph. L. 1880, j). 321.
At the passage of this act special laws existed, which had been enacted from time to time, providing for salaries instead of fees to the several prosecutors of all the other counties. The salaries fixed by these special laws also varied in amount.
The third section of the act of March 12th, 1880, provides- “ that the salaries of the prosecutors of the pleas in the counties not therein specifically named, and which were theretofore-fixed by special acts, shall be continued as thus established.” Stevenson was appointed prosecutor of Passaic after the passage of this act, and if it is constitutional it regulates his compensation.
The first question involved is whether this is a special and local law within the meaning of paragraph 11, section 7, of article IV. of the constitution of this state.
The effect of the act is to abolish the fee system in the whole state, and in this respect it is general in its operation. But it
A law which does not operate equally on all of the class to which it relates, but creates preferences and establishes inequalities, is not a general law. Van Riper v. Parsons, 11 Vroom 1. The salaries fixed by this law are governed by no general rule, according to population or service rendered. It is arbitrary, and creates the most glaring inequalities. The salary for Passaic, with a population of sixty-eight thousand, is $2000, while that for Union, with a population of fifty-five thousand, is $3000, and $4000 for Camden with a population of sixty-two thousand.
The constitutional amendment was designed to repress such preferences, and to secure uniformity in legislation. The grouping together in a single act of a number of special- or local laws does not constitute a general law. This legislation is not general in its operation and effect, and is as clearly within the constitutional prohibition as if eight several acts had been passed, each applying to one of the counties named in the act of March, 1880. It is in evasion of and not in conformity with the requirement of the fundamental law. Woodruff v. Freeholders, 13 Vroom 533.
This law, being special and local, can it be adjudged to be void for failure to comply with the amendment to the constitution which provides that no private, special, or local bill shall be passed unless public notice of the intention to apply therefor, and of the general object thereof, shall have be.en previously given ? This amendment further provides that the legislature, at the next session after the adoption thereof, and from time to time thereafter, shall prescribe the time and
In the case cited, the Chief Justice, in a very able opinion in which I' fully concur, held that the minutes of the two houses, or either of them, although kept under the requirement of the constitution, could not be received to show that the law as actually voted on and passed, and approved by the governor, was variant from that filed in the office of the secretary of state. The extremely uncertain character of the evidence furnished by the journals was discussed by the court in reaching its conclusion that the mandates of the constitution prescribing the mode of legislative procedure were addressed to the legislative branch of the government alone, and that judicial inquiry could not go behind the sanctions which the legislature had provided for the authentication of its acts.
Without such journals it would be impossible for legislators to know the situation of the vast number of bills before them. The inference, therefore, to be drawn from the injunction to keep a journal is that it is intended for the information of the legislative body alone, and not for the perpetuation of testimony to be used in judicial investigation.
After this decision had been promulgated the constitutional amendment now involved was drafted. It was agreed to by two successive legislatures, canvassed before the people, and
The superadded words in an instrument subjected to the most careful consideration of many legal minds, and so deliberately adopted as a constitutional amendment, must be presumed to have been used for a purpose which, without them, would not have been expressed.
The injunction in the amendment is that at the next session of the legislature after its adoption the legislature shall not only prescribe the time and mode of giving notice, but what shall be the evidence thereof and how such evidenc.e shall be preserved. Some reasonable meaning must be ascribed to this language; it cannot be rejected as surplusage.
The legislative body could have no use for such evidence after the bill has passed; nor can I conceive that it is one of the functions of a subsequent legislature to resolve itself into a court to try a question of fact in order to determine whether a prior legislature had kept within the constitutional restraints. If the fact of giving notice could not be thereafter challenged in the courts, the evidence, instead of being preserved, might as well be cast into the waste-basket. The only purpose for which it can reasonably be believed that the evidence is perpetuated is, that 'it may be used in a judicial investigation whether due notice has in fact been given.
There is no uncertain or doubtful implication in this respect. The preservation of the proof as evidence necessarily implies, in law, its competency and admissibility in courts of justice ; as clearly so, to the legal mind, as if it had been so expressed. Evidence required by the organic law to be preserved after
Such, I believe, was the almost universally-accepted interpretation of this amendment when it passed, and the legislature acting upon it at the first session after its adoption enacted the law now upon our statute-book for its enforcement.
