Bleecker Street Health & Beauty Aids, Inc. v. Granite State InsuranceBleecker Street Health & Beauty Aids, Inc. v. Granite State Insurance
In this action by a proposed insured against its insurer for breach of contract in disclaiming coverage for a loss resulting from a fire that began in an upstairs restaurant, plaintiff misrepresented on its application that there was no such establishment in the building utilizing a deep fryer. The insurer demonstrated that this misrepresentation was material by submitting an appropriate affidavit from its underwriter, along with a description of its computer system’s handling of applications and excerpts from its underwriting guidelines (see Chester v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 290 AD2d 317 [2002]). Although the guidelines stated only that the type of hazard at issue is “to be considered” rather than coverage being denied in such instance, and the insurer’s computer logic system would not have automatically denied the application but would merely have triggered review by an underwriter (cf. Iacovangelo v Allstate Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 300 AD2d 1132, 1133 [2002]), the underwriter herself averred—not as a mere conclusion, but as an invariable fact based upon her experience (cf. Carpinone v Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 265 AD2d 752, 755 [1999]; Alaz Sportswear v Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 AD2d 357, 358 [1993])—that the insurer’s internal unit considering the matter “always” denied an application if there was a deep fryer or restaurant above the premises of the proposed insured. While an answer to an ambiguous question on an insurance application cannot be the basis for a claim of misrepresentation (see Garcia v American Gen. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 264 AD2d 808, 809 [1999]), we find that the instant application was not ambiguous. Moreover, as the motion court aptly discerned, if plaintiff’s president, when he signed the application, saw only the signature page, as he testified, he could not have been misled by any unclear language.
Although the motion court initially dismissed third-party plaintiff Principe’s claim for indemnification, it should have recognized that the negligence and breach of contract causes of
In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to address Sterling’s contentions regarding proximate causation. Concur—Tom, J.P., Sullivan, Williams, Buckley and Kavanagh, JJ.