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Blessing v. National Engineering & Contracting Co.
664 S.E.2d 152
W. Va.
2008
Check Treatment

*1 Inc., 386, 572 S.E.2d Syl. pt. Realty Hatten v.

See Mason also 380, 135 S.E.2d

(“Questions present negligence jury the evi- fact for determination when conflicting issues is pertaining

dence to such facts, though undisputed, even where men draw dif- such that reasonable them.”).

ferent conclusions

IV.

CONCLUSION foregoing, we find view Stanley’s properly

circuit court denied Ms.

pre-verdict judgment of a matter motion judgment Consequently, law. entered Chevy is affirmed. favor of Dr.

Affirmed. Individually

Misty BLESSING, and as the Estate

Administrator of Wallie Below, Appellant

Blessing, Plaintiff

NATIONAL ENGINEERING & CON COMPANY, Foreign

TRACTING Cor Beatty Construction,

poration; Balfour Foreign Corporation;

Inc., Virginia Department Transpor

West

tation, Highways, Agency An Division of Virginia, of West State Site-Blau Inc; Engineers, Arrow Concrete

velt

Company; Concrete of Arrow West Vir Inc.; Nutting

ginia, Company; H.C. P.E.,

Byron Smith, Individually, Defen Below, Appellees.

dants

No. 33433. Appeals

Supreme Court of Virginia. Feb. 2008.

Submitted April

Decided

Concurring Opinion of Justice

Benjamin June Opinion of

Concurring Justice July

Starcher

Roger Williams, D. McHugh, James P. Charleston, Appellant. for Waller, Tabit, Eric R. Steptoe Joanna I. & Johnson, PLLC, Charleston, Appellees, for Engineering National Contracting Compa- & ny; Construction, Beatty and Balfour Inc. Wilcox, Stonestreet, Timbera C. Robert M. Shohl, LLP, Charleston, Dinsmore & Ap- for pellees, Virginia Department West of Trans- portation, Highways, Division of Byron Smith.

PER CURIAM: Misty Blessing appeals from Septem- 13, 2006, ber order of the Circuit Court of County granting summary Kanawha judg- Appellee ment to Department West (the of Transportation “Department”) in con- wrongful nection with a death Appel- action against lant filed and its employee, Appellee Byron grant- Smith. ing summary judgment Smith, and Mr. the trial court ruled that the absence of insurance Appel- barred pursuing lant from her claims under the doc- sovereign immunity. trine of Upon our re- matter, view of this genuine we think that a issue of material fact exists as to' the issue of and, in this ease accord- ingly, we reverse.

I. Factual Background and Procedural 3, 2003, On October working Ap- while for pellee National Engineering and Contracting (“NECC”)1 at a construction site Bridge known as the Logan Man/Rita County, Virginia, Appellant’s husband Blessing Wallie injuries sustained fatal scaffolding2 the tremie on which he was working collapsed. Appellant instituted a wrongful September death action on through which she asserted negli- various 1. NECC was the hopper contractor the state hired and a concrete pouring bridge. build the pillars concrete into caissons that form the that a bridge upon. deck sits specialized 2. A type tremie scaffold is a of scaf- folding pipe which involves the use of a tremie ” gence de novo. Id. at claims manag- Department’s project standard of for the sum 152. Our review er for the construction of the mary judgment appealed from simi Man/Rita Bridge.3 Syl. Peavy, larly Painter v. de novo. Pt. 189, 192 lawsuit, response to *3 (1994). And, customary as is our review summary and Mr. Smith filed motion for summary judgment rulings, of the test we judgment, asserting that the circuit court there apply is to examine whether remains jurisdiction subject lacked matter over them of tried any genuine issues fact to be and sovereign based on the doctrine of immuni- inquiry regarding whether further facts ty.4 recognizing the inapplicability After of clarify of the application desirable to law. immunity recovery sovereign where 192, According See id. at 451 S.E.2d at 758. insurer,5 solely from the state’s the trial ly, proceed to determine whether there we liability policy court the state’s and examined that, antecedent factual that must be Blessing’s inju- unless “Mr. are issues concluded ruling can directly ries resulted from occurred before a issue and resolved conclusive ‘employees Virgi- coverage Ap regarding while State of West of present pellant’s liability pol nia physically were at the site of the claims under the state’s construction, performing incident ... mainte- icy. (but