It is possible that the legislature, by exercising its ingenuity, might prescribe such mode of proof as would render the right of review in the courts abortive, but constitutional guaranties are not to be construed upon the hypothesis that legislators will be astute to evade them. On the contrary, we-must ascribe to them the desire to enforce them in the most, beneficial manner.
Whether the legislative act passed in this instance, to effect the object of this amendment, is wisely framed to that end, it is not pertinent to consider. If it is not, the infirmity is-chargeable to the legislative act and not to the constitutional provision. I think it would not be difficult to devise a mode of preserving the evidence which would enable courts to adjudge, with as much certainty as is attainable in the conduct, of human affairs, whether notice, was duly given.
Under the statute passed by the legislature to enforce this amendment, (Rev., p. 1125,) the publication of an act in the Pamphlet Laws is prima- facie evidence that legal notice was given. The only counter-evidence in this case is the admission of the parties that no notice was given. Courts cannot act upon such admissions in determining the constitutionality of statutes. Facts may be admitted by parties to suits, but the law cannot be made or abrogated by agreement. Whether-
But if the constitutional requirement as to notice had been observed, in my opinion it violates a further amendment forbid ding private, special or local laws which regulate the internal affairs of counties. Such internal affairs can be regulated only by general laws. This law attempts to fix the salary of the prosecutor of the pleas of Passaic county. It is true that the prosecutor represents the state in the administration of the criminal law, and while the administration of justice within a county may not properly be termed an internal affair of the county, the amount of compensation which public officers who administer the laws shall receive from the county treasury is an affair which concerns the county alone, and not the state. This statute does not affect the administration of justice in anywise ; it relates wholly to the salary which the county shall pay. Those who control the county finances are charged with the duty of raising the necessary funds to pay such salaries, and upon such laws depend the extent to which the county shall be burdened by taxation. In no respect can the internal affairs of a county be more materially regulated.
Laws relating to the mode of paying public officers by the-counties, and to the amount of compensation, regulate their internal affairs equally whether such officers' are engaged in administering justice or in the performance of other funetionswithin the county. It seems very clear that the compensation of officers of the latter class can be fixed only by general laws. The reason for applying a different rule to the former-class should be very clear.
The beneficial operation of this salutary constitutional provision will be greatly impaired by an interpretation which permits inequalities to any extent to be created throughout the state by special and local laws for the compensation of
If laws increasing or decreasing the annual expenses of a ■county are to be regarded as laws regulating its internal affairs, then surely the subject matter of this controversy must be governed by general and not by local laws. Such I take to be the correct interpretation of the constitution. The act under review is therefore of no validity.
The judgment below should be affirmed.
In my judgment the law in question, which .fixes amounts to be paid to prosecutors by particular counties, (which must be raised by taxation,) is obnoxious to the prohibition of the constitution against private, local or special laws regulating the internal affairs of counties. I concur in the views expressed in the prevailing opinion of Justice Van Syckel on this subject, and on that ground I vote to affirm.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) I agree with the majority of the court in thinking that the law under consideration is local. Two questions therefore arise: First, whether it violates the constitutional amendment, forbidding local laws which regulate the internal affairs of counties. Secondly, whether it is void for non-compliance with the constitutional amendment requiring that no private, special or local bill shall be passed, unless public notice of the intention to apply therefor, and
I. Does this law purport to regulate the internal affairs of the counties where it is to operate ? It attempts to fix the salary payable by the county of Passaic to the prosecutor of the pleas of that county. Is the payment of that salary an internal affair of the county ? I think not. The compensation of the prosecutor is a necessary incident of the prosecution of crimes within the body of the county, and such prosecution cannot properly be regarded as an internal affair of the county. The offences to be prosecuted are violations of state laws, committed against the peace of the state, prosecuted in the name of the state by an attorney of the state before judges appointed by the state, the penalties to be imposed are inflicted by direct authority of the state and mainly understate supervision, and whether in any case they shall be remitted is determined in a court of the state. These things have-been so ever since the commonwealth existed; and- they show,, in my judgment, that, according to the general consent of our people, the repression of crime in each county concerns the state at large and is not an internal affair of the county. The incidents partake of the character of the principal.
