35 Fla. 625 | Fla. | 1895
A three-fold object was sought to be accomplished by the bill of complaint; (1) to have it decreed that the exemption from taxation under the 18th section of the Internal Improvement act was a continuing exemption for thirty-five years after the completion of the several lines of railroad constructed on the routes in said act designated, and that said exemption attached to the rm, following the property into whosoever hands the same might come; (2) to have a decree for the recovery by the complainant, as successor of the Florida Railway & Navigation Company, of $140,812.47 paid by said company in 1885, for taxes of 1882, 1883 and 1884, to the State of Florida, alleged to be illegal, and to-have been paid under duress and upon protest; (3) to enjoin the collection of taxes by the defendants for the years 1879, 1880 and 1881, which were sought to be collected under the provisions of the statutes, Chapters 3558 and 4073 laws of Florida. The first two objects of relief were refused by the court below, but the third was granted. Both parties allege in their briefs that the complainant and the defendants each appealed from the final decree below. The record shows an appeal by the defendants only. Both sides have presented the whole case upon the principle that an appeal in chancery is practically a rehearing, and opens up the whole case to the respondents. Southern Life Insurance Company vs. Cole, 4 Fla. 359. We consider the whole case, and whether the complainant below was entitled to any of the different matters of relief for which it prayed in its bill of complainant.
The question involved in the first relief prayed for is easily disposed of. The claim that the exemption provided for in the 18th section of the Internal Im
It is alleged in the bill of complaint, and admitted by. the answer, that certain lines of railroad of the -complainant built in the years 1877, 1881 and 1883
The second matter of relief sought by the bill of complaint was to recover from defendants the sum of $140,812.47, alleged to have been paid by the Florida Railway & Navigation Company on the 28th of May, 1885, to William D. Barnes, Comptroller of the State of Florida. This money, as shown by the bill, was claimed by the State of Florida for taxes assessed against said Florida Railway & Navigation Company for the years 1881, 1882, 1883 and 1884. These taxes are alleged to have been paid under duress, because the State’s officers, including the executive of the State, had threatened to sell the railroad of said company on account of said taxes, and to put the purchaser at such sale into possession. The taxes collected are alleged to be illegal on account of the exemption, of the property from taxation. The money sought to be recovered was paid to the Comptroller officially,, and for the State for which he was acting. The recov-
The Constitution of Florida- of 1885, section 22 of Article III, is as follows: “Provision may be made by general law for bringing suits against the State as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating. The nineteenth section of Article IY of the Constitution of 1868 was the same. No such provision having-been made by the Legislature, the section quoted is inoperative to change the general principles xxpon which we hold that the State is not liable to be sued.
The next and third object sought to be accomplished by the bill of complaint was decided in' favor of the complainant below. This was the relief prayed for and granted, adjoining the collection of taxes for the years 1879, 1880 and 1881, upon certain railroads and
Various objections were made in the bill of complaint to the proceedings to enforce the collection of the taxes claimed by the State. Among other things which are insisted upon, and which it is necessary for us to determine, it was alleged, substantially, (1) that Chapter 3558, above set out in full, was obnoxious to-the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, forbidding States to pass laws impairing the obligations of contracts, and to similar provisions in the Constitution of the State of Florida; (2) that it is a special law for the collection of taxes for State and county purposes, and obnoxious to the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Florida, that it does not provide for a uniform assessment of all omitted property, and is discriminating in the mode of payment; (3) that the act was incomplete in itself, is retrospective, and interfered with vested rights; (4) and it-is also claimed, in effect, that at the time the predecessors of the claimant, and through whom it claims, acquired the property assessed, the years 1879, 1880- and 1881 had expired, that the taxes now sought to be collected had not been assessed against it, that the-State had no lien upon it for the said taxes, and that-the right of complainant to the property is superior to. the claim of the State for the taxes sought now to be-collected by a sale of the property. (5) It is also-alleged in the bill of complaint that the exemption of railroads from taxation under the eighteenth section
The greater portion of the argument of counsel for appellee, upon the alleged conflict between the act of 1885, Chapter 3558 laws of Florida, and the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida, is based upon the assumption that the exemption provided for by the 18th section of the Internal Improvement act attached to the railroad property as an incident of the same, and was a contract by the State for a continuing exemption of the property in the hands of whosoever might acquire the same. As already stated, since the decision of the case of Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. vs. Palmes, in the Supreme Court of the United States, the proposition contended for has been so finally settled that it is no longer open to discussion in this State.
