delivered the opinion of the court:
Pаmela Bloemer, wife of an injured employee of defendant Effingham Equity Co-оp, brought an action for damages sustained by her for loss of consortium, but exсluding loss of support, allegedly caused by defendant’s negligence. Plaintiff brought thе action against Effingham Equity Co-op in Counts VII and VIII of the amended complaint. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss said Counts VII аnd VIII. On appeal the plaintiff contends that the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, sec. 138.5(a)), does not bar the spouse of an injured employee from bringing the spouse’s own action against the negligent employer for her loss of consortium excluding her loss of support, and she contends that tо deprive her of such action violates her rights as granted by the constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois. The question presented is one of first impression in this State.
Said section 138.5(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides in pertinent part:
“No common law or statutory right to recover damаges from the employer * * * for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensаtion herein provided, is available to any employee who is covеred by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a).
The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act further provides:
“The compensation herein provided * # ” shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in * * * this Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.11.
Section 138.5(a), in taking away existing rights of action of the employee and extending liabilities of the employer, fixes limits to the amount to be recovered and covers the whole ground of the liabilities of thе employer. Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
The injury for which plaintiff seeks rеcovery resulted from an accidental injury sustained by her husband arising out of and in the course of his employment. Plaintiff is seeking recovery against the emplоyer for her damage which is dependent upon the employee’s cоmpensable injury for which the employer has been paying the compensation provided by law.
Other courts which have considered similar questions under stаtutes having limitations similar to ours have decided that the wife of such injured emplоyee is barred by the limitations of the Workmen’s Compensation Act from maintaining an independent action against the employer arising out of or by reasоn of the injury to the employee. England v. Dana Corp.,
The Illinois Workmens Compеnsation Act was intended to provide a complete scheme for recovery from an employer for industrial injuries only and therefore, the trial court was correct in sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff also contends that said section 138.5(a) unconstitutionally deprived her of her property without due рrocess of law.
“By the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the legislature required the employer to give up certain defenses and required the employee to give up certain recoverable elements of damage оf a common-law negligence action; and this we have held many times is a rеasonable exercise of the legislature’s police power fоr the promotion of the general welfare. [Citations.] This court has never сonsidered one to have such a vested right in the common-law rules governing negligence actions as to preclude the legislature from substituting a statutory rеmedy of this type for the common-law remedy.” Moushon v. National Garages, Inс.9 Ill.2d 407 , 412,137 N.E.2d 842 ; Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,44 Ill.2d 15 , 19,253 N.E.2d 364 .
We find that the reasoning of the court in the Moushon case as to the constitutionality of Section 138.5(a) is determinative of the constitutional issue raised by the plaintiff.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DIERINGER, P. J., and BURMAN, J., concur.
