The division of unemployment assistance (division)
1. Background. From March 1, 1988, until his discharge on October 18, 2002, the plaintiff, Leon Bleich, was employed by Maimonides as a tuition and scholarship administrator. Following his discharge, the plaintiff filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which the division denied. The plaintiff appealed to the division’s hearings department. After a hearing, a review examiner determined that the plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment benefits because the wages he earned from Maimonides were exempt from taxation pursuant to G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r).
The plaintiff sought judicial review of the board’s determination pursuant to G. L. c. 151 A, § 42.
2. Facts. We first describe Maimonides, supplementing as necessary the findings of the review examiner with the unchallenged evidence before him. The review examiner found, and the record supports, the following:
“[Maimonides] was incorporated in 1938 for the purpose of maintaining a place of worship according to the Orthodox Hebrew rite, the instruction of Jewish youth in the [tenets] of the Jewish religion and, among other things, to maintain and operate a school for the dissemination and teaching of Hebrew religious and literary works based upon Orthodox traditional Judaism together with English secular education in co-ordination with and under the supervision of the public school authorities and covering all subjects taught in the elementary and high school grades of our public schools.”
Maimonides is governed by a board of directors who are appointed by members of the Maimonides corporation, described by the executive vice-president of Maimonides, Leora Joseph, as a small “self-perpetuating group” that acts as the school’s “overseers.” The board of directors, in turn, appoints a “school
Maimonides employs approximately 120 people full time and twenty part time. It does not make contributions to the Federal or State unemployment systems, in accordance with Federal and State determinations to that effect.
3. Discussion. In 1935, responding to widespread unemployment, Congress established a cooperative Federal-State program to provide benefits to unemployed workers. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,
Under G. L. c. 151 A, employers
The issue in this case is whether the division properly determined that the services provided by the plaintiff to Maimonides fall within the employment exclusion of G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r),
The plaintiff maintains that Maimonides does not qualify for exemption under the statute because the school is not a “church” as contemplated by the first prong of G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r). See note 11, supra. As to the second prong of G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r), the plaintiff concedes that Maimonides is “operated primarily for religious purposes,” but argues that
For its part, Maimonides agrees that, as to the second prong of G. L. c. 151A, § 6 (r), it operates “primarily for religious purposes.” But in the District Court and again on appeal it submits that it is not “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches,” interpreting that aspect of the statute narrowly to apply only to “hierarchically controlled” schools such as those operating under the authority of the Roman Catholic Church.
Because the plaintiff and Maimonides agree, and as the review examiner found, Maimonides satisfies the “primary purpose” component of that statute, the crucial issue in this case is whether Maimonides is “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” G. L. c. 151A, § 6 (r). See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1)(B). We have twice interpreted G. L. c. 151A, § 6 (r), as it applies to services performed for an employer operating “primarily for religious purposes” when the employer has a legal identity separate from a “church or convention or association of churches.” In both cases we concluded that the employer was exempt from unemployment contributions because the entity was “controlled” by a church. See Kendall v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec.,
Whether an entity is “operated,” “supervised,” “controlled,” or “principally supported” by a church is an inquiry concerning “four alternative statutory requirements” (emphasis added). Kendall v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., supra at 736. We reject the plaintiffs implicit suggestion that to qualify as an exempt employer, a separately incorporated religious institution must be “operated,” “supervised,” or “controlled,” by a church. As the division correctly points out, the Legislature provided that an organization operated primarily for religious purposes may qualify for exemption if it is merely “principally supported” by a “church or convention or association of churches.”
We recognize that Maimonides is largely self-governing. But the school is grounded in the Jewish religion and derives substantial support from area synagogues and other Jewish organizations. “Support,” as used in G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r), is not limited to financial support. Cf. Nampa Christian Schs. Found., Inc. v. State Dep’t of Employment,
For all of these reasons, the division correctly determined that Maimonides is exempt from the State unemployment tax as an organization “operated primarily for religious purposes” that
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The division, currently within the Department of Workforce Development, see G. L. c. 6A, § 16G (e), inserted by St. 2003, c. 26, § 550, was formerly within the Executive Office of Economic Affairs and was known as the Department of Employment and Training and the division of employment security, see St. 1990, c. 177, § 247.
From 1938 until 1953, the Maimonides School was known as the Mai
The review examiner concluded that Maimonides satisfied the requirements of G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r), because the plaintiff was employed by a “church or convention or association of churches” (the first prong) or because Maimonides is operated “primarily for religious purposes” and is “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported” by, in the words of the examiner, a “church community” (the second prong). He noted that, “[although there is no hierarchical Jewish Church, the school was founded by Orthodox Jews to further the [tenets] of Orthodox Judaism, and these people, including the people who continu[e] to run the school, are a ‘church community’ as contemplated by the Law.”
General Laws c. 151 A, § 42, provides for judicial review of any proceeding before the board of review (board) under G. L. c. 30A.
The mission statement of Maimonides, which was submitted in evidence, states that the school’s mission is to “produce religiously observant, educated Jews who will remain faithful to their religious beliefs, values, and practices as they take their place as contributing members of the general society.”
In 1951 the United States Treasury Department issued a determination exempting Maimonides from Federal income tax because the school is “organized and operated exclusively for religious and educational purposes.” In 1981, the division issued a “redetermination” to the effect that Maimonides is not required to make payments to the Commonwealth’s unemployment fund, and services of Maimonides employees are exempt under G. L. c. 151A, § 6 (r).
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. § 3301-3311 (2000), was originally enacted as Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935.
Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a), the United States Secretary of Labor approves State laws that conform to the requirements of FUTA, and certifies on a yearly basis that such laws remain in conformance. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(c). To retain Federal approval, State programs must “ ‘cover’ certain broad categories of employment,” as provided in 26 U.S.C. §§ 3304 and 3309, California v. Grace Brethren Church,
General Laws c. 151 A, § 8, describes employers who are subject to the provisions of the chapter.
General Laws c. 151 A, § 6 (r), excludes from the definition of “employment" any “[s]ervice performed in the employ of a church or convention or association of churches, or an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches” (emphasis added).
With one exception, G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r), mirrors its Federal counterpart, 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1), which excludes services performed for certain religious organizations from mandatory unemployment insurance coverage. A 1997 amendment to FUTA established an additional exemption for service performed for “an elementary or secondary school which is operated for primarily religious purposes, which is described in [§] 501(c)(3), and which is exempt from tax under [§] 501(a).” 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1)(C).
Maimonides claims that it is exempt under the statute because it is a “church,” satisfying the first prong of G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r). It points to its articles of organization, which provide that the purposes of Maimonides are in part to “maintain a place of worship, according to the Orthodox Hebrew rite,” adding that there is a synagogue on the premises where “a rabbi leads daily worship services for the faculty and students as well as members of the community.” Concerning religious schools, the United States Supreme Court has construed service performed “in the employ of . . .a church or convention or association of churches” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1)(A), the Federal counterpart of the first prong of G. L. c. 151A, § 6 (r), to include only “schools that have no legal identity separate from a church” (emphasis added). St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,
Maimonides also challenges the constitutionality of G. L. c. 151 A, § 6(r), arguing that the statute favors hierarchically organized religions and therefore violates the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as various provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. We need not reach the question because we affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that the board correctly interpreted the statute in ruling that Maimonides does in fact qualify for exemption under G. L. c. 151 A, § 6 (r). See Commonwealth v. Bartlett,
In Director of the Div. of Employment Sec. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield,
We construe the term “church” to include synagogues or other non-Christian organized religious bodies. Cf. Gorodetzer v. Kraft,