Karen BLEDSOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 04-4531.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Jan. 31, 2006.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s judgment is AFFIRMED.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, concurs in the judgment.
argument, however, the Grocers’ attorney declined to claim that the record supplies any specific example of Kroger‘s operating a store within one mile of any of the plaintiffs, in violation of the Foodland one mile no-compete policy. The Grocers’ attorney pointed to the deposition of Foodland executive David Barens but he did not assert that this deposition names any specific store that Kroger has operated within one mile of any of the plaintiffs. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 35:14-26 (audio recording). In fact, Mr. Barens’ deposition in pertinent part names no such store. See JA 1562-63. It follows that this totally unsubstantiated element of the Grocers’ argument is ineffective to create a genuine issue of material fact and warrants no further attention.
Mary Thorson, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MARTIN, NELSON, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge.
Ms. Bledsoe has a number of impairments, but she has not presented evidence that those impairments rise to the level necessary to be disabled. The administrative law judge‘s factual findings and denial of benefits are supported by substantial evidence and are procedurally proper. The court therefore affirms the district court‘s judgment upholding the decision of the administrative law judge to deny social security disability insurance benefits.
I.
Bledsoe was born on April 20, 1958. She has a ninth grade education. Bledsoe has had various skilled and unskilled jobs as a cashier, small parts assembler, and mental health aide. She testified that she stopped working in 2000 because of asthma, pulmonary disease, tarsal and carpel tunnel syndrome, anxiety and depression. Bledsoe‘s obesity is an overarching factor in her disability claim. She is “5‘4” ” and weighed 241 pounds when she filed for disability insurance. Her ideal body weight is 125 pounds. In various medical reports she is referred to as “extremely obese” and “morbidly obese.”
Bledsoe‘s claim for disability rests on the argument that the combination of her impairments qualify her as disabled; she does not claim that she has one particular impairment that makes her disabled. Bledsoe‘s impairments include: asthma exacerbated by pneumonia, depressive neurosis, obesity, hypertension, respiratory condition (wheezing and shortness of breath), headaches, post-surgical carpel tunnel syndrome, a lesion on her right thorax, generalized anxiety and depressive disorders, panic attacks, foot pain, tarsal tunnel syndrome, mild nerve entrapment at the right ankle diagnosed in 1996, and lasting effects from a 1996 auto accident in which she suffered a lacerated spleen and renal contusion.
Bledsoe‘s myriad of impairments do not stop her from engaging in normal activities. She drives, cooks, reads, makes her bed, washes dishes, does laundry, attends church, watches television, goes grocery shopping weekly, and cares for her grandchildren. She was articulate during her testimony before the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ“).
Procedural History:
Bledsoe‘s initial application of September 1, 2000 was denied initially and on reconsideration. The Commissioner determined that Bledsoe was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act,
II.
This court reviews whether the ALJ‘s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ employed proper legal standards in reaching his conclusion. Brainard v. Sec‘y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). “The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive....”
III.
None of Bledsoe‘s arguments have merit. Most of Bledsoe‘s argument is procedural. To the extent Bledsoe argues that the ALJ‘s findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the testimony of Dr. Long, Dr. Hughes and Bledsoe‘s own testimony of her daily activities are substantial evidence to support the ALJ‘s finding that Bledsoe is not disabled.
Bledsoe‘s argument throughout her brief is that the proper procedure for weighing and considering evidence was not followed. Thus, even if the outcome is supported by substantial evidence the defects in the procedure warrant remand. Because the ALJ did follow proper procedures in coming to his decision, the court affirms the ALJ‘s decision to deny benefits.
Eligibility for disability benefits is determined by a five step process as outlined in
Steps One and Two: Claimant has a severe impairment and is not working
The ALJ‘s findings on steps one and two are favorable to Bledsoe. Bledsoe passed step one because she was not working when she applied for social security. Bledsoe passed step two because she has a severe impairment. Bledsoe‘s severe impairments include asthma, emphysema, and tarsal tunnel syndrome (entrapment of the tibial nerve, which follows the back of the leg to the ankle).
Step Three: Claimant‘s impairment is not a listed impairment
The ALJ did not err procedurally in determining that Bledsoe was not disabled under step three. Step three requires the ALJ to consider whether Bledsoe‘s impairments equal the level of severity of an impairment described in
Bledsoe does not argue that she has one particular impairment that falls into the class of “listed impairments.” Rather, Bledsoe argues that the ALJ should have, but did not, consider whether all of her various impairments viewed together equaled a “listed impairment.” This argument is without merit because the ALJ explicitly stated in his factual findings that he considered the combination of all impairments.
The ALJ did not procedurally err because he did look at the combination of all Bledsoe‘s impairments to determine if Bledsoe was disabled. The ALJ made a finding that “the medical evidence establishes that the claimant has ‘severe’ im-
The ALJ did not err by not spelling out every consideration that went into the step three determination. The language of
Bledsoe‘s argument that the ALJ should spell out the weight he gave to each factor in his step three analysis is not supported by case law. Requiring a heightened articulation standard would be inconsistent with this court‘s rulings. In a case that turned on step three analysis, where the disability claimant had multiple medical problems, this court noted, “the ALJ‘s findings of fact should not be disturbed unless we are persuaded that his findings are legally insufficient.” Dorton v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1986). Dorton supports the proposition that there is no heightened articulation standard where the ALJ‘s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Id. In the instant case the ALJ‘s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. The plain language of the ALJ‘s opinion states that he considered all impairments. The ALJ thus considered all evidence as required by the regulation.
More specifically, the ALJ did not confine his analysis to severe impairments. Bledsoe argues that the ALJ looked only at asthma, emphysema, tarsal tunnel syndrome, anxiety and depression when determining that Bledsoe did not have a “listed impairment.” Bledsoe notes that the ALJ should have considered the totality of impairments to see whether the combination of all impairments rose the level of a severe impairment. See
Bledsoe makes one final, unavailing, procedural argument—that the ALJ improperly analyzed her obesity. Bledsoe contends that the ALJ committed a procedural error by failing to follow the procedure outlined in Social Security Ruling 02-01p. Social Security Ruling 02-01p does not mandate a particular mode of analysis.
Thus, the ALJ did not err at step three.
Step 4: Claimant can work at her old job
The ALJ‘s finding that Bledsoe could perform her past work as an assembler is supported by substantial evidence and is procedurally proper. At step four, the ALJ must assess whether Bledsoe could work in any of her previous occupations.
Bledsoe contends the opinion of Dr. Lin should be given controlling weight because Dr. Lin is a treating physician. The ALJ must give specific reasons for not affording such weight to Dr. Lin‘s opinion.
The ALJ did consider Bledsoe‘s obesity. First, the ALJ made explicit mention of Bledsoe‘s obesity in his finding of facts. Second, the ALJ does not need to make specific mention of obesity if he credits an expert‘s report that considers obesity. See, e.g., Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating “although the ALJ did not explicitly consider [claimant‘s] obesity, it was factored indirectly into the ALJ‘s decision as a part of the doctors’ opinions.“). Drs. Long and Hughes considered Bledsoe‘s obesity. JA 270 (note, in the caption, “alleged impairment: obesity“). Thus, the ALJ‘s opinion shows that he considered Bledsoe‘s obesity.
Because substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ‘s finding that Bledsoe can work as a small parts assembler, she is not disabled. Thus, the ALJ properly denied benefits at step four.
IV.
The district court judgment upholding the commissioner‘s denial of disability benefits is AFFIRMED.