It is also contended by appellee that the act, Chapter 3558, supra, interferes with the vested rights claimed of exemption from taxation of the complainant’ s property, because those rights accrued, under a judicial construction declaring that the exemption from taxation provided for in the 18th section of the Internal Improvement act, attached to the property as an incident without regard tó changes in the ownership of the same. This contention is supported by reference to the opinions of this court in the cases of Allen vs. Atlantic & Gulf R. R. Co., 15 Fla. 637, delivered at the June Term, 1876, and Genzales vs. Sullivan, 16 Fla. 791, delivered at the June Term, 1878. The first mentioned case did not, but the latter mase undoubtedly
In effect, the complainant says that while it may be-that the railroad property 'sought to be sold for the-taxes for the years 1879, 1880 and 1881, was really subject to taxation in those years, yet it had been by a mistaken construction of the law declared not liable to taxation, and that the complainant, relyiug upon such construction, and upon faith of the exemption from taxation, had contracted and-invested its money in the property. In this case it is unnecessary to determine what effect a change of judicial decision will have-upon contracts made, while a former and different construction of the law prevailed. In reading the cases, of Palmes vs. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., and Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. vs. Palmes, supra, it is evident that only one phase of the liability to taxation of the property in dispute was before the court and involved in its adjudication. The only point, of non liability decided in Gonzales vs. Sullivan was, that the exemption provided for in the Internal Improvement act attached to the property and continued as an incident of it after its transfer from the original owners and builders. The more important and vital question, as to whether a corporation coming into existence since the adoption of our Constitution of 1868: could hold such property as exempt, was not determined in the Gonzales-Sullivan case; nor has it ever been determined in any other case by this court. Therefore, that one branch of the question had been.
Another matter is worthy of attention in considering the effect of the judicial construction of the statute from which the complainant claimed his privilege of -exemption from taxation accrued. By reference to the bill of complaint and to the act (Chapter 1646 laws of Florida, pamphlet laws of 1868, page 143; McClellan’s Digest, 1006) it will be seen (in the preamble to the act found in the original, not in McClellan’s Digest) that at the time of the passage of the act, July
The complainant says further, in effect, that at the time its predecessors purchased the property the taxes claimed had not been assessed against it, that there
As different portions of the property rest upon different bases of fact, we will have to separate them in such statement. First, we will examine the nature of the title of the complainant to the line extending from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee, with branches to Monticello and St. Marks. For present purposes, it is only necessary to trace this chain of title to the acquisition of the property by Edward J. Reed and associates, in September, 1879. Their title was acquired at a sale on foreclosure of a statutory lien on behalf of the State against the Jacksonville, Pensacola & Mobile Railroad Company. The property was owned and operated by said Reed and associates, but under what firm or corporate name is not shown by the record, until February 8,1882. On this date Reed and his associates organized a corporation under the general laws of the State of Florida, under the name of the Florida Central & Western Railroad Company, and on the 28th of February, 1882, conveyed the property to said corporation. An inspection of these articles of incorporation on file in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Florida
The next point requiring demonstration is, that the Florida Railway & Navigation Company did not become an innocent purchaser by reason of the consolidation of the Florida Central & Western Railroad Company into it. This consolidation was accomplished by virtue of the statutes —sec. 27, p. 285, and sec. 37, p. 288, McClellan’s Digest. The statutes under which the consolidation was made makes no provision as to the payment of the debts and liabilities of the constituent companies which, by the consolidation, become absorbed into a new corporation.' Neither does it appear by- the bill of complaint, nor the articles of incorporation on file in the office of the Secretary of State, that any provision of this kind was made in such articles. In such a state of affairs all the authorities seem to agree that unless the statute or articles of consolidation make express provision therefor, the new corporation assumes all the debts and liabilities of the constituent companies. In the absence of express statutory provision, or an assumption by agreemenb-of the new company, the debts and liabilities of the original companies follow as an incident of the consolidation, and become- by implication the obligations of the new corporation. Columbus, Chicago &