nance, cleaning excluding repair, or in- spection being performed of materi- work or III. Discussion others),’” als used there was syllabus point Pittsburgh of two coverage applicable policy. under the Decid- Virginia Regents, Elevator v. West Board of ing that Mr. Smith’s on-site duties “as the 743, (1983), 310 S.E.2d 172 W.Va. 675 we Project Supervisor per- d[id] amount recovery which seek no “[s]uits held ‘construction, maintenance, formance of re- funds, allege but rather that re from state pair cleaning,’” or court deter- circuit limits covery sought up under and coverage mined that there was insurance liability coverage, the State’s fall insurance liability policy under the conse- state’s and bar the traditional constitutional outside quently Appellant’s ruled claims were against the suits State.” See W.Va. Const. by sovereign immunity. barred VI, explained § 35. As in Pitts art. we Arguing that there are of fact as to Elevator, statutory burgh prohibition coverage pre- insurance existence of 29-12-5(a)(4) Virginia § Code found West from being clude this matter resolved with- (2004), prevents which insurers who issue inquiry, out further factual seeks policies Insur to the State Board of Risk and grant of sum- reversal of lower court’s (“Board Risk”) Management from ance mary judgment. grant relying on the state’s of constitutional II. of Review Standard immunity, functions as a limited bar to sover immunity.6 eign 172 310 ap W.Va. plenary

A of review standard Consequently, at 688. where the plies appeal recognition S.E.2d this based on our Kirk, subject issue are of insurance claims at 195 W.Va. 466 S.E.2d Gribben v. and (1995), procured by the of Risk “appellate review Board 147 courts directly sub- involving principles sovereign general treasury is not questions state’s grant negli- right of sov- grounded simple to waive constitutional Those claims negligence, gence, professional premises Pittsburgh lia- ereign immunity, explained as we bility. Elevator, recovery that seek from insurance suits purse logi- public than rather from the Const, VI, § 4. See art. W.Va. sovereign cally fail to invoke the doctrine pre- is to doctrine whose —a Virgi- Pittsburgh Syl. v. West 5. See Pt. Elevator legislatively diminution of funds from vent the Regents, nia 310 S.E.2d Bel. of purposes. appropriated W.Va. at 172 (1983). 675 S.E.2d at 688-89. 310 Despite recognition our in Mellon-Stuart Hall, 291, 296, 129 S.E.2d 359 Legislature not have the does risk, precept ployees jected to then the of the State of West constitutional physically present inci- at the site of the “[i]mmunity sovereign is relaxed [but] “bodily injury” dent at which the liability to the extent of the insurance cover “property damage” performing occurred age.” Virginia Dept. ex rel. State construction, maintenance, repair, or Madden, 497, 500, Transp. v. (but cleaning excluding inspection of being performed be- work or materials ease, seeking In this is not others) ing used to claims of recovery from the coffers.7 For the state’s “bodily injury” “property damage” necessary pre- that would which arise out maintenance or use serving vent as a buildings abut sidewalks which covered claims, separate bar to her she looks to two policy, (emphasis supplied) *4 policies agree- as well as an indemnification correctly by The trial court found that policy ment. The first issued to the was exclusionary language virtue of the set forth Virginia by of State West National Union coverage in Endorsement No. no insurance (“National Union”) Fire Insurance injuries directly Blessing’s exists “unless Mr. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, of and the second ‘employees resulted from occurred and while policy is one that to Balfour Beat- was issued Virginia physically of the State of West Construction, Inc., ty parent company of present per- at the site of the incident NECC, by Liberty Mutual. We will examine construction, maintenance, forming repair, or coverage separately of as to (but cleaning excluding inspection of work policies. each of these being performed or materials used Policy A. National Union others)....’” ruling As the basis for its that Blessing’s fatality, At the time of Mr. nonexistent, coverage was the trial court liability policy issued National Union ruled that “Mr. Smith’s conduct the Pro- as to the extended to the ject Supervisor perform- does not amount to negligence. state for certain acts of The ‘construction, maintenance, repair, ance of or ” parties in operative cleaning.’ policy language found in Endorsement No. Appellant argues that the trial court erred coverage by providing: modifies the which in that the record in this case is devoid agreed It is that this insurance afforded indicating “any employee of evidence of policy apply any under this does not physically the State of West was resulting ownership, design, claim from the present Blessing’s at the site of Wallie acci- selection, installation, maintenance, loca construction, maintenance, ‘performing dent ” tion, construction, supervision, operation, repair, cleaning_’ support or As for her use, (including or control of streets side position, Blessing deposition Mrs. cites to walks, highways public thorough or other Byron excerpts of Smith and Jack Hardin fares), tunnels, dams, culverts, bridges, that were attached as exhibits to her re- sewers, sanitary rights-of-way, storm or sponse Department’s motion for sum- markers, signs, warnings, markings, mary judgment, as well as answers several fences,

