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Bloom v. Lewis
640 P.2d 935
N.M. Ct. App.
1980
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*1 EASLEY, (6) C.J., SOSA, parent corporation Justice, The pays Senior expenses salaries or losses of concur. or the sub-

sidiary. PAYNE, J., dissenting. (7) subsidiary substantially The has no parent corpora- business except with

tion or no except conveyed assets those

it parent corporation.

(8) parent corpora- In papers

tion, officers, and in the statements of its

“the subsidiary” is referred to as such or department as a or division. BLOOM, Representa- Linda as Personal tive of the of Louise (9) The directors Estate executives of the or Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, subsidiary independently in do not act interest subsidiary but take di- v. parent corporation. rection from the Lewis, Leann LEWIS and Earl legal requirements The formal Defendants-Appellees. separate the subsidiary indepen- as a HODGES, Repre corporation dent not observed.’ R. James as Personal Hоdg sentative of the Marsha Estate U., Auto., Intern. United Etc. v. Cardwell es, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, Co., supra (quoting MFG. at 1286 Fish v. East, (10th 1940)). F.2d Cir. met, guidelines Not all of these must be Leann Earl LEWIS and only

these are factors for court to Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellees, consider in determining whether not to recognize separate corporations enti- ties. Id. Walter Dils and Barbara as Personal present only this testi Dils, Deceased, the Estate of Louise De mony in the relationship the record on fendants-Cross-Defendants-Appellants. ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍corporations the two is that Marriott Inter Corporation, organized national under the No. 3952. laws of Maryland, subsidiary of Mar is New Appeals Court of Mexico. Corporatiоn organized riott which under Delaware; the laws of agree that all 3, 1980. Nov. formerly Corpora

ments Marriott between

tion and overseas entities have been as

signed operate to and now under Marriott

International Corporation. The

evidence concerning that the trial court had corporations

the relationship of the was the

management agreement between Marriott

Corporation and SHARACO was as

signed Corpora to Marriott International support

tion. The evidence a con does

clusion Corpora that Marriott International Corpora

tion is the ego alter of Marriott

tion. judgment trial court’s and the award attorneys’ fees are reversed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. *2 Roach, A., Albuquerque, P.

Klecan & Dils, Walter Barbara is there a presumption witness Estate of Personal material was the recorded unfavor- Deceased. Louise able to his client? Lowell Burciaga, Albuquerque, G. Juan stating a jury instruction II.Should McKim, Leann Gallup, for Earl Lewis and is a of due there Lewis. part care on decedent *3 A., G. Berry, Marchiondo & P. Charles wrongful in a given death case? Hodges, Berry, Albuquerque, for James R. testimony the III. of the investi- Should Estate of as Personal of the police gating officer have been ex- Hodges, Deceased. Marsha speculative? cluded error to two IV. Was it consolidate the OPINION cases? ANDREWS, Judge. court,to error V.Was it for the allow Hodges, Laurie Marsha Debbie Dils and of Dils’ insurance the fact passengers by were driven Bordelon in a car brought on before the to be Proceeding opposite Louise Dils. in di- the of apрlicability the issue the of the rection was a truck driven Lewis by Leann purpose family doctrine? Cindy passen- Lewis was the sole an instruction have been VI.Should Dils, ger. Dils, Marsha Louise Debbie and party the effect that a were killed in a collision with the vehicle is on the side whose Lewis vehicle. road of the has the burden of ex- parties appeal The to this are Walter and plaining its there? personal Louise the the court a have directed VII.Should of representative the estate of Louise Dils on the Hodge’s issue of con- and, (Dils); (Lewis); Leann and Earl Lewis tributory negligence? Hodges, personal representa- James R. the (Hodg- tive the estate of Marsha Recording Tape I. Destruction aсtion, es). Dils action The and the attorney Shortly after Lewis third-party and the cross-claims and tape a inter- for Lewis conducted recorded ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍complaint, were for trial. consolidated Bordelon, person view with Laurie recovered a money verdict riding Dils car who survived the Dils; appeals a in favor he verdict entered deposition by а accident. later taken on of Lewises his claim The them. Dils, Bordelon did not recall attorneys for plaintiffs appeal Dils favor of verdict in a anything about accident which had complaint. the Lewises bearing liability. issue of , Dils’ version of the that the accident was tape of the earlier sought to obtain Lewis vehicle was in an- passing Dils’ lane discovery, attorney but the for by interview hill, vehicle as it destroyed tape, purportedly rounded a and that Lewis had nothing significance was unable to she was avoid Dils as sud- because there it, tape. wanted reuse appeared and he denly over the hill. Lewis con- lane, that Dils tended swerved into Lewis’ ato argues that the actions amount gesture which was to be as a understood evidence; thus, destruction of from inexperienced “hello” Dils. tapie con- presumption there is a custom, seeking this swerved into Dils’ lane If to Lewis. unfavorable tained material to avoid but collided with Dils car arose, or even if it was such a as it returned to its own is undis- inference, lane. It the trial court com- arguable аn puted point impact that the in Dils’ errors, but we conclude mitted several lane. it did not. appeal. issues are

