Bloemker v. Laborers' Local 265 Pension Fund

yеars had credit on and 27.9 service ROGERS, Before SILER and Circuit January Plan provides 2005. The BELL, Judges; Judge.* District eligible participants can be for benefits retirement, early normal when take SILER, J., opinion delivered the retirement, retirement, disability late ROGERS, court, J., joined. which re- retirement. The Plan sets out the BELL, 444-45), (pp. D.J. delivered quirements participant must meet to be separate dissenting opinion. for these retire- eligible each of forms of provides ment and for calculat- formulas OPINION ing options benefits under each of these SILER, Judge. Circuit using participant’s information an em- early Generally, Richard L. Bloemker1 re- actuarial calculations. received employer-spon- ployee eligible. tirement benefits from his for normal retirement * Bell, spouse. Lynn United Richard The Honorable Robert Holmes Both action, Judge for the Distriсt Stales District Western plaintiffs in and all claims this Michigan, sitting by designation. arguments also Mr. Bloemker are asserted Nevertheless, Bloemker, singu- Lynn asserted his wife. 1. Richard is married as is used under Plan she is entitled to benefits lar form Bloemker here. age he reaches 62 and has at least entitled to receive retirement benefit specified above, years’ participation A and that five the amount shown eligible early any optional can for for forms pay- become participant your ment are early age equivalent 55 if basic as as he has bene- fit. for at least five participated

years. proper formula calculat- It stated that Bloemker would receive early ing retirement benefits under the $2,339.47 per month for his life and that age of depends partici- $1,169.75 his wife per would receive month years and his number of with pant if living she were still after his death. provides participants Plan. The Plan Bloemker early commenced retirement benefits which annual statements estimate began receiving benefits under the the benefits to which would be enti- Plan in the amount certified in the BEF. age. at normal tled retirement He later received a letter from Stoner on Plan January September 26, 2006, On Bloemker letterhead receivеd dated status, indicating annual that Stoner had recently his statement of which esti- con- ducted an that audit and had mated if he he would be enti- determined that it retired may have in calculating erred monthly early his tled retirement In $2,666.99. benefits. December explained The also statement he received another letter from only this was Stoner. that estimate benefits. explained This letter that information, computer “a рro- Based on this Bloemker con- gramming error” it caused to incorrectly Jennifer tacted Bielamowicz Stoner & early calculate Bloemker’s (“Stoner”), retirement ben- third-party Associates ad- efits. It further that explained his benefit plan, ministrator of his who acted aas $1,829.71 should be per month administrator, instead of discuss possi- $2,339.49 per month he was currently bility early He retirement. received a receiving and thаt his benefit amount from her that if he stating letter were to $1,829.71 would be reduced to 1, 2005, effective April on eligible retire he would be January 2007. The letter also stated $2,564.00 month, “approximately per for that overpaid he had been the amount of single annuity, your life payable life- per month for months and $509.78 only.” time The also explained letter required repay $11,215.16 he was Stoner an application, once rеceived it that he was It set overpaid. out several send would Bloemker an estimate of his options repay for him to this amount in- joint and survivor benefits. cluding by single making lump sum pay- early Bloemker applied for retirement ment by having monthly benefit 10, 2005, on February benefits and select- reduced even to account further for the Basic ed Joint and as the type Survivor overpayment. 1, 2005, benefit. On March Bielamow- drafted а icz document titled “Laborers’ Bloemker exhausted his adminis # Local 265 Pension Plan Benefit Election trative remedies under Plan and com (“BEF”). Form” The BEF was stamped complaint menced suit. In his Bloemker by Stoner and contained certification claims that he had contract with the stating: Plan, Stoner, which through was executed

