This is аn action to recover damages for personal injuries. Defendants are engaged in the retail building material business. Plaintiff purchased 600 square feet of galvanized metal siding from defendants, which he intended to haul in his truck. The siding consisted of sheets 26 inches Avide and came in ten-, eight-, seven-, and five-foot lengths. Plaintiff wanted ten-foot lengths. Defend *524 ants, having little of that length, persuaded him to take two ten-foot аnd the balance in five-foot lengths.
The siding was in a pile about one foot thick. The pile rested on a platform about four inches above the floor and leaned against the Avail. The outside оf the bottom of the pile was about 16 inches from the wall.
riaintiff and defendants’ manager carried íavo ten-foot lengths to plaintiff’s truck. The five-foot sheets Avere next to the wall. The manager, Avith plaintiff’s assistance, then pulled the siding other than the fiwe-foot sheets aAvay from the Avail and stood them upright to enable the manager to remove the five-foot sheets to carry them to the truck. There Avas approximately 600 pounds of siding in the portion of the pile which Avas placed upright. Plaintiff undertook to hold the pile Avhile the manager removed the five-foot lengths. The pile was upright and “in bаlance” when the manager let go of it and plaintiff undertook to hold it alone. Plaintiff stood on the floor four inches below the platform on which the pile rested and held the pile Avitli one hand on each side. The pile got out of balance toward plaintiff and fell upon him, causing severe injuries.
Plaintiff was five feet eight inches tall. He had been a farmer. For about two years prior to thе accident he had been engaged in repairing buildings and cutting and hauling logs which he unloaded himself. The evidence shows that he Avas intelligent, alert, and perhaps of more than ordinary strength. He was exрerienced and familiar with the difficulties and dangers connected Avith handling heavy objects. He testified that he did not knoAV the weight: of the pile of siding, but that Avas a jury question in view of the fact that he helped carry íavo ten-foot lengths to his truck.
Plaintiff claimed that defendants were negligent in requesting liim to hold the pile of siding and in failing to Avarn him of its weight and to provide proper equipment to support it. The defenses were denial of negligence and the assertion of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
*525 At the close of the testimony defendants moved for a directed verdict upon the grounds that plaintiff had failed to prove a cause of action and that the accident Avas either unavoidable or Avas caused by the negligence of both parties. The motion Avas denied. Plaintiff reсovered a verdict. Defendants then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon the grounds that they were not negligent and that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and had assumed the risk. No objection Avаs made beloAV to the court’s entertaining the motion on all the grounds mentioned. Briefs were filed in which the questions were discussed and there Avas oral argument thereon. The court granted the motion upon the ground that assumption of risk appeared as a matter of law. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment.
Plaintiff contends • here that the court below could not grant judgment notAvithstanding the verdict under 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 9495, uрon the ground of assumption of risk, since the motion for a directed verdict did not specify it as a ground and that all questions relating to liability were fact questions for the jury.
A party is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the vеrdict on motion after verdict under 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 9495, where he moved for a directed verdict at the close of the testimony and the motion was denied “if the moving party was entitled to such directed verdict.” Whеre, as here, grounds not specified in the motion for a directed verdict at the close of the testimony are specified in the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and are entertained by the trial court without objection, the point cannot be raised for the first time on appeal that grounds not specified in the motion for a directed verdict were considered on the motion for judgmеnt. Andrews v. Flour City Paper Box Co.
Much of the briefs and arguments related to the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk. Plaintiff insists that the doctrine of assumption of risk has no apрlica
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tion to the instant case for the reason that it is peculiar to and confined to cases where the relation of master and servant exists between the parties. In view of the fact that we consider that the order was right in any event upon the ground that there was no negligence, we dispose of the case upon that ground. See Blume v. Ballis,
It is clear that the pile was in equilibrium when plaintiff took hold. There was no risk of danger to him so long as he maintained the pile in that position. There was danger to him if he permitted it to get off balance, which he did. Plaintiff’s argument is that there was a duty to warn that the pile would fall if it got out of equilibrium since it was heavy and apt to fall when out of equilibrium, and that failure to warn was negligence.
Defendants were under the duty to exercise due care to avoid causing injury to plaintiff. There was no failure to exercise due care unless their conduct exposed him to unreasonable risk of injury. An act which exposes another to risk of injury only by his failure to cоnform to those rules of conduct for his own safety with which he might reasonably be expected to comply does not violate the standards of due care. A party has a right to assume that others will observe as a minimum the operation of well known natural laws. Prosser, Torts, pp. 232-234. The operation of the law of gravity is a matter of such common knowledge that all persons of ordinary intelligence and judgment, even if they are illiterate, are required to take notice of it. Olson v. McMullen,
The lack of danger to a person holding the pile upright in equilibrium and the danger of its falling if permitted to get out of equilibrium were so obvious that no warning was necessary. The operation of the law of gravity would cause the pile to fall, if plaintiff permitted it to get out of equilibrium. In Tomczek v. Johnson,
The authoritiеs elsewhere support the vieAV that there is no duty to warn against a fact so obvious and generally knoAvn as that heavy objects out of balance or equilibrium Avill fall unless they are supported. The rulе was applied in holding that there was no duty to warn that a box forming part of a stack vrould fall if the stack Avere moved in such a way as to tilt the box, Lewis v. Koller
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& Smith, Inc. (C. C.)
In Anderson v. Smith, 35 App. D. C. 93, it was held that the master Avas under no duty to Avarn that a door and frame weighing 1,200 to 1,500 pounds Avould fall if not suppоrted and that, absent custom, he Avas under no duty to provide a block and tackle or other suitable appliance for lowering the door. The apparent danger of the door’s falling if unsupported was said to be so open and obvious that no Avarning of such fact was necessary.
The plain fact is that plaintiff kneAV that the operation of the law of gravity Avould cause the pile to fall if he permitted it to get out of equilibrium. See Tomczek v. Johnson,
Affirmed.