83 Iowa 265 | Iowa | 1891
u First. The said answer or count does not aver that defendant sustained any relation to said Sellers, whereby defendant was interested or would be affected in property, reputation or otherwise, on account of said Sellers keeping company with said plaintiff. Second. It is not a justification to speak falsely concerning a young lady, and ruin her character in the estimation of a young gentleman keeping her company on account of or on the ground of friendship or protection of such gentleman’s interests. Third. Said matter is pleaded as a justification or a privileged communication, and does not state facts which amount to such justification. ”
The error assigned as to the ruling on the demurrer is that ‘ ‘the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the second count of the defendant’s answer.” The appellee objects that the assignment is too general, and we think the objection is well taken. The different grounds of the demurrer present different questions, and, according to the rule repeatedly announced by this court, the assignment is insufficient, and cannot be considered. Code, sec. 3207; Town of Waukon v. Strouse, 74 Iowa, 548, and cases therein cited.
II. The appellant discusses the correctness of numerous rulings of the court in regard to the admission of evidence. The appellee contends that the questions thus discussed are not sufficiently presented by the assignments of error. The assignments are of the same character as those held insufficient in Albrosky v. Iowa City, 76 Iowa, 301, and other cases. Following the rule of those cases, the assignments must be disregarded.
The instruction was properly refused. The belief and good faith of the defendant in uttering the slander, ,if; proven, might be considered in mitigation of damages, but would not prevent the recovery of substantial cqmpensation . for1 the injury sustained. The instruction also ignores the fact that, even though the defendant believed the statement in question to be true, and though he made it to Sellers thinking that he had an interest in knowing' it, yet, if made maliciously, he would be liable for more than nominal damages. A person who repeats a slander does so at his peril, and cannot escape the consequences which naturally follow his act; because, although mistaken as to .the fact, he acted in good faith. Whether the defendant stood in such relation to Sellers as to make it proper for him to volunteer the statement he made is a question we need not determine. What we have said in regard to the instruction just considered disposes of several questions presented in regard to the second instruction asked by the defendant and refused, and in regard to portions of the charge given.
VI. Other questions are discussed by counsel which are not of sufficient importance to receive special mention. We find no error in the record prejudicial to the defendant.
The judgment of the district court is, therefore,, AEEIRMED.