OPINION
Pamela Denise Bledsoe appeals her conviction of delivery of less than 28 grams of cocaine, enhanced by a prior felony conviction. Upon the jury’s finding of guilt, Appellant entered a plea of true to the enhancement paragraph. The jury found the enhancement paragraph trae and assessed punishment at imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, for a term of twenty-three years. Appеllant challenges her conviction by four points of error. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
ABSENCE OF APPELLANT DURING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION
In Point of Error No. Two, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in conducting voir dire and jury selection in her absence. Admitting that Appellant did not attend trial until after the jury was sworn, the State concedes that conducting voir dire in her absence was error. It argues, however, that the error is harmless. We agree that Article 33.03 error was committed, but we аre unable to conclude that it is harmless.
Under Article 33.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant must be present during all voir dire proceedings.
1
Lawton v. State,
The focus of the “reasonably substantial relationship” test differs from that of Rule 81(b)(2) in that the former seeks to determine the effect of the defendant’s absence on the advancement of her defense, while Rule 81(b)(2) seeks to determine the effeсt of the defendant’s absence on the outcome of the guilt/innocence or punishment proceedings.
Adanandus,
The State argues that Appellant did not show actual harm caused by her absence during voir dire and jury selection because she did not raise this issue in a motion for new trial. We do not agree that thе “reasonably substantial relationship” requires a showing of actual harm particularly since the test is stated in terms of the opportunity to defend. Moreover, it would bе nearly impossible for a defendant to demonstrate actual harm arising from her absence during voir dire and jury selection without engaging in a reenaсtment of the entire proceeding. Consequently, we will not limit our harm analysis under the “reasonably substantial relationship” test by requiring Appellant to show aсtual harm.
We find that Appellant’s presence during voir dire and jury selection bears a reasonably substantial relationship to the opportunity to defend for several reasons. First, voir dire is the only opportunity for the venire to view Appellant for the purpose of discovering whether any of them were acquainted with her. Here, the venire was simply given Appellant’s name without any further description and asked whether any of them knew her. While one of the venire-members recognized her by name, there may have been others who would recognize her only upon sight. Examining the flip side of this coin, voir dire also presents an opportunity for Appellant to view the venire face-to-face to determine whether she knew any of the veniremеmbers and whether any of them possessed a bias either for or against her. While counsel can expose some biases by asking pertinent questions, оthers may not be exposed without Appellant’s assistance in observing the panel. For example, one of the veniremembers indicated during the prosecutor’s voir dire that she knew Appellant. She stated that she was not friends with Appellant, but simply “knew of’ her from high school, and that there was nothing abоut the relationship that would cause her to be biased either for or against Appellant. Here, counsel was required to decide whether or nоt to further question the potential juror about this relationship and whether to exercise a peremptory challenge without any input from Appеllant regarding the prior relationship. Third, a defendant may assist counsel during voir dire by watching the reactions of the veniremembers to counsel for both рarties. When an attorney is engaged in questioning one member of the panel, (s)he may be unable to observe or measure the reactions of оther members. Due to her absence, Appellant was unable to provide this assistance to her counsel. Finally, Appellant’s absence deрrived her of the opportunity to not only observe voir dire, but to actually participate in any aspect of jury selection.
Having concluded that Appellant’s presence during voir dire and jury selection bears a reasonably substantial relationship to the opportunity to defend, we сannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that her exclusion from this process did not contribute to her conviction or punishment. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). Point of Error No. Two is sustained. 3 Appellant’s conviction is reversed and this cause is remanded for a new trial.
Notes
. In all prosecutions for felonies, the dеfendant must be personally present at the trial, and [she] must likewise be present in all cases of misdemeanor when the punishment or any part thereof is imprisonment in jail; provided, however, that in all cases, when the defendant voluntarily absents [herself] after pleading to the indictment or information, or аfter the jury has been selected when trial is before a jury, the trial may proceed to its conclusion. When the record in the appellate сourt shows that the defendant was present at the commencement, or any portion of the trial, it shall be presumed in the absence of all evidеnce in the record to the contrary that [she] was present during the whole trial. Provided, however, that the presence of the defendant shall not bе required at the hearing on the motion for new trial in any misdemeanor case. Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 33.03 (Vernon 1989).
. The State asserts throughout its brief that Appellant’s absence during voir dire and jury selection was voluntary. Under Article 33.03, it is irrelevant whether Appellant’s absence was voluntary or due to some reаson beyond her control since her absence occurred prior to the jury being selected. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 33.03 (Vernon 1989). Nevertheless, in the intеrest of accuracy, we note that the record does not reflect the reason for Appellant’s absence during this portion of the trial. In thе face of a silent record, we will not assume that her absence was voluntary.
. Given our resolution of this point of error, it is unnecessary to address the remaining contentions.