These are four appeals by the assessors from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board granting abate-ments to The Vincent Club of taxes for the years 1961 and 1962 assessed against its land and buildings at 71 and 73 Brimmer Street, Boston. The petitions before the Appellate Tax Board were under formal procedure and by way of appeal by the taxpayer from the refusal of the assessors to make an abatement. The facts were agreed.
The issues are whether the taxpayer is a charitable organization and is exempt from taxation of its real estate pursuant to G-. L. c. 59, % 5, Third (as amended through St. 1957, c. 500, § 1), which exempts “real estate owned by . . . a charitable' organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purposes for which it is organized.”
The taxpayer was incorporated on March 19,1958, under G-. L. c. 180. Its purposes, as stated in its charter, are “To raise funds in aid of the Vincent Memorial Hospital of Bos
Upon incorporation the taxpayer succeeded an unincorporated association, also known as The Vincent Club, formed in 1892 to raise money in support of the Vincent Memorial Hospital. The hospital is a public charity, incorporated in 1890 “for the purpose of establishing a hospital for the diseases of women, as a memorial to the late Mrs. J. ft. Vincent,” a well known actress in the last century. The hospital is the gynecological unit of the Massachusetts General Hospital, where research and treatment in the fields of cancer, gynecology, and endocrinology are conducted.
From 1892 until incorporation in 1958, The Vincent Club contributed more than $1,000,000 to the hospital, and since incorporation has contributed $231,000, making a total of unrestricted gifts of more than $1,250,000 through 1962. In both 1961 and 1962 the gift amounted to $47,000, made up of the net income ($30,000) from the annual fund-raising activity plus $10 out of the $15 annual dues collected from members, of whom there were over 1,800 in both years.
The principal activity of the taxpayer is its annual money-raising activity, which consists of an annual show in
The real estate at 71-73 Brimmer Street consists of two two-story brick buildings connected as a single unit and occupied and utilized only in strict conformity with the aims and purposes set out in its charter and by-laws. No commercial activities are conducted on the premises, no part of which is rented or made available for hire to outside organizations or to members or groups of members for social functions. No part of the funds of the club inures to the benefit of any member.
The appellant claims that there was error in the denial of its fourth request, which was that “An essential of a legal charity is that it should not be a money-making organization. ’ ’ Either this was completely immaterial, or it was at least an indirect allegation that the taxpayer is such an organization. In any event, it was rightly denied.
The taxpayer’s status as a charitable organization is disputed by the appellant. A charitable organization is defined in GK L. c. 59, § 5, Third, as “a literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific institution or temperance society incorporated in the commonwealth.” Whether the taxpayer is one depends upon “the language of its charter or articles of association, constitution and by-laws, and upon the objects which it serves and the method of its administration.” Little v. Newburyport,
The production of a revue is attacked as incompatible with activities appropriate to a charitable organization. It is described by the appellant as being quite different from money-raising by campaigns soliciting direct contributions to the hospital, which is conceded to be a legitimate function of a charitable organization. This is a necessary concession in the wake of the quaint statement in some of our decisions, that a charity is “not confined to mere almsgiving. ’ ’ See, for example, New England Sanitarium v. Stoneham,
The appellant denies that the real estate is occupied for the charitable purposes for which the corporation is organized. This question merges into that just considered as to whether the taxpayer is a charitable organization. In fact, many cases cited by the appellant on the first issue are more pertinent authorities on the second. See Mount Hermon Boys’ Sch. v. Gill, supra, 148; Salem Lyceum v. Salem, supra, 16. “Such occupancy means something more than that which results from simple ownership and possession. It signifies an active appropriation to the immediate uses of the charitable cause for which the owner was organized. The extent of the use, although entitled to consideration, is not decisive. But the nature of the occupation must be such as to contribute immediately to the promotion of the charity and physically to participate in the forwarding of its beneficient objects.” Babcock v. Leopold Morse Home for Infirm Hebrews & Orphanage,
The tax board justifiably inferred that the taxpayer “is a charitable organization in purpose and in the work done,” and that “ [t]he real estate in question is owned and occupied by it solely in carrying out the charitable purpose for which it was incorporated . . ..” These conclusions are well within the authority of Molly Varnum Chapter, D. A. R. v. Lowell,
The decision of the Appellate Tax Board is affirmed with costs to the taxpayer.
So ordered.