Opinion by
Appellant supplied printed matter, “campaign cards,” to persons representing themselves as officers of the “Davis-Brown Campaign Committee,” an alleged politi *462 cal organization functioning during the State election of 1930. Appellee Yauclain did not personally authorize this work to be done, and the burden was therefore on appellant to show that the purchases were made by the agents of appellee, with his authority. It appeared that appellee was treasurer of the so-called campaign committee and аppellant endeavored to show he assented to the purchases. There was no doubt that some sort оf a committee existed, but to affix liability on an officer, or one or all of its members, for acts done in its name, it must appear that it existed in some form of a substantial nature, not merely as a loosely formed, voluntary association as this committee appeared to be. Some members were unacquainted with other members, it had nо by-laws, and nothing indicates that it held regular meetings or gave authority to anyone to act. Persons dealing with such an оrganization must do so with the understanding that they run a great risk in finding-anyone, other than the one who gave the order, who is legаlly responsible for bills. I-Iere appellee served as treasurer at the request of a friend of one of thе candidates, and held the position by mutual consent rather than election. His duties were merely those of a custodian of campaign contributions, disbursing them upon vouchers signed by the chairman and publicity director. He had no authority to order printing to be done, and could not be held liable for the orders of the publicity director, any morе than a candidate could be held liable where he had no part in authorizing the work done. The finding of the court below that appellee took no active part in the campaign and had no control over its conduct, is well substantiated by the record.
The principles of law governing the responsibility of candidates and officеrs of such committees have been before the courts, and in all cases we have adhered to the rule lаid down for voluntary associations. The mere fact that one is a candidate, an officer or a member оf a political organization does not, of itself, establish his
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liability, personally or otherwise, for debts incurred by that оrganization. In
Franklin Paper Co. v. Gorman,
Appellee was not consulted regаrding the purchase of cards, and, even if he knew they were being purchased, that fact could not be used as thе basis for a presumption that he assented and would be personally bound therefor:
McCabe v. Goodfellow,
There was no proof thаt appellee ratified the contracts involved so as to impose individual liability on him. It is true that certain of the bills rendered by appellant to the Davis-Brown Committee were paid by the checks of appellee as treasurer of the funds entrusted to his care, but that fact is of no significance in ascertaining ratification. In the conversations which occurred between appellant and appellee after the close *464 of the campaign there is nothing which could be construed as a ratification or an adoption of these contracts so as to affix defendant with personal liability. He merely recognized the bills as proper claims agаinst the fund which he held, and such promises as he made were that they should be paid, not by him or out of his own pocket, but from the moneys entrusted to his care to meet campaign expenses. Appellee’s position was very similаr to that of a stakeholder for the interested parties.
It has not been shown that the committee, as a committee, by resolution or otherwise ever authorized the making of these contracts and appellee сould not ratify for the committee. See
Humphrys v. Republican Central Campaign Committee,
supra. It is doubtful if he could have assumed these contracts personally, for they were not made for his benefit nor on his behalf:
Edwards v. Heralds of Liberty,
The case of
Irwin v. McCullough,
After a careful review оf the record, it is clear that the court below was correct in directing a verdict for appellee and in refusing to grant a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.