Based on your our records of for the larger early hours amount of worked under the Plan the contribu- benefits. He argues Plan and your tions which made misrepresentations have been Stoner made material behalf, hereby certify you we to him on which he to his relied detriment. Motors way. Sprague Gen. Plan and the same contends Finally, he 403-04, n. Corp., 133 F.3d fiduciary duties breached Stoner Cir.1998) (en banc). pre Yet we have not and the Stoner him under ERISA. While equitable estoppel as viously recognized court that the first the distriсt urged op in the benefit —as claim viable preempted were these claims two of See to the welfare benefit-context. posed Inc., Pfizer, ERISA, Thurman see Armistead ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍v. Vernitron (citing at 403 id. (6th Cir.2007), the district 855, 860 Cir.1991)). 1287, 1298 Corp., 944 F.2d two claims as the first court construed to extend has been reluctance Our than ERISA rather being brought under following observation from based accordingly preempted.2 state law Armistead: the com- court also construed The district typically paid out benefits are [P]ension asserting a claim plaint as employers and of funds to which both common law. estoppel under federal Contributions employees contribute. that Bloemker court concluded district actuari- are determined pay-outs claim or a not make out a contract could in the terms of assumptions al reflected under ERISA. claim to reсover benefits If the effective terms of the fiduciary was not a It also held that Stoner may by altered transactions be- plan be plead that the and that Bloemker failed officers of the and individual tween fiduciary a its Trustees breached groups or discrete plan participants Finally, court noted duty. the district them, expecta- rights legitimate limited to welfare estoppel claims were parties to retirement in- tions of third plans not retirement benefit plans, benefit prejudiced. may come here, in and that question like the one Following a 944 F.2d at 1300. number bring estoppel even if Bloemker could circuits, that this other we now conclude claim, sufficiently complaint failed to sufficiently weighty to de- interest court allege a claim. The district such in where feat claims cases granted the Defendants’ motions dis- writing in reрresentation was made claims, and Bloem- miss each of the denied plaintiff can demonstrate and where summary judgment as ker’s motion extraordinary circumstances. moot.