guardrails, or related or similar interrogatories that were referenced and in- agreed things activities or but it is Appellant cluded the same document. the insurance afforded under this deposition testimony maintains that (1) apply “bodily inju does to claims of Messrs. Smith and Hardin8 establish that ry” “property damage” or which ongoing Project both duties of Mr. Smith as a directly result and Engineer Supervisor9 occur while em~ or were such that he complaint, Appellant expressly Project Engineer In her amended as the at the construction site. that, pled Department, being "quality as she Mr. Hardin described his duties as only up recover under and liability to the limits of the control” nature. applica- insurance in effect and point during 9.At some the construction allegations complaint. ble to the in the Bridge, Mr. Smith’s classification Man/Rita the upgraded (EIT 2) inspector employed by engineer training 8. Mr. Hardin was an state as an was reported daily engineer highway state who on a Mr. basis to Smith to that of key either terms are actively involved the construction definitions multiple meanings. lacking susceptible just Bridge and not the Man/Rita the term the term “construction” nor Neither perform inspection-related duties. site to National “inspection” is defined within Project Supervisor Project Engi- As the adopted principles Based on Union physically neer for who was contracts, for the construction present scaffolding collapse time of the at the argues “inspection” the term death, Blessing’s that led to Mr. narrowly so as not should be defined duties asserts that review Mr. Smith’s performed by Mr. Smith include the tasks engaged that he in the demonstrates and, conversely, “construction” term day-to-day bridge on a construction broadly of encom defined in terms should capacity Project Engi- In his basis. as passing performed the tasks Mr. Smith so Supervisor, su- neer or Smith coverage. See D’Annun to find favor daily pervised progress occurring on a Security-Connecticut zio v. Ins. Life right and basis but reserved to intervene 39, 41, 410 progress upon observing alter the work (recognizing principle reason “[w]hen practices unsafe construction or meth- meaning of people can differ able about One such intervention occurred when ods. contract, ambig an insurance the contract is a “practice pour,” Mr. Smith observed uous, ambiguities all be resolved will *5 appeared “safety to a issue” noted what be insured”). suggests of the favor regard pour. to the In to addition terms ambiguous meaning that the of the construction, monitoring progress the compels in ruling discussion a favor under responsibility approv- the Mr. Smith had for following on the construct: based payments to ing progress NECC. Virginia that “It settled law in is well in are ambiguous terms insurance contracts response arguments, In to these the De- strictly construed the insurance to be partment employees, that includ- contends its Syl. company and favor of the insured.” ing actually performing Mr. “are not Mut. Ins. v. McMahon & Pt. Nat’l Co. any the work attendant to the construc- Sons, Inc., S.E.2d 488 177 W.Va. tion, they only inspecting are the but rather the project to ensure contractor uses interpreta- fully While convinced proceeds according and to correct materials upon impose the tion that seeks to specifications.” Refuting Appel- contract the issue,10 agree that contract we insurance deposi- that contention the submitted lant’s necessary to re- inquiry factual is additional testimony provides of work tion evidence interpretation. this issue of contract solve performed by Mr. that should be Smith developed, currently is we As the record related, Depart- the as construction viewed definitively opine Mr. Smith cannot whether testimony argues excerpted that the ment than solely engaged inspection rather position to reenforce that Mr. serves its working on site at work while construction limited to tasks Smith’s on-site work was however, note, Bridge. do the We Man/Rita solely inspection in nature. that were deposition testimony sug- Smith’s that Mr. many questions require job “quality that gests As with he viewed his duties as quality con- policies, Typically, the in nature. interpretation of insurance control”11 the according specifica- acknowledge Department's proceeds con- the contract We must the by be covered obtained under is outside the risks tention tions" designed policy specifically for Union under discussion. National Union the National Moreover, observes, inju- Department any .employees be as the instances responsible injury pres- by performed their ry "for an virtue of attributable to work they perform- employees and the the insur- ence at the scene work covered contractor's perform- ing.” Department’s requires contrast the contractor ance the state roads and place. maintenance-related work on ance of have bridges logical presume the which it is for job highway describing his duties as a coverage, Depart- procurement insurance project, follows: engineer Mr. said as Smith suggests performs for the ment work it Well, engineer just highway a clas- is—it’s "inspecting project to ensure supervi- can You also be uses the correct materials sification. the contractor inspection-related aspects explained trol connotes the As we Marlin v. Wetzel Education, than County of work rather the work itself. Board agree indemnification questions Given remain as to the “essentially ments are nature non-insur extent of Mr. Smith’s on-site involvement ance contractual risk transfers.” Id. at Bridge, the construction of the we Man/Rita question, 569 S.E.2d at 468. Without as the genuine conclude that there ais issue of determined, trial court “in the event precludes material fact that matter from liability damage persons for property through summary judgment resolved were to accrue to the as a result juncture. remand, scope at this On of the facts and circumstances set for[th] fully Smith’s work should more devel- Complaint, amended, in the the hold oped purposes determining whether provision harmless