The petitioners are persons who are dissatisfied with the short ballot title which has been prepared by the Attorney General for a proposed initiative measure which was filed with the Secretary of State on 14 January 1952. The short ballot title so prеpared reads as follows: “CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATING TO ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR”. The nature *3 of the proposed constitutional amendment is indicated in the “general title” whiсh reads as follows:
“BALLOT TITLE
“CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATING TO ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR-^-Purpose: To amend the Oregon constitution by adding section 39 to Article I thereof, which provides that after January 1,1953, no alcoholic liquor containing more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol by volume shall bе manufactured or sold within the state, except for medicinal purposes upon prescription of licensed physiсians. No alcoholic liquor herein described _ shall be imported except for medicinal, scientific, sacramentаl or mechanical purposes.
“The amendment is self-executing and all provisions of the constitution and laws of Oregon, charters and ordinances of all municipalities therein in conflict, are thereby repealed.
YES or
“Yes. I vote for the proposed amendment.
“No. I vote against the proposed amendment.”
Pursuant to the provisions оf OCLA, § 81-2106, the petitioners have appealed to this Court from the decision of the Attorney General in preparing the short bаllot title and assert that it is insufficient and unfair for the following reasons:
“(1) The words ‘relating to alcoholic liquor’ therein containеd do not indicate or suggest that the proposed initiative measure would prohibit the manufacture, importation, or salе of alcoholic liquor in the State of Oregon.
“ (2) For aught that appears in said short ballot title, the proposed amеndment might be any one of a number of possible measures merely regulatory, as opposed to prohibitory, of the handling of alcoholic liquor, such for example as: one changing the present method of licensing the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquor (the ‘Knox Act’); or *4 a new local option measure; or a measure giving incorporated сities and towns greater control over the licensing of the manufacture or sale of alcoholic liquor; or even a measure authorizing and regulating the sale of spirituous alcoholic liquor ‘by the drink’ under certain conditions. The one fact nоt clearly implied by the words ‘relating to alcoholic liquor’ is that both the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquor in thе State of Oregon, as well as its importation into the state, would be prohibited by the proposed amendment.
“ (3) Said short ballоt title does not contain the one simple, distinctive, descriptive, and informative expression by which the measure would naturally and commonly be referred to and spoken of, by both its proponents and its opponents, or any equivalent of such expression.
“ (4) Said short ballot title does not inform the voter or call to his attention in any manner that, in voting on a measure, ‘relаting to alcoholic liquor’ he would be voting for or against statewide prohibition of the manufacture, importation, or sale of alcoholic liquor.”
The “ballot title” comprehends both the short title and the general title.
Dodd v. Neuner, Attorney General et al,
“ * * * In making such ballot title the attоrney general shall to the best of his ability give a true and impartial statement of the purpose of the measure and in such language that the ballot title shall not be intentionally an argument or likely to create prejudice either for or against the measure. * * *” OCLA, § 81-2106.
This provision applies to the short as well as to the general title. The same section provides that:
‘‘* * * The ballot title shall contain: (1) A distinctive short title in not exceeding ten words *5 by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken оf * * V’ OCLA, §81-2106.
In
Richardson v. Neuner,
"* * * (1) acted impartially; (2) performed faithfully the duties delineated in the legislаtive acts which conferred jurisdiction upon it; (3) stayed within its jurisdiction; (4) committed no error of law; (5) exercised discretion judiciously and not capriciously; and (6) arrived at no conclusion which was clearly wrong.” Richardson v. Neuner, supra.
In our most recent decision on this subject we held that by using the word “distinctive” the legislature intended:
tt* * * the language of the short title should so describe the measure as to convey tо the voter’s mind as nearly as may be the general character of the proposed legislation. The distinctive short title must bе, as the statute says, in ten words ‘by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of’.” Dodd v. Neuner, Attorney General et al, supra.
The sufficiency of the short title “CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATING TO ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR” must be dеtermined by the application of the statutory language as construed in the cases cited supra. The short title states thе subject-matter of the constitutional amendment but does not state its purpose. It does not contain any words by which the meаsure is, or will be, commonly referred to or spoken of. We doubt if there are a dozen normal adults in the state who do not undеrstand what is
*6
meant
by
a prohibition law, or who would not readily identify the proposed measure as a prohibition law, and we doubt if anyone outside of a court room would say that a prohibition measure is commonly referred to or spoken of as an act “relating to alcoholic liquor.” There is a real distinction between regulatory and prohibitory acts and in the instant cаse it is entirely possible to make that distinction clear in the short title. The principle involved here is identical to that with which we dealt in
Allen v. Van Winkle et al,
The demurrer to the petition is overruled.