The Circuit has its Seventh rules, include a which ERISA DISCUSSION requirement, to a representation written Equitable Estoppel pension. Kannapien a involving case (7th Co., 629, Quaker The court construed Bloem district 507 F.3d 636 Oats Cir.2007). complaint stating ker’s as claim for fеd has also a The Seventh Circuit equitable estoppel. recently explained importance eral common law We —both language and in recognized “equitable estoppel statutory in terms of the have cases,” may theory policy requiring in of ERISA be a viable ERISA terms —of rely on estoppel plaintiffs writ- promissory estoppel treated ERISA have 2890, (1983)). 77 490 Because preempts S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 2. "ERISA state laws that 'relate to' stating complaint Congress we construe Bloemker’s as employee because statutory might and federal com- claims under was concerned that state laws interfere contract, ERSIA, though even management mon law of the administration misrepresentation, and claims are plans.” Corp., Lee 431 such Mello v. Sara claims, 440, (5th Cir.2005) they are not (citing similar to some state law F.3d 444 Shaw Inc., 85, 96-97, preempted. Delta Air Lines 463 U.S. 103 cases; pel first “ERISA promises. ten It noted that rules each of these pursuant ‘maintained plans imposes must be an extraordinary circuits circum ” State written instrument.’ Orth Wis. requirement.3 stances See Bonovich v. Union, F.3d Employees Council Columbus, 57, Knights 2L 146 F.3d 62-63 (7th Cir.2008) U.S.C. (quoting (2d Cir.1998) (applying Second Cir 1102(a)(1)). explained § court The then cuit’s rules to an ERISA previous precedents its estab- had claim); Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & objection,” policy- lished the “main (3d Co., Cir.2008) 539 F.3d 300-05 terms, to oral modifications of ERISA (discussed below); in detail Mello v. Sara plan’s would plans “is that enable the Corp., Lee 444-45 Cir. integrity, possibly its actuarial sound- 2005) (“explicitly adopting ERISA-estoppel ness, relatively be eroded low-level cognizable theory” pension case); as a in a employees.” (quoting Taylor Miller v. Spink v. Lockheed Corp., Insulation 758-59 (9th Cir.1997). 1261-63 Cir.1994)). greatly policy This concern is Pell, In рlaintiff Pell employed representations lessened issue when the company and, became DuPont here, sub- writing, particularly are made sidiary. 539 F.3d at 297. Pell accepted for- representations where constituted permanent position formality mal of the at DuPont certifications. based in writing requirement part representation thus dan- lessens the to him that he discussed ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍in Armistead that ger would receive credit under the DuPont integ- claims could undermine the financial pension plan for working his time for the rity pension plans. Armi- See subsidiary. Id. at 297-98. The DuPont stead, (“[Permitting 944 F.2d at 1299 oral pension years credited of service from plans pension modification of would under- date employment Pell, first of —for mine the of security pension rights, 1971. this was Id. Pell began After work- goal Congress sought by requir- to serve DuPont, ing for repeatedly DuPont in- ing that put writing.”) Pell in formed written statements thаt his Third, Second, Fifth, beginning The service date 1971. and Ninth Cir- was Id. In 2001, retired, applied estop- cuits have also their he ERISA DuPont determined case) yet published The estoppel 3. First Circuit has not determined its ERISA rules to a "recognize[] estoppel whether it will claims pension claim. Schena v. Metro. Ret. Life provisions.” under civil ERISA’s enforcement 281, Employees, Fed.Appx. U.S. 244 Co., (1st Livick v. 524 Gillette 30-31 Cir.2007). (11th Uniquely, the Eleventh Cir.2008). Fourth The Circuit considers apply repre- does Circuit not either written "prohibited estoppel waiver and to be con- extraordinary sentation or an circumstances cepts” respect Gagliano to ERISA. requirement, employs but it a comparatively Co., Reliance Ins. Standard Cir.2008). 547 F.3d Life rigid ambiguity requirement. See id. We Eighth applies The Circuit find cases from no the District of Columbia cases, the doctrine of to ERISA Fink discussing applicability Cirсuit Co., v. Union Ins. Cent. 94 F.3d Life to ERISA actions. 1996), Cir. we find but no case from the recognized We find no circuit that has es- Eighth apply, applying, refusing Circuit or toppel claims under ERISA but held those pension ERISA The claim. categorically inapplicable claims equitable recognized Tenth Circuit has However, ERISA, many benefits. of our sister cir- though in the it context reject cuits would the claim at issue here suggested might egre- it on has that do sо in an gious Cattery grounds pen- other that than the fact it is a case. U.S. Ins. Co. in Life claim, N.Y., (10th Cir.2004). including apparent- sion 407-08 some circuits' (in ly ambiguity. The requiring Eleventh Circuit has un- strict rules nying beginning date him in 1979 based service credit beginning actual that Pell’s DuPont representations 299. Pell false upon 1975. Id. at sued Lockheed’s was ap- ERISA, and Third Circuit Id. at 1261. eligibility. under about his that, under [an succeed plied “[t]o its rule claim on The district court dismissed this relief, theory equitable estoppel] On appeal, motion to dismiss. Id. (1) a mate- must establish plaintiff ERISA Ninth Circuit held that (2) det- reasonable and representation, rial misrepre- allege must a material Spink the representation, reliance upon rimental sentation, and reasonable detrimental (3) Id. extraordinary circumstances.” ex- upon representation, reliance Hancock John (quoting at 300 Curdo circumstances, traordinary pro- that the (3d Mut. Ins. Life ambigu- at issue visions were Cir.1994)). court held that the state- persons such reasonable could ous service regarding beginning ments Pell’s effect, disagree meaning as to date were material to finally, representations were those representations that his reliance on an oral involving interpretation made reasonable, light of an particularly coun- pre-retiremеnt from a DuPont email at 1262. After a that fo- discussion who, question response selor direct requirement, ambiguity cused Pell, beginning from stated that his service Spink alleged court concluded had dem- date was 1971. Id. 300-02. Pell require- to meet all of these sufficient facts onstrated detrimental reliance based Following Id. át 1262-63. Pell ments. of his forgoing opportunities because Spink, we hold Id. at The Third expected pension. applies plans where repeated held “DuPont’s affir-