set forth in the contract language of Endorsement No. which between NECC and the would undisputedly coverage if excludes Mr. Smith apply.” Notwithstanding potential appli engaged only inspection-related activi- agreement,13 cation of hold harmless such accident, applica- ties the time of the risk-shifting provisions and its uncertainty ble.12 Based on our as to Mr. equivalent are not the functional of the liabil given Smith’s role the construction at issue ity required by Pittsburgh Eleva development the limited of the record on this avoiding tor for the bar of sover issue, we reverse the decision of the trial eign immunity. See 172 W.Va. at court on its that there nowas cover- 676, syl. pt. S.E.2d at under the National Union foremost, First Agreement B. indemnification Indemnification agreement protects locating As an alternate means of in- damages arising from the acts of NECC and coverage necessary appli- surance to avoid Any damages its subcontractors. attribut- *6 cation of principles, Ap- Department able to the acts of the and Mr. pellant points to NECC’s execution of an Smith are not covered the hold harmless agreement indemnification under which it language Thus, agreement. only of the the agreed to hold the and its em- risk-shifting agree- that the indemnification ployees liability “harmless from all for dam- potential ment has the to effect14 is as to the persons property may to that accrue non-governmental acts of entities. Because during negli- reason of the acts or the damages state would still be at risk for [NECC], gence of the Contractor his awarded connection with either the actions agents, employees, or if subcontractors or Mr. the founda- Appellant posits there be such.” the premise sovereign tional for immunity pro-— agreement indemnification not “while neces- tecting purse the state’s place. —remains sarily synonymous insurance, with is never- practical equivalent theless the reasoning ‘insur- At the heart of our Pittsburgh purposes analysis ance’ for recognition set forth Elevator awas that the fulcrum Elevator_” Pittsburgh argument This against which enables suits to be instituted analysis. not agencies does withstand the legislative State and its is the having during argument sor and do the same duties without the raised oral as to the failure of degree you're actual or the license. But over a signed the state to have submitted a endorsement inspectors. making team of You're out there policy part to the National Union as of the record sure that the contract is followed and that— infra, in this case. See D. section mainly, quality highway it’s control. It's the department getting good product. We 13. Because all claims that filed measure the work that's done and document each defendant other than the payment completes the as the contractor the finality through Mr. Smith have reached either work. dismissal, appears unlikely settlement or it parties protracted 12.Should wish to avoid agreement applied the indemnification would be litigation, might settlement be an attractive meth- at some future date. achieving finality od for as to this issue in a potentially more economical fashion. Settlement supra 14. See note 13. resolving also be a useful means of the issue Marlin, trast, property-owner in provision15 proscribing plaintiff con insurer who asserting tracts the Board of Risk “additional who to named as an immunity litigation. sovereign as a bar general in- insured” under the contractor’s 756-57, at at See 172 W.Va. 310 S.E.2d 688- policies third-party com- surance instituted clear in that that the We were decision plaint general against the contractor’s liabili- sovereign bar of lifted 217-18, ty insurer. 212 W.Va. at 569 S.E.2d liability procured the extent finding property at 464-65. through the state Risk. Be Board of li- covered under the contractor’s owner was agreement cause the indemnification does Marlin, ability policy this Court looked place policy not stand an insurance at the fact that the construction contract by an insurer to the for issued Board of Risk expressly required property issue owner protecting the state from to be an “additional insured” on the contrac- it, damages accruing to state funds theoreti liability policy is- tor’s and the insurer had cally regard remain at risk with to claims indicating sued a “certificate insurance” by Appellant against Depart asserted property added to the owner was Therefore, ment and Mr. Smith. the indem policy at as an additional insured. Id. “practical nification not S.E.2d at 465. equivalent” of insurance for Pittsburgh Court’s decision in Elevator.16 jtidice, Liberty case Mutual sub Liberty Policy brought litigation the underlying C. Mutual as Consequently, a third-party defendant.18 secondary seeking As a means of to find appealable rulings on the issue there are liability poli- coverage under the commercial coverage is to the De whether1 available cy by Liberty NECC, Ap- issued Mutual partment Liberty policy under the Mutual as pellant argues that the and Mr. Marlin, an “additional insured.” See Smith “additional insureds” under 472-73. Liberty policy Mutual based provided under that for an “insured Unsigned D. Endorsement contract.”17 While looks to this matter, argument During the oral of this authority in Marlin for Court’s decision fact Appellant called to our attention19 the position, parties pursue its did not line No. signature on Endorsement appropriate procedures obtaining a.de- not bear to the National Union does termination of the *7 Liberty signature repre- under of an policy. the Mutual con- the authorized state 29-12-5(a)(4) agents § partment 15. and its three counts of the W.Va.Code Beatty complaint, five-count NECC and Balfour position took the that the indemni- Construction pre- In addition to the substantive bases that agreement apply claims. fication did not to those agreement serving vent the indemnification from us that either The record before does not indicate coverage sidestep necessary as the insurance to Appellant or the action to took suit, procedur- the to constitutional