In ascertaining the title of the complainant to the line of railroad from Fernandina to Cedar Keys, it is necessary only to go as far back as a judicial sale, made in certain proceedings in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Florida, in a suit between one Doggett, Receiver, and the Atlantic, Gulf & West India Transit Railroad Company. The bill does not allege the date of this alleged sale, but it appears with certainty that it was before the year 1881 and probably before the year 1879. Applying that rule by which all allegations in a pleading are taken most strongly .against the pleader, we are warranted in construing the bill as alleging this sale as occurring before 1870. It does not clearly appear by what corporate name the road was operated after this purchase. The property was purchased at the sale mentioned by E. N. Dickerson and C. D. Willard; who organized a corporation with the same name as that which had formerly owned it. The bill alleges that this company’s name was changed in 1881 to the Florida Transit Railroad Company. But it also alleges that the company under the old (not the new) name was, in December, 1882, consolidated, with other corporations, into the Florida Transit & Peninsular Railroad Company. This last named company was likewise consolidated, with others, into the Florida Railway & Navigation Company; in February, 1884. The com
There is some variance as to what lines are advertised for sale, as stated in the allegations contained in the body of the bill of complaint, and in the sheriff’s, advertisement attached to the bill of complaint and ¡made an exhibit to and part' thereof. Three lines advertised by the sheriff are (1) that from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee, (2) Eernandina to Tampa, and (3). Waldo to Cedar Keys. In the bill the line is described as from Eernandina to Cedar Keys. The line leading southwest from Eernandina branches into two lines at Waldo, one of which branches leads to Cedar Keys,, and one leads to Tampa. The latter branch in the bill of complaint is described as several different roads built by different companies, as follows: Line F, Waldo to Ocala, built in 1877 by the Peninsular Railroad Company, and line Gf, Ocala to Wildwood, built in 1881 by the Tropical Florida Railroad Company. These companies were consolidated, in 1882, with another company, into the Florida Transit & Peninsular Railroad Company. This latter company, as we have-before seen, was consolidated into the Florida Railway & Navigation Company in February, 1884. The first of these lines, that from Waldo to Ocala, is liable to the payment of the taxes sought to be enforced against-it, for reasons already stated. The line from Ocala to Wildwood is alleged to have been built in 1881 — what period of said year is not stated. Acting upon a rule-of construction already announced, we construe this-
Another objection to the proceedings to collect the taxes involved herein is, that the act of 1885, under' which the assessments were made, is a special law for the collection of taxes for State and county purposes, and obnoxious to the provisions of the Constitution of 1868, in force at the time the act was passed. The portion of this Constitution with which the act is claimed to be in conflict is the provision in the seventeenth section of Article IY, forbiding the Legislature to pass, special or local laws for the assessment and collection of taxes for State, county and municipal purposes. The eighteenth section of the same article provides.
The bill also alleges, in substance, that the act complained of was enacted to reach only property of the-class of complainant; that other properties of large-values and lands elsewhere in the State were improperly omitted from assessment for taxes for the years-1879, 1880 and 1881, and that no act has been passed toreada such property; that the act complained of does not attempt to secure a just valuation and assessment of all classes of property. These objections do not show any constitutional infirmity in the act. The fact-
From what has been said herein, it follows that the lines of railroad of. the complainant from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee, with St. Marks and Monticello branches, the line from Fernandina to Cedar Keys, and the line from Waldo to Ocala, are subject to the taxes sought to be collected from them. The line from Ocala to Wildwood is subject only to such taxes for the year 1881. The lines above mentioned, except that from Ocala to Wildwood, are the ones in existence and assessed by Barnes, Comptroller, as alleged.
The decree of the Circuit Court holding the lines of railroad described therein as subject to taxation in 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885 and 1886, and refusing injunction against the assessment and collection of taxes thereon for 1886, and refusing to direct return of taxes paid for 1882,1883 and 1884 by the Florida Railway & Navigation Company, is affirmed, except that portion which holds the line from Ocala to Tampa subject to taxation as aforesaid. Only that part of the latter line which extends from Ocala to Wildwood was sub