Several raised on this not of the interview was tape any way was in available destroys tape attorney I.Where an evidence which it was undiscoverable work recording of an with a Dils because interview investigating of the acсident made product, and thus the destruction tape police specula- not been destruction police could officer. The officer’s attorney taken an evidence. Statements response question tion to a was offered may product, from work a witness are answer, any which did not call for such good cause exists. not be disсovered unless Dils to thus the burden was on counsel for Co., Carter Burn Const. Dils did move that the answer be struck. denied, 85 (Ct.App.), P.2d cert. move, preserve not so and thus (1973). from the might error which have resulted party must good To cause a establish speculative testimony. sought not show that the material Evidence, Mexico Rules of Rule New diligent upon available the exеrcise timely regard to the effect of failure to necessary it is effort and object, states: his or that the denial preparation of may predicated Error a rul- sought the-production of the material *4 ing or excludes evidence which admits cause unfairly prejudice will his case or party right of the is unless a substantial hardship injustice. him undue or affеcted, and 31, Id. at 508 P.2d 1324. ruling the is one Objection. In case showing. There Dils made no such objection admitting timely a evidence nothing is record to indicate that the record, appears of stat- motion to strike unwilling to talk to Laurie Bordelon was ground objection. . . . ing specific attorney. Dils knew the witness’ Lewis’ Thus, by analogy, it is clear that “failure yet whereabouts аt all times and object admission of evidence consti- to the depose shortly her until before the trial. It objection, in such tutes a waiver of any is not clear that there was information case, objection for the destroyed tape cannot be raised which would preparation Dils' appeal.” McCauley Ray, been useful in the v. 80 first time on were, (1968). but even if there we cannot conclude 171, Failure discovery good cause existed for the therefore, strike, dispositive. is move to lawyer’s product. work The trial court of the Two Cases IV. Consolidation correctly finding tape acted that the was protected, refusing err in and thus did not in con The trial court did not err inject to allow Dils to the issuе into the solidating the two cases. Consolidation trial. cases within the discretion of N.M.R.Civ.P., 42(a), court. Rule N.M.S.A. Concerning Pre- Jury II. Instruction 405, 1978; Clauser, Vargas v. 62 N.M. sumption of Due Care (1957). There is no merit to Dils’ P.2d 381 It was not an error for the trial argument prejudiced by she was jury court to refuse to instruct cases in that she consolidation of the two there is a of due care on the plaintiff one and was the role of cast in part wrongful of a in a decedent death other; required proof defendant expressly action. an instruction is Such prosecute the action 12.16, N.M.S.A.1978, by forbidden U.J.I.Civ. against Hodges was identi to defend authority and this Court has no to strike cal, properly acted to and the trial court Jury promul down Instructions Uniform of both aсtions expedite the determination gated by Supreme our Court. Ammer See the same time. at Inc., Broadcasting man v. Hubbard 89 N.M. (1976). Liability Insurance Evidence of V. Testimony Speculative III. of the Police allowing did not err in The court Officer by liability covered that Dils was evidence named as a insurance. Dils’ father was The trial court did not err in admit family purpose ting conjectural by statement as to the cause defendant quires the court to theory, plaintiff and the fact the Dils held an instruct that elder insurance his policy by proving damage proxi- on the vehicle driven “has the burden” of daughter purpose was of mately admissible for one or more caused establishing the Dils’ responsibility (breaches elder claimed acts of his daughter’s negligence theory. on this duty), defendant(s). committed It may not both contest the issue of liabil- requires also that defendants’ affirmative ity under the family purpose doctrine and defenses be set out jury and that the require appli- that evidence relevant to the instructed on defendants’ prov- “burden of cation of the doctrine be excluded. Rule ing” their affirmative defenses. But no- 411, N.M.R.Evid., N.M.S.A.1978. Cf. Gram- where in the tailored U.J.I.Civil 3.1 Co., mer v. Kolhaas Tank Equip. & 93 N.M. by the trial court here was the in- 685, 604 P.2d 823 (Ct.App.1979). structed that if of the defendants were ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍wrong road, found to be on the side of the