Circuit plaintiff extraordinary can demonstrate mative combined with misrepresentations, circumstances in addition the traditional diligence, Pell’s demonstrate that there estoppel elements. Id. at extraordinary circumstances.” It appropri- 304-05. further held that the precedent, Under our the elements injunction Du- requiring ate relief was an 1) claim con are: pension Pont to calculate Pell’s based on amounting represen language duct or to a beginning date of 1971. Id. at 311. service 2) fact; tation of material awareness of the Spink, plaintiff, Spink, In the was em- 3) by to party estopped; true facts the be by ployed Lockheed from 1939 to 1950. part party an intention on the the to be Then, 1979, 125 F.3d at 1259. in when acted estopped representation that the be old, rehired Spink years was 61 Lockheed on, party asserting or conduct the toward he Spink' and to him that represented that the latter has a the such time under would accrue credited service conduct right to believe that the former’s From 1979 pension Lockheed’s Id. 4) intended; of the true is so unawareness Spink Lockheed sent notifications asserting estoppel; the the party facts indicating accruing credited that he was 5) justifiable reliance detrimental time, service but in 1984 Lockheed notified the party asserting estoppel eligible that Spink partic- he was not for Armistead, F.2d at representation. 944 ipation pension plan plan due Biscuits, (citing v. Apponi Sunshine their excluding employees rule hired after (6th Cir.1987)). Inc., 1210, 1217 birthday. Spink Id. sued Lock- sixtieth heed, alleged that has valid asserting among other claims Bloemker aсcording to equitable estoppel from de- claim for equitably estopped Lockheed was party alleges asserting estoppel. elements. He that he re- That par- these seldom, stating ty’s ever, that if ceived a document he could reliance can be rea- $2,339.40 justifiable sonable or if it per elect a benefit is inconsistent unambiguous additional with the clear month for life with an benefit of terms of $1,169.75 per plan for his wife after his documents available to or month furnished Second, party. him. to the death if she survived This document allow that to override the terms of plan stated that Stoner certified Bloemker clear docu- was entitled to receive benefit. It ments would be enforce something clearly estoppel require- satisfies the first other than the documents them- requires element selves. not ment. The second That would be consistent plaintiff to the defen- demonstrate ERISA. “contain[ed] dant’s actions element of Assuming the truth Bloemker’s alle-

fraud, deception either intended or such gations, dismiss, as we a motion must on amount to ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍gross negligence as to construc- Corp. Twombly, Bell Atl. 550 U.S. fraud,” Crosby tive Rohm & Haas 127 S.Ct. 167 L.Ed.2d 929 Cir.2007) (quoting (2007), the first of these rationales is inap- Trs. Mich. Laborers’ Health Care Fund plicable. alleges Bloemker that it would Gibbons, 587, 591 Cir. have impossible been him to determine 2000)), has by alleg- which Bloemker done his correct given the com- ing that Stoner the Plan and were aware plexity of the actuarial calculations and his of the true facts and intended for knowledge lack of about relevant actu- rely representa- Bloemker to upon arial assumptions. has He therefore al- allegations satisfy tions. These also leged sufficient facts such that a fact find- Finally, third element. Bloemker er could that his reliance determine alleged has that he not aware of the certification of his benefits was facts, true he relied upon and that these reasonable. misrepresentations deciding to re- Sprague also asserts enforce tire, to satisfy which is sufficient the re- ment of than something other maining estoppel. elements of ERISA; documents is inconsistent with

Nevertheless, previously have we held precedents already recognize our that this vary “cannot circumstances, is not true all and we unambiguous plan the terms of docu- appli determine that this assertion is not Sprague, ments.” F.3d at 404. We do Armistead, present cable In case. here, apply that rule because neither we acknowledged argu the defendant’s of by Sprague the rationales invoked to equitable ment that recognizing estoppel justify general against its prohibition ap- something would lead to enforcement of plication unambiguous estoppel provi- to plan other than the provisions thus outweigh sions is sufficient to the extraor- effect an oral impermissible modification of dinary presented by circumstances this plan.4 an F.2d at ERISA 1299. We justifications Spraguе case. two stated rejected argument applying the estop general its rule: pel always was inconsistent with ERISA

