73 So. 85 | Ala. | 1916
The plaintiff’s (appellant’s) intestate came to his death through contact with an electrically charged “chain” used by the city of Cullman in raising and lowering a street light operated by the municipality to light public thoroughfares therein. The street light was suspended over the street, on a cable running from the tops of two poles. Feed wires conveying electric current were strung from these poles to the thus suspended arc light. The suspension cable was near the feed wires; and there was evidence tending to show that the insulation on the feed wires had rotted and had fallen away, exposing the feed wire to at least possible contact with the suspension cable and the “chain” or with some of the metal mechanism connected therewith. The “chain” ran from a small windlass fastened to
The defendant’s witness Ed Imbush testified as follows: “I recollect the night Mr. Bloom received an injury down on First street and Second avenue. Mr. Bloom was my brother-in-law; he married my sister. I was with him the night he was injured. He was injured down on First street in the city of Cullman, Ala. We were going on that night to the Cullman Quartet Club. The Quartet Club was over on the other side of town, in the city of Cullman, Ala., in the southwest part of town. We were going from the north on that night. We were on the concrete sidewalk in front of Mr. Tilford’s property on Second avenue on that night at the time Mr. Frank Bloom received his injury. I was about 15 or 20 steps ahead of him. I was about middle ways of the First street when he was injured at the pole. There was a remark made about the light not burning bright, and I think Frank Bloom made the remark. He said by going down and jerking the chain he could make the carbons meet on the light and make it burn brighter. At that time he was on his way to the dance hall. He did not have anything to do with the electric light, and he was not in any way connected with the company, nor had he any duties to perform in connection with the light. I heard him sáy he could make the light burn brighter by jerking the chain. I walked right on past the pole and on the sidewalk, and in a few seconds after that I saw Mr. Bloom [around] on the pole and on the chain. At that time it was raining a little, kind of drizzling. I guess it was muddy on the street; it was a little muddy [on] the sidewalk. This was about 7 o’clock at night,. My brother Johnnie was right along with Mr. Bloom, and my mother and sister were in front of me, and we were all going to the same place. I judge my mother and sister were about 40 or 50 steps in front of me.”
On cross-examination this witness testified as follows: “The statement I heard Mr. Bloom make about taking hold of the chain and jerking it to make the light burn brighter, was back about 300 or 400 feet from the light, and there was nothing else said about it. We proceeded on down from the street towards the place where we were going. The first I knew of the death of Mr. Bloom was when I was something like 15 or 20 feet from
No eyewitness to the tragedy, or to the acts of Bloom just before and at the time he came in contact with the “chain” was introduced. It otherwise appears that to come in contact with the “chain” a pedestrian traveling the streets, walking as Bloom was, must have left, or turned aside from, the usual walkway. The trial court gave the general affirmative charge for the defendant. It is asserted in briefs for appellant that the trial court entertained the opinion that, according to the testimony of Ed Imbush quoted above, Bloom was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence barring a recovery in this action. In the brief for the appellee, prepared by one of defendant’s counsel who was not present at the trial, it is stated with commendable candor that, if that was the theory upon which the trial court proceeded in giving the general affirmative charge for the defendant, “then we cannot conscientiously defend that action of the court in view of the record in the case.” Our opinion is that, if “the court so instructed the jury upon the theory stated, the result was error; that the court, on the evidence before it, was not authorized to affirm, as a matter of law, that Bloom’s death was proximately caused by his own negligence. More particular reference to that phase of the case will be later made.
Code, § 1273, is as follows: “No city or town shall be liable for damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or corporation, unless said injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his duty, or unless the said injury or wrong was done or suffered through the,neglect, carelessness, or failure to remedy some defect in the streets, alleys, public ways, or buildings after the same had been called to the attention of the council, or after the same had existed for such unreasonable length of time as to raise a presumption of knowledge of such defect on the part of the council, and whenever the city or town shall be made liable to an action for damages by reason of the unauthorized or wrongful acts, or the negligence, carelessness, or unskillfulness of any person or corporation, then such person or corporation shall be liable to an action on the same account by the party so injured.”
Counsel for appellee would justify the action of the court in giving the general affirmative charge for the defendant on the theory that if unaided by the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff’s particular allegations of negligence were not at all supported in the evidence, and that the rule could not be applied in this instance, because it is only available where contractual relations exist between the parties.
At section 59 of 1 Shear. & Red. on Neg. (5th Ed.) it is said: “In many cases the maxim ‘res ipsa loquitur’ applies. The affair speaks for itself. The accident, the injury, and the circumstances under which they occurred are in some cases sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence, and thus cast upon the defendant the burden of establishing his freedom from fault. Proof of an injury occurring as the proximate result of an act of the defendant, which would not usually, if done with due care, have injured any one, is enough to make out a presumption of negligence. When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from a want of care. So also: ‘Where it is shown that the accident is such that its real cause may be the negligence of the defendant, and that, whether it is so or not, is within the knowledge of the defendant, the plaintiff may give the required evidence of negligence, without himself explaining the real cause of the accident, by proving the circumstances, and thus raising a presumption that, if the defendant does not choose to give the explanation, the real cause was negligence on the part of the defendant.’ ”
The pleadings on both sides of the line need to be reformed to clearly present the issues fairly litigable between thes parties..
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.