87 Neb. 716 | Neb. | 1910
The defendant sold a quantity of grain and made and signed a written memorandum of sale, in which “Blenkiron Grain Go.” was named as the purchaser. The contract was delivered to this plaintiff. Afterwards the defendant refused to deliver the grain, and the plaintiff brought this action on the contract. There was a general demurrer to the petition, which was sustained, and the cause dismissed. The plaintiff has appealed.
In the petition the plaintiff alleges that the defendant sold and agreed to deliver to the plaintiff 2,500 bushels of oats, which was agreed upon between the parties, and that a memorandum of sale was reduced to writing and signed by the defendant, “and is now in words and figures follow
Some preliminary questions are presented, but the principal question discussed in the briefs is whether the said change of the name of the purchaser without the knowledge or consent of the maker of the instrument would relieve the defendant from liability thereon. There is an interesting statement of the origin and development of the laAV in regard to alterations of Avritten instruments in a note under Woodworth v. Bank of America, 10 Am. Sec. 239, 267 (19 Johns. (N. Y.) *391), long regarded as a hading case. In that note-immaterial alterations are deined 1o be “such merely verbal changes as do not vary the ton-
The case of Arnold, Barbour & Hartshorn v. Jones, supra, is very similar to the one at bar. In that case the plaintiffs were doing business in both names, and, after the note had been given in which the payee was named as the Providence Steam Pipe & Gas Company, the note was changed by drawing a line through that name and writing over it the name of the payee as Arnold, Barbour & Hartshorn. This was. held not to release the surety on the note, who had not consented to such change. The court discusses the general question somewhat at length and announces a very strict rule avoiding instruments generally on account of alterations, but holds that the case then being considered was not within the rule. The court said: “The plaintiffs were the persons who composed this firm, and they carried on the business of dealing in steam and gas pipes, and no other business, as well in the name of ‘Arnold, Barbour & Hartshorn,’ as in the name of the ‘Providence Steam Pipe & Gas Company,’ and this note was given for a debt due to this firm. * * * This state of facts shows that the defendant intended to give this note and become liable to whomever might compose this firm; that this note itself did not designate, nor was it evidence of, the names of the persons who composed this firm. The defendant’s liability did not therefore depend wholly upon the evidence which this note afforded,
In Barnes v. Van Keuren & Floyd, 31 Neb. 165, this court said: “It is not every alteration of a promissory note that will discharge the maker. To have that effect the change must be a material one, something either of advantage or detriment to the promisor.” In that case the name of a surety was added to the promissory note after it was delivered, without the knowledge or consent of the maker, and it was held that such an alteration will not discharge the maker. In Fisherdick v. Hutton, 44 Neb. 122, it is said: “If the change is immaterial, or unimportant — that is, one which does not vary the legal effect of the document, or change its terms and conditions — it will be disregarded.”
If the allegations of the petition are true, and they must be so regarded when tested by a general demurrer, we do not see that this alteration in any way affected the liability of the maker of the instrument. It is alleged that the grain was in fact sold to the corporation, plaintiff in this case; that it was so-understood and intended by both of the parties. The principal part of the name was unchanged. After the name of this corporation had been changed from “Blenkiron Grain Co.” to “Blenkiron Bros., Inc.,” there was no such legal person as “Blenkiron Grain Co.” To 'that extent then the name might be regarded as fictitious, and without doubt when a fictitious name is inserted as promisee in a contract, with the knowledge of both parties, and the contract is so delivered and received as the contract of the parties, to insert the true name would not be a material alteration.
Reversed.