VI. Instruction as to the Effect of Be- they had to assert the affirmative defense ing on Wrong of the Road Side legal excuse from the duty staying on side; It their is clear that own nor was the told that when an accident occurs, the party whose defendants had the burden of vehicle is found to satisfac- be on the torily explaining presence side of the road has explain burden to its proof there. Frei side if plaintiff’s on that claim Brownlee, 56 N.M. accepted by jury. P.2d 671 to be (1952); Schuelke, Paddock v. states, The Use Note to U.J.I.Civ. 3.1 473 P.2d 373 (Ct.App.1970). part: is the important single most “[T]his *5 When it was shown that the [defendant’s] instruction in the lawsuit ... ... [and] car was on the side of the road at post remaining to all which in ” collision, the instant of the the burden structions are tied.... If that instruction was on the explain defendant to [defend- clearly itself not did set forth the burden presence there. ant’s] imposed on a defendant Frei v. Brown Id. at 765. leе, Schuelke, supra; supra; Paddock v. Bank, Albuquerque and Pavlos v. Hodges Nat’l. requested that trial court in- (1971), jury, struct in cases that: this kind—and it did not—it was error for It is duty of a driver who travels on separate the court to refuse a instruction the wrong explain side of the to road dealing that with defense burden. presence of his vehicle on such side with- negligence. out his Hodges against Plaintiff also recovered Therefore, you if find that either of the defendant Dils under the incorrect instruc- defendants drove their [Lewis Dils] tions as negligence. to what constituted As vehicle side of the road- unlikely jury it is find such would way, then such defendant shall have the if, burden, under the correct Dils is explain burden to their there contributorily negligent, not found this is- burden, they and should fail to meet this essence, sue must also be remanded. if you they are guilty instructed that believes that it was the Lewis’ negligence as a matter of law. negligence rather than that of Dils’ which argue Defendants that other in caused the it stands to follow that duty structions on the of both drivers to jury may also believe that it was the stay on respective sides of the roаd negligence Lewis’ than Dils which rather amply covered the issue. To instruct on the injury Hodges. caused the parties equivalent duties of the is not to an instruction on either the defendants’ VII. burden Should the Court have Directed a proof Hodges' or the of going defendants’ burden Verdict on the Issue of forward with Negligence? the evidence. Contributory 3.1, “issues,

U.J.I.Civil which deals with Hodges’ cross-appeal alleges error complaint, re- answer, proof,” burden ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict assumption sion of that is that Lewis was contributory