First, seen, estoppel permissible as we and held that was requires have justifiable though even ... “[ejquitable pre reasonable or reliance the impose We did not in Armistead the written fare rather than a benefit. See 944 representation impose requirement that we F.2d at 1299-1300. this case Armistead involved a because wel- (6th Cir.1992). Furthermore, n. 6 exercising from contractual party eludes a operate con- additional documents to inequitable of his own rights because modify beneficiary amend estop- plan, the or the party asserting the duct toward rely on those to deter- pel.” have allowed enforce- can modifications Id. We thus something plan Sprague, the mine his benefits. See othеr than ment appro- under at 403. documents based that a priate circumstances. hold We Here the written Plan documents estoppel in plaintiff equitable can invoke calculating provide formula for benefits plan pro- unambiguous pension the case beneficiary would be to which entitled plaintiff can demonstrate

visions where beneficiary depending on whether the re in- estoppel, the traditional elements of time, early, on or late. The BEF tired in in- cluding engaged that the defendant signed by purport Bloemker did deception gross negligence or such tended an amendment a modification (1) fraud, plus as to amount constructive Plan. Nor did it to create a purport sepa (2) representation; plan provi- a written rate contract for benefits addition to which, although did unambiguous, sions Insteаd, provided the Plan. it those not allow for individual calculation of bene- simply provide actuarially claimed ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍(3) fits; extraordinary circumstances to, entitled certified benefit Bloemker was equities strongly in which the balance of Accordingly, on the Plan. based dis application Bloem- estoppel. favors to conclude trict court correct fulfill all of alleged ker has facts that could Bloemker cannot recover benefits under therefore, requirements; dismissal these § 1132 of ERISA based on modification claim appropriate. of his was not supplemental the Plan or separate contract. Duty Fiduciary II. PART, AFFIRMED IN REVERSED Because Flacche v. Assurance Sun Life PART, IN and REMANDED for further Cir.1992), 958 F.2d 730 is control- -opinion. proceedings consistent with this affirm the determi-

ling, we district court’s that Bloemker a claim nation cannot assеrt DISSENT fiduciary duty any for breach of against BELL, ROBERT HOLMES District the defendants. Judge, dissenting.

III. Contract Claim agree desirability I of a rule 1132(a)(1)(B) permits

Section of ERISA that claim to provides may bring that a plan beneficiary vary pension plan provisions ERISA which, him although unambiguous, suit “to recover benefits due to under do not allow the terms of 29 U.S.C. for individual calculation of benefits. plan.” Nev- 1132(a)(1)(B). above, ertheless, § appears any As it rule disсussed plan govern equitable estoppel vary written ERISA claim permits documents benefits of benefi rights provisions ERISA Sprague, unambiguous ciaries. at 402. the rule an- F.3d Where conflicts with in ex in Sprague creates ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍benefits nounced v. Motors General (en Cir.1998) banc), ERISA, those how cess of established 133 F.3d 388 ever, vary rights may those cannot be enforceable unambiguous provisions. contract under federal common law. See terms of Accordingly, v. Motors until Corp., Sprague Cattin Gen. 404. over- panel an en banc of this Court turned Court, I Supreme

or the United States required to affirm the dis- we are

believe equitable estoppel Bloemker’s

missal of Simpson, v.

claim. United States (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Darrah 540-41 Park, City Oak 206(c). Cir.2001)); R. 6th Cir. ALVAREZ, al., A. et

Deborah

Plaintiff-Appellants, CHICAGO, Municipal

CITY OF

Corporation, Defendant-

Appellee. al., Caraballo,

Alexander et

Plaintiff-Appellants,

City Chicago, Municipal

Corporation, Defendant-

Appellee. 09-2020,

Nos. 09-2021. Appeals,

United States Court

Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 2009. May

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Bloemker v. Laborers' Local 265 Pension Fund

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: May 19, 2010

Citation: 605 F.3d 436

Docket Number: 09-3536

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.