71 N.Y.S. 306 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1901
The facts upon which the claim of the plaintiffs arose are as follows : Prior to December, 1895, the defendant had discounted a note made by the Belle of Nelson Distilling Company for $5,000,
This conversation was reported to the plaintiffs’ manager, who testified that he subsequently called upon Rosenwald, the president of the bank, and his testimony as to the interview is as follows: “ I went into his office, which was in the back room of the bank, and said, 1 Mr. Rosenwald, there is a loan due of the Belle of Nelson Distilling Company in your bankof $5,000, and I understand there are 500 barrels of whiskey as collateral with this loan, and I am asked by Mr. Johnson whether I would care to take it off your hands, and I would like you to tell me please what you know of the certificates and if everything is all right,’ and he answered, ‘ Mr,
The president of the defendant then produced and showed to the plaintiffs’ manager the certificates which called for 500 barrels of whisky. On December twelfth, the day that the note became due,. .the plaintiff directed Bamberger to go down to the bank, take up the loan and bring back the certificates, giving him a check for $5,000 for that purpose. Bamberger, upon the delivery of the check,. received the note from the Southern National Bank and the certificates in question. . This note was stamped by the bank as paid. The certificates certified that there had been deposited in the bonded warehouse of the company 500 barrels of whiskey deliverable only upon the return of the certificates properly indorsed, and on payment of the State and government taxes which might be due on said whisky, and storage charges. The plaintiffs before they sent to the defendant had received from Johnson a new note of the distillery company indorsed by H. D. Nessber & Co., and the note held by the defendant was returned to the maker, the indorsement thereon being canceled. Subsequently it appeared that this distillery company had issued fraudulent certificates, and that the various certify cates which purported to represent 500 barrels of whisky upon which the plaintiff made the loan complained of, in reality represented but 43 barrels, that being all that the plaintiffs had ever Obtained from the distillery company upon these certificates.
After the plaintiffs had information of the fraud committed by the maker of this note, they sent Bamberger to Louisville to ascertain whether the certificates were good or bad. They employed a firm of lawyers at Louisville, and left the matter in their hands. Subse-. quently it appeared that certificates for forty-three barrels of whisky represented actual whisky, but the rest of the certificates did not.
There is no allegation in the complaint, nor was there the slightest evidence to show that if the president of the bank made the representations testified to he did so fraudulently, or with knowledge that they were false, or with any intent to defraud or deceive the plaintiffs. So far as the action is sought to be - sustained as an action to recover damages for deceit, neither the allegations of the complaint nor the proof would justify the court in submitting any -question to the jury.
The plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to rescind the transaction and recover back the amount paid for the note. The complaint, however, did not allege a rescission. There was no allegation that the plaintiffs tendered the note and certificates back to the bank and demanded a return of the money they had paid. The transaction between the plaintiffs and the bank seems to have been a payment of the note by the maker from the proceeds of a discount of a mew note by the plaintiffs. The note which had become due and was held by the defendant was stamped paid by the defendant, and in that condition received by the plaintiffs without objection and delivered to the maker. The transaction was in effect a payment of the note by the plaintiffs as the agents of the maker, the defendant at the time transferring to the plaintiffs as such agents the securities which it had held as collateral. It is somewhat difficult to see what there was to rescind or upon what basis the plaintiffs could recover from the defendant the money paid by the maker óf the note to discharge its indebtedness. In the absence of evidence of fraud which would sustain an action for deceit, I do not see how any action can be maintained against the bank which would entitle the plaintiffs to recover from it money which they , had paid to discharge the indebtedness upon the note. But, assuming that there was something that could be rescinded, the bank had a right before the plaintiff could insist upon such a rescission to have tendered back all that plaintiffs had received from the bank, and to be put again in the same position that it would have been in if the transfer had not been made. There is no pretense that this was done. The note that was delivered by the bank to the plaintiffs was never tendered
This evidence was stricken out as not within the pleadings ; but if allowed to stand it would not have entitled the plaintiffs to recover. The court, after striking out this testimony, denied the motion of the defendant to dismiss the complaint, although without it there was clearly no cause of action alleged or proved, and submitted to the jury the question whether or not they believed the witnesses Kraus alid Bamberger as to the representations made by the president of the defendant, and instructed the jury that if they believed that testimony and believed the statements made were false, the' plaintiffs were entitled to recover.. The jury found a verdict for the defendant, thus refusing to credit this story of the alleged interviews with1 the president of the defendant. The plaintiffs attack this direction upon the ground that the court should have directed a verdict in their favor as the jury were bound to believe the testimony of Kraus and' Bamberger, it being uncontradicted. We think that with the testimony of Kraus and Bamberger no cause of action was found. But assuming that a cause of action was proved, this direction was not error. There is no evidence that any representations
I think on the whole case no error was committed which would justify a reversal, and the judgment and order denying a new trial should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., and O’Brien, J., concurred; Patterson and Laughlin, JJ., concurred in result.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.