II. Is the law void for want of notice ?
With regard to this question, I think, first, that whether notice was given is an inquiry not open to judicial consideration. Two theories exist in this country touching the effect as evidence of a document found in the legal depository of laws and regularly certified by the usual authorities to have become a law. One is, that such a document is 'prima, facie a law, but that the courts will receive other evidence, such as legislative journals, to ascertain whether the mandates of .the constitution as to the mode of enacting laws were observed regarding it, and if they were not, will adjudge it null. The other is-that such a document is conclusive evidence of its being a law,, so that no proof can collaterally establish the contrary. This latter is the theory which has been adopted in New Jersey (Pangborn v. Young, 3 Vroom 29,) and it has my entire con
But while this is conceded to be the rule touching all other constitutional provisions, it is denied as to this amendment, because the clause directs the legislature to prescribe what shall be evidence of the giving of notice and how the evidence shall be preserved. The argument is that because the evidence was to be preserved, it was designed to have it used to maintain or impeach the validity of the law. The constitution does not itself express such a design; it is ■claimed to appear by inference only. The reasons for such an inference seem to me to be weak and to have been substantially condemned in Pangborn v. Young, ubi supra. There the question was whether the court would permit it to be shown by the journals of the legislature that the alleged law had not been voted for by a majority of each house. The constitution in terms commands that no bill or joint resolution shall pass unless there be a majority of all the members of each body personally present and agreeing thereto; that the yeas and nays of the members voting on such final passage shall be entered on the journal which each house is
The statute passed to carry out this amendment well exemplifies the danger of holding that the question whether due notice was given is a matter for judicial revision. It directs (Rev., p. 1125,) that the notice shall contain a correct statement ■of the general object of the bill, be signed by at least one of the parties who intend to apply for its passage, and be published in at least one of the newspapers printed and published-in every county wherever said bill is or is likely to take effect, and, if no newspaper be printed and published in said county, then in a newspaper printed and published in some adjoining county, which publication shall be at least once in each week for four consecutive weeks next preceding the day prescribed for the first assembling of the legislature in which such bill is to be introduced. It further directs that proof of the publication shall be made by an oath or affirmation in writing made by the publisher or agent of the publisher of every newspaper in which such publication was made, containing a copy of the notice published, which shall be presented with such bill when introduced, and after the final vote upon said bill shall be filed and deposited by the officers of the legislature in whose hands the same may be in the office of the secretary of state, there to remain; by the secretary it is to be recorded. Whether this statute is within constitutional limits and bind
As a check upon legislative power, the clause is utterly useless ; for, in fact, no bill of any kind does nowadays pass either house without public notice being given, both by its public introduction and by newspaper correspondents, of the intention to apply for it and its general object, and each legislature can enact.
But, secondly, I think there is not, in the present case, competent proof that due - notice was not given. The only evidence to that effect is the admission of the parties. In Illinois, where the courts are willing to go behind the certified bill to see whether the legislature has proceeded according to the constitution in enacting laws, they distinctly repudiate the admission of parties as proof of irregularity. Happel v. Berthauer, 70 Ill. 166. The point for decision is whether what seems to be a public law closely affecting the preservation of the public peace, which is certified by the general assembly, the senate and the governor to have been enacted in conformity with all the requirements of the constitution, and which, under the sanction of the government, has been promulgated as law to all the citizens of the state, is proved not to be law by the admission of two suitors. The question is not one of private concern merely; it involves the enforcement of a public statute, and, in this case, against public officers. If, on a bill for divorce, the parties should stipulate that the defendant was to be taken as guilty of the offence charged, the court would ignore the admission because the public is interested in the maintenance of the marriage state. The enforcement of a public law is quite as important to the public as is the preservation of any single marital bond. The proof to defeat the law should therefore be, not simply evidence legal against the nominal parties, but proof against the state, proof of the absolute fact, proof which constrains the conscience of the court to adjudge that a co-ordinate branch of the government has transgressed its constitutional bounds. This proof no private admission can furnish.
My conclusion, therefore, is that the statute before us was duly passed and is valid, and that therefore the judgment below should be reversed.