in his favor on the issue contributorily negli- Dils was giving negligent; of in- negligence, as well as in the negli- negligence Hodges contributorily which not contributory gent; structions Hodges. and, therefore, аpplied against (the pas- gent, could have against both senger) should have recovered a verdict The court should have directed negligent defendants. Marsha’s in favor of on the issue of negligence. Bolen v. Rio contributory Cf. assumption of an erroneous Secondly, an Estates, Inc., 466 P.2d Rancho contributory negligence finding of Dils’s (Ct.App.1970). We find no evidence to (Bloom’s)and bears on Dils’s Hodges’ negligence, support finding should have no claims had testimony beyond Lewis’ negli- upon the claims of effect whatever driving while but once before “swerved” That Hodges against Dils. gence made testimony can- changed had not lanes. This viewed favor of must be verdict in Hodges as- support an inference that prеvailing light most favorable to the negligent riding with a sumed the risk Melbourne, 90 N.M. party. Romero v. driver, duty to shout a or that she had a viewing In so (Ct.App.1977). Hodges’ conduct warning, plaintiff or that verdict, mind necessary it is to bear in to this acci- way contributed negli- acts of Hodges claimed several dent. Lewis gence against both Thus, Hodges against included: the verdict denying relief to Dils in thе and the one to exer- the Defendants failed 1. That are remanded for a action every operator of a vehi- duty of cise the proceeding, new trial. In that public highways to exercise using cle give the correct instruction court should avoid an at all times to ordinary care burden, Lewis’ and should then direct accident. negli- Hodges’ contributory verdict as keep the 2. The Defendants negligence gence the issues of Lewis’ before lookout. proper or Dils’ toward toward Dils to maintain 3. The Defendants failed Hodges are determined. of their vehicles. proper control *6 IT ORDERED. IS SO operate Defendants failed to 4. That the of the right half their vehicles HERNANDEZ, J., concurs. right of the entirely to the roadway and WALTERS, J., part, in dissents concurs thereof. center part. in Defendants, driving while That the 5. vehicles, di- opposite in WALTERS, proceeded Judge (concurring part, in attempted pass each other to part.). in rections and dissenting wrong of the upon the side the left or to majority opin- parts I of the concur all roadway. VI except pаragraph of ion the last Section their vehi- drove 6. That the Defendants Hodges verdict and the reversal of the roadway when the left side of the cles to against Dils. grade where crest of a approaching the paragraph majority assumes view is obstructed. the driver’s Dils object to that the found which I operated their 7. the Defendants That incomplete contributorily negligent under heedlessly will- carelessly and vehicles reviewing not believe a instructions. I do ful, rights disregard of wanton assumptions about a make court should and cir- due caution others and without findings, especially when there jury’s cumspection. to- negligence alleged and several acts of claims, defendants the Dils presented. Agаinst these evidence has been ward which negligence contributory Hodges’s evalua- asserted majority is correct its Even if the if the jury was instructed verdicts, exten- and the logical jury’s tion of the defense, requested Dils and obtained an instruc- proved Dilses their affirmative Despite contributory negligence recover. this in- tion on and the could not allowing to рassenger, struction an erroneous defense of a which were ob- (see against Hodges Paragraph Dils jected by Hodges. and to Dils also failed to VII, supra), a verdict was returned for request proper instruction on the issue VI, and Dils. Stated another Paragraph supra. can- discussed She way, Dils lost the verdict to under a complain improper оf the effect of not now lighter imposed burden on Dils than will be when she con- incomplete instructions retried, on Dils Hodges-Dils Jones, if the case is Platero v. tributed to the errors. See because Dils will not be able to assert (Ct.App.1971). Hodges’s contributory negligence, and that, having lost a This court should hold too, will have the burden of explaining her instructions verdict under mоre favorable on the side of the road if Hodges- govern retrial of the than will the jury position shortly finds that was her retrials, (Bloom) Dils Dils-Lewis Lewis and before the crash. permitted to chance that should not be Insofar Hodges-Dils as the suit is con- jury will reach a differ- somehow a second cerned, and under the instructions to Hodges. on her to One ent decision the jury, thе one jury could found that Hodges’s entitle- already has decided or more negligent pleaded acts recovery against Dils under in- ment to Hodges, injury caused to prejudicial Hodges. structions most conduct had not contributed ver- deprived not be of that Hodges should injury; wilfully to that or that Dils was and dict.

wantonly negligent Hodges’s recovery retrial, begs Upon this is cаse negligence. was not by contributory barred interrogatories to be submitted special

Finally, appeal objected jury. to the (1) grounds

the trial was tainted because of the de-

stroyed tape recording of Bordelon’s state-

ment, (2) negligence of Lewis was evident physical

from the fact that Lewis was on side of the road at the moment (3) impact, pre- Dils was denied the sumption of a decedent’s due care. Items (1) (3) majority are answered in the HARTLEY, ‍​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‍Plaintiff-Appellant, E. James (with opinion concur) adversely which I VI, Dils. Item is by Paragraph covered BACA, Defendant-Appellee. Gordon supra, and under the evidence of this *7 applies to both the Dils and Lewis drivers. No. 4921. application It has no whatever to of New Mexico. Appeals Court negligence alleged by Hodges. acts of Dils’s driver, The jury Hodges’s was aware that 2, 1981. July Dils, was on her own side of the road when occurred; nevertheless, the accident it held passenger.

Dils liable in to her clearly

This indicates to me that whether satisfactorily

either ex- driver could will

plain being away evidence of immediately

side of the road before and at wrong-

the time of the it was not negligence

side-of-the-road resulted against Dils.

Case Details

Case Name: Bloom v. Lewis
Court Name: New Mexico Court of Appeals
Date Published: Nov 3, 1980
Citation: 640 P.2d 935
Docket Number: 3952
Court Abbreviation: N.M. Ct. App.
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