3 Paige Ch. 246 | New York Court of Chancery | 1831
The cases referred to by the counsel for the defendants, on the argument, establish the principle, that upon a deed inter partes, a stranger cannot at law avail himself of a stipulation in his favor. Neither can the release of such stranger be pleaded in bar to an action of debt or covenant brought by the party with whom the agreement was made. (Scudamore v. Vandenstene, 2 Coke’s Inst. 673. Gilby v. Copley, 3 Lev. 138. Storer v. Gordon, 3 Maule & Sel. 308. Barford v. Stuckey, 5 Moore's Rep. 23.) It will be found upon examination, however, that this is a mere technical rule. And in Barford v. Stuckey, Dallas, Ch. J. says, in express terms, that the person with whom the contract was made might have been compelled by a court of equity to sue for the benefit of the party in whose favor the stipulation was made. It is every day’s practice in this court to give effect to such stipulations in marriage settlements, and other conveyances in trust, upon the application of the persons in whose favor the stipulation is made; although such persons are not parties to the deed. And even at law, upon an agreement riot under seal, a third person may maintain the equitable action of assumpsit upon a stipulation for his benefit, contained in a contract between other parties. (Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 John. Rep. 139. Sprat v. Agar, 2 Siderf. 115. Dutton v. Pool, T. Raym. Rep. 302. Starkey v. Mill, Style’s Rep. 296.)
It is not necessary to determine, in this stage of the suit, whether there can be any decree against the wife, in relation to the income of the bank stock ; or whether that income would belong to Mrs. Bleeker, on the death of Mrs. Bingham, if the latter, in her discretion, should think proper to retain it until that time. The allegation in the bill is that the husband, in violation of the stipulation in the trust deed, has received the dividends himself, and has refused to permit his wife to pay them over to the complainants. In other words, "that he has controlled her volition; and has not permitted her to apply the dividends, to the use of Mrs. Bleeker, according to her own discretion. If the agreement is valid, the court may at least require the husband to place the dividends in the hands of the wife, so that she may apply them to the use of the complainants in such way as in her discretion she may deem proper. And if she thinks proper °to have them paid over absolutely, the husband should be required to pay them accordingly.
If the complainants have an interest which this court can protect, it was not necessary for them to join the wife, as a complainant, in the bill against her husband. Her legal and
For these reasons I think the complainants are entitled to an answer. The demurrer must therefore be overruled, with eosts.