bar there are compel ruling a from the court on this issue. trial similarly prevent agreement al the assisting Appellant attempt clear from her to Beatty NECC Con- 17. Counsel for and Balfour subject jurisdictional the As the matter hurdle. process to raised due issues below as struction clear, patently party to this record makes court on issues re- whether the trial could rule declaratoiy judgment ever initiated a ac- matter garding Liberty a named Mutual since it was not purpose seeking ruling tion on the for the litigation. party to the applicability indemnification coverage Liberty under the While the filed a cross-claim purportedly relied that NECC on Mutual seeking NECC Balfour Construction liability purposes. the De- When commercial contribution, the lower indemnification and/or partment a demand of and Balfour made NECC dismissing on after court never ruled this claim Beatty for indemnification under Construction grounds sovereign immunity. on the case contract, rejected the demand based on language the hold con- fact that harmless negligent pertained Although Appellant contract the issue of the tained first raised dismiss, agents, unsigned to contractor and its but not endorsement in her motion actions of the agents. appear that lower court made and its it does not actions sought recovery against De- this issue. Since Following argument, Appel- proceed- oral sentative. reversed and remanded for further ings opinion. judicial consistent with this lant asked this Court to take notice of the fact that there are recent circuit two Reversed and remanded. rulings court trial courts concluding unsigned an endorsement is BENJAMIN, Justice, concurring: part policy. Consequent- not of an insurance (Filed 2008) June ly, unsigned operate endorsement cannot majority I I concur with the decision. modify to the terms of as intended separately write because I would remand the by the insurer. decision the circuit court on somewhat grounds. different Citing language from O’Neal v. Pocahon- Transportation matter, Upon tas agree review of this I with the circuit upon S.E. 478 court’s conclusion that Circuit Court of Marshall based deposition testimony pre- the evidence and County20 unsigned ruled that an endorse- sented, genuine issue of material fact ment21 to an insurance issued Na- respect existed with to Mr. Smith’s conduct tional Union Fire Insurance project supervisor as the because he did not part not of the insurance See id. perform “construction, maintenance, repair Consequently, Appel- 129 S.E. at 481. Rather, cleaning” project on the site. suggests language lant of Endorse- Smith’s role the construction at issue was ment No. limit which seeks to clear, unquestionably spe- as his duties were liability arising types from certain of acts cifically relegated “inspection” of work. Department, committed would be Additionally, agree I the circuit court’s excluding coverage effect as a means of genuine conclusion that no issue of material reasoning applied were this same to be respect fact existed with to Mr. Hardin’s case. this inspector reported conduct as an who to Mr. Smith at the construction site because Mr. Preferring to allow the lower court to rule specifically Hardin testified that his duties upon matter, this issue as an initial we do “quality were also control” in In- nature. wish to call this matter to the trial court’s deed, examples pro- the various of conduct attention for of remand. Given vided do in fact reinforce unsigned both this issue of the endorse- Appellee’s assertion that these men were ment —a matter will only inspecting to ensure that the presumably rectify prompt seek to fashion contractor uses the correct materials and in both this ease and others22 —as well as the proceeds according specifications. to contract uncertainty remaining how the issues will light nature decided, parties may pursue wish conduct, type of I also would hesitate expeditious finality more seeking means of “inspection” define the term in such a narrow this case.23 *8 proposed by Appellant. manner as The foregoing, Based on the I, the decision of the majority recognizes, as do that the cover- County hereby Circuit Court of Kanawha is obtained under the National Union al., Kelly Paving, party. 20. See § Inc. et Consol. a See W.Va.Code 33-12-11 Wetfele 05-C-306M, (Cir. Case Nos. 07-C-58M & Ct. (Repl.Vol.2006). Although the 2004 amend- Co., 3, 2008); Marshall Jan. accord Westv. W.Va. countersignature require- ments eliminated the (Cir. Dept. Transp., No. 06-C-61 Ct. Brooke executed, ments "for contract of insurance 26, 2008). Feb. thirty-first day issued or delivered on or after the December, four,” two thousand the counter- 21. The endorsement at issue contained the same signature requirements provision set forth in that contractual terms as Endorsement No. 7 in this applicable because the insurance contract case. at issue this case was executed before the effective date set forth in the amendment. During argument, Appellant oral referenced a statutory provision requires countersig- agent nature of a licensed resident of the insurer supra, 23.See note 12. every insurance contract to which the is state ” from the monar wrong’ and is derived designed for instances specifically when is Chemerinsky, chy’s prerogatives. Erwin employees may responsible be Supreme The presence Shifting the Balance Power? injury by of their at “for an virtue Federalism, rt, and State Sover they perform- the scene and work Cou Against Sovereign Immu performs eign Immunity: ing.” The work (2001). 1201, The nity, is 53 Stan.L.Rev. inspecting for the independence fought for its sought be covered the United States outside the risks governmen why monarchy in of a precisely against a favor National Union This is accountable for its requires system contractors to have tal is held The doctrine of “sover place to cover actions. Id. at 1202. their own insurance notion.” per- eign immunity that basic any injury attributable to the work undermines employees. Id. at 1202. formed the contractor’s prevent accountability, is to

Furthermore, what respect to the issues Without with ease, acting outside the law? my government surrounding this I must state seri- immunity actor to Sovereign allows a state regarding the constitutional- ous reservations private actor under escape liability where ity prior this Court’s decision Pitts- be afforded Virginia the same circumstances would burgh Elevator v. West Board of be luxury; and for that reason should 310 S.E.2d 675 such Regents, 172 W.Va. jurisprudence. sovereign eliminated from our respect to the issue of immunity. Although pre- that issue was directly addressing the constitu Instead of action, if parties to this sented *1 in the doc inherent tional contradictions future, presents in the appropriate case itself trine, exceptions from Court has “carved this issue I believe this Court should revisit against suing the State.” prohibition appropriate it is to determine whether at 745. Graf, at 516 S.E.2d sovereign judicially exception create an facing Thus, suit the issue the State Virginia Constitu- the West which fall one of the is whether its actions within explicitly prohibits. tion (for listing exceptions many exceptions 745-46), at aside, 516 S.E.2d majori- in the see id. I concur

Those unnecessary leading confu provide to wholesale ty’s decision to remand the case jurisprudence. Id. 205 W.Va. sion our opportunity to review the circuit court (Starcher, J., dissent 516 S.E.2d at 747 unsigned endorse- upon rule the issue of ing). issue, juncture, That at this should ment. upon as an initial matter

developed and ruled majority in the exception presented The at the circuit court level. opinion is: recovery from state seek no Suits which Justice, STARCHER, concurring: recovery funds, allege that but rather 2008) (Filed July up to the limits under and coverage, fall liability insurance State’s by the the result reached I concur with bar to constitutional outside the traditional separately I majority opinion. write against the State. suits juris our reiterate that based on “archaic constitutional prudence v. West Pittsburgh Elevator Syllabus point in the 21st language” that has little relevance Regents, 172 W.Va. Virginia Board of Virginia University Bd. century. 310 S.E.2d University v. ex rel. West Trustees colleague, Warren My Justice former *9 741, 118, 125, S.E.2d 748 Graf, 516 205 W.Va. actually McGraw, has state “[T]he noted (1998) (Starcher, J., dissenting). to NOT want perverse incentive large claim facing a English coverage when rooted in Sovereign is goals of risk to the runs counter King ‘the can do premise [which] “the under law Board, 743, 310 172 Regents, in-depth these contradic- discussion of 1. For an 1210-16; tions, 675, Stan. L.Rev. at see also see 53 682-87 S.E.2d Pittsburgh v. West Elevator 276 spreading protection catastrophic spread damages from costs it inflict-

loss_” Ayersman citizen, private v. Division Environ- ed—rather than a who is left Protection, 544, 548, mental 542 remedy. Chemerinsky argues, As 58, (McGraw, J., concur- spread injuries better to “[I]t is the costs of ring). government illegal among from actions citizenry wronged entire than to make the case, High- In the instant the Division of individual bear the entire loss.” Id. at 1217. (“DOH”) ways argues that because its em- ployee, present in “inspec- Mr. an The should issue whether insurance capacity Blessing fatally tion” available, is but whether the State breached injured, the National Union is not duty Yes, damages. taxpay- its and caused applicable, and the suit is barred sover- impact damage judg- ers feel the eign immunity. argu- The DOH is therefore treasury, ments on the state and when tax- ing that it does not have insurance cover- payers impact, they feel that will demand contrary to “a normal insured —which government. better behavior their The party who wants maximum in an greater government ultimate result will be accident-” Id. at 542 S.E.2d at 62 accountability. (McGraw, J., concurring). Under the DOH’s Still, I concur'. theory, injured party is afforded abso- lutely opportunity her have case decid-

ed on the merits. prospect actuality

“The damages creating

can be crucial in an incentive for the

government comply with the law.”

Chemerinsky, 53 Stan.L.Rev. at 1214. With- liability, out fear of the State has little incen- actions, tive to be careful in its because Virginia, STATE of West Plaintiff injuries resulting perform from a failure to Below, Appellee, its are of consequence. duties no financial principal justification A for the doctrine of sovereign immunity protec said to be STAMM, David Gabriel Defendant tion of the financial structure of the State. Below, Appellant. Elevator, Pittsburgh No. 33505. article, S.E.2d at 688. In his Professor Chemerinsky justification. addresses this Supreme Appeals Court of Stan. (Quoting L.Rev. 1216-17. Virginia. Maine, 706, 749, Alden v. 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. (1999)), 144 L.Ed.2d 636 he discusses April Submitted Supreme how the United States Court has May Decided viewed the doctrine of as protecting thrust, “being the State from will,

federal fiat and its into the debtor, subject status disfavored

power private levy citizens to on its trea

sury perhaps government buildings even property which the State administers public’s behalf.” 53 Stan.L.Rev. added).

(emphasis among

But us could who ever view negligent

debtor as a result of one’s own acts through “favorable”? When the State its individual, negligence injured

own has it is

precisely position the State that in a better

Case Details

Case Name: Blessing v. National Engineering & Contracting Co.
Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 17, 2008
Citation: 664 S.E.2d 152
Docket Number: 33433
Court Abbreviation